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Disclaimer 
 
This study has been carried out with the financial support of the Commission of the European 
Communities Sixth Framework Program, project N° 022686 “Comparative Evaluations of 
Innovative Solutions in European Fisheries Management,” CEVIS. It does not necessary reflect the 
Commission’s views and in no way anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area. 
 
Foreword 
The aim of Comparative Evaluations of Innovative Soluti ns in European Fisheries Management 
(CEVIS) is to evaluate fisheries management innovati ns from four different perspectives: 
biological robustness, cost efficiency of management, conomic robustness and social robustness. 
This report presents the analytical framework for studying social robustness and the empirical 
testing of this framework in four case studies: Baltic Sea, Faroe Islands, North Sea, and Western 
Shelf. 
This report is based on the work of Work Package 6 (WP6). The aim of WP6 is to evaluate the 
social robustness of innovative approaches for European fisheries management, such as: 
participatory governance, rights-based management (RBM), and effort-based management in the 
four case study areas.  
We understand social robustness to be a combination of three factors that allow a management 
regime to adapt to a broad range of potential ecological, economic and political situations. These 
three factors are: 1) the acceptance of the regime by stakeholders; 2) the capacity for institutional 
learning in the regime and 3) the innovations’ lega conformity to the existing legal context. 
Stakeholder acceptance depends on how stakeholders perceive and respond to management. 
Institutional learning is the process in which institutions change in reaction to internal pressures 
(e.g. of those holding and managing fishing rights) or external changes in ecosystem and socio-
economic contexts (e.g. pressures by non-rights holding stakeholder or administrators). 
Understanding legal conformity requires us to analyze how well management innovations reflect 
and implement relevant EU and international law with respect to fisheries, the environment, trade, 
competition and state-aid. This report only focuses on the first two aspects of social robustness: 
stakeholders acceptance and institutional leaning1.  
The case studies were carried out using two different sources of information: literature review 
(scientific as well as grey literature), and field research and interviews. The first source involved 
reviewing existing literature on the management innovations focusing on our four case study areas. 
The second, and most important, source of information was from interviews of stakeholders as 
diverse as fishermen, conservationists, scientists and managers. The people interviewed expressed 
their views from a variety of academic and professional perspectives. Through their narratives, they 
identified which decisions and circumstances they found to be beneficial, and which detrimental to 
their fisheries systems.  
                                                
1 The aspects of legal conformity are presented in Deliverable 15 of CEVIS: A Legal Policy Brief for Fisheries 
Management. 
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The partners in the WP6 are grateful to the European Commission and to all institutions and 
individuals in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Wstern Shelf, and the Faroe Islands who have 
devoted their time and expertise to help us with our endeavours. 
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1.0. Introduction 
What is successful fisheries management and what is not? This question relates to the purpose of 
fisheries management. Is it to ensure stock abundance; or rather to make certain that fisheries 
produce the maximum economic yield for the lowest management costs? Or is the purpose to 
advance systems that are seen as fair, and which provide stability in the local areas dependent on 
fisheries?  
In CEVIS, we have evaluated fisheries management regimes and innovations both within Europe 
and abroad with regard to four management objectives: biological robustness, economic efficiency, 
cost effectiveness of management, and social robustnes . These studies have shown that trade-offs 
often occur between management objectives—a management regime/innovation can be successful 
in some respects while ignoring others. Yet in order for a regime to be sustainable over time, the 
regime probably needs to address and be considered robust in all four management objectives at 
some level. 
In this report, we focus on the social robustness of four case studies. Before presenting these, a 
conceptual framework is needed: What does it mean th t a management innovation/regime is 
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socially robust? How can you say whether a management system is socially robust or not? How can 
you measure social robustness? First of all; we understand social robustness to be a combination of 
three factors that allow a management regime to adapt to a broad range of potential ecological, 
economic and political situations. These three factors are: 1) the acceptance of the regime by 
stakeholders; 2) the institutional learning of the regime; and 3) the innovations’ legal conformity to 
the existing legal context. Stakeholders’ acceptance involves how stakeholders perceive and 
respond to management. Institutional learning is the process in which institutions change in reaction 
to internal pressures or external changes in the ecosystem or socio-economic contexts. These three 
factors were chosen based on the earlier work of CEVIS (Aranda, 2007) in USA (Alaska), Canada, 
Iceland, and New Zealand.  
1) Stakeholder acceptance is important as fisheries management does not always work according to 
the intentions of policy and decision-makers. When managers implement fisheries regulations, 
fishermen may change behavior and adapt to the new conditions. This can lead to a discrepancy 
between policy goals and resulting practice. Regarding both democratic legitimacy and 
efficacy/performance, the success of a fisheries management regime depends, to some extent, on 
how it is perceived by stakeholders. Stakeholders do not only provide legitimacy, knowledge and 
implementation capacities, but they can also obstruct new innovations that they do not support. 
2) Institutional learning. The success of management innovations also depend on the institutional 
learning that takes place in the system. Institutional learning is the process in which institutions 
change in reaction to internal pressures (e.g. of th se holding and managing fishing rights) or 
external changes in ecosystems and socio-economic context (e.g. pressures by non-rights holding 
stakeholders or administrators).  
3) Innovations in fisheries management also need to conform to relevant international and EU law; 
otherwise they are susceptible to legal challenges and are unlikely to persist. Especially under EU 
law, a broad range of legal questions surround fisher es management, relating to the free movement 
of goods, persons and capital, competition and state aid rules, and the Common Fisheries Policy 
CFP itself. Such legal questions include aspects of fi heries law, environmental, trade, subsidies and 
competition regulation, as well as community policies, such as non-discrimination laws. 
Understanding legal conformity requires us to analyze how well the management innovations 
reflect and implement relevant EU and international law with respect to fisheries, the environment, 
trade, competition and state-aid.  
This report presents four case studies, which have evaluated the social robustness of fisheries 
management innovations. The four case studies are: 1) the closed areas and division of cod stock in 
the Baltic Sea; 2) the fishing-days system on the Faroe Islands; 3) the Dutch co-management system 
of Biesheuvel and the UK Producer Organisations (POs); both operating in the North Sea; and 4) 
the fishing rights of the Basque industrial fleet in the North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention 
(NEAFC) grounds, and the territorial rights of the Basque Cofradias in the Western Shelf. These 
innovations present different, and, most often, multiple and varied aspects of RBM, effort-based 
management, and participatory governance.  
Based on the work of earlier CEVIS studies, (Aranda, 2007) in USA (Alaska), Canada, Iceland, and 
New Zealand, five hypotheses on the relationship betwe n management innovation/regime and 
social robustness were developed. 
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1.1. Contents of the report 
Chapter 2 presents the methodological and conceptual framework of the four case studies including 
working definitions of social robustness, stakeholder acceptance, and institutional learning.  
Chapter 3 outlines the fisheries management innovations of each of the case studies.  
Chapter 4 describes the three kinds of management rgimes (RBM including effort-based 
management and participatory governance) with regard to the individual case study. 
Chapter 5 presents the five hypotheses regarding social r bustness and the empirical findings from 
testing each of the case studies. The conclusions are ummed up in Chapter 6. 
Appendix 1 contains the report from the Baltic Sea case study. This case study focused on two 
management innovations designed to cope with the sev re stock depletion and high fishing pressure 
on Baltic cod: (1) closed areas and seasons for cod fisheries; and (2) new split management regimes 
based on division of cod resources among two areas – eastern and western cod stocks. Overall, 
stakeholders perceive the plan to be a complicated top-down-hierarchic system, which makes day-
to-day fishing activities difficult. The innovations have reduced fishing opportunities and have had 
a negative impact upon legitimacy and stakeholder acceptance of regulations in the cod fishery. 
Appendix 2 contains the report from the Faroe Islands case study. The case study focused on the 
‘fishing-days system’ strategy, which was introduced in the mid 1990's. The system is an effort-
based system, which has strong elements of participa ory governance as the fishing industry plays a 
central role in the decision-making processes. The system can also be argued to be rights-based as 
the fishing-days system has many of the qualities as for instance a system for individual transferable 
quotas (ITQ) from an economic and legal perspective. 
Appendix 3 contains the report from the North Sea case study. The report compares two systems of 
co-managed RBM: ITQs in the Netherlands (which were combined in the early 1990s with the 
Biesheuvel co-management system), and the UK’s system of Fixed Quota Allocations (FQA), 
introduced in 1999, in which POs participate in quota management. These two European fisheries 
management regimes have been chosen not only because they combine RBM with co-management, 
but also because the systems seem to converge from different starting points. The Dutch system 
started as a pure ITQ regime, which over time, took n participatory features. The UK system began 
as a co-management system and is developing into a quasi-ITQ system. This contrast enables us to 
compare the two cases with regard to institutional le rning capacity. 
Appendix 4 contains the report from the Western Shelf case study. This case study focused on RBM 
and participation in the industrial Basque fishery and the Basque coastal fishery. The industrial 
fishery targets demersal species in the waters of the NEAFC and is managed through an ITQ 
system. The Basque coastal fishery in the Bay of Biscay employs territorial user rights. Cofradias, 
or fishermen’s guilds, play a key role in the management process of coastal fisheries. In both 
Basque sectors, participation is strong and effectiv  even though it is narrow because it only 
involves fishermen.  
Appendix 5 contains the common guidelines made in plenary for the interviews during field 
research. 
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2.0 Methodological and conceptual framework 
2.1. Methodology 
These four case studies were carried out using a common methodological framework that was 
developed in plenary by the participants of the working group. The framework involved a literature 
review and field trips. Firstly, the working group reviewed existing literature including, scientific 
documents, grey literature and press reports relating to social robustness and fisheries management 
in case study areas. This allowed us to set innovations in the context of the overall fisheries system 
and identify key informants who led us to other relevant people and institutions.  
The second, and most important, source of information came from field trips and interviews with 
stakeholders as diverse as fishermen, conservationists, scientists and managers. The aim of the 
interviews was to gather insights on the social robustness of the respective innovations. But in order 
to do so, it was necessary to develop a general understanding of how the system works and of any 
trade-offs in the system. Moreover, the interviews sought to identify day-to-day issues in fisheries 
management, as well as contingency measures undertaken o counteract threats to resource well 
being, such as non-compliant behaviour. The interviews covered two important categories: 1) the 
history and development of the innovations (institutional learning); and 2) the views and opinions 
of fishermen, the wider industry, managers, and civil society stakeholders on the management 
system and compliance with it (stakeholder acceptance). Approaching the issue of stakeholder 
acceptance, we also inquired into changes in costs and benefits for fisheries management operations 
associated with the innovation, what indicators they use to monitor and improve outcomes, what 
they see as the best practices in implementing, monitoring and enforcing the innovations, and 
resulting management measures.  
The interviews were in-depth and open-ended allowing interviewees to express their views and 
relate the story from their variety of academic andprofessional perspectives. Participants were able 
to identify which decisions and circumstances were beneficial and which have been detrimental to 
their fisheries systems. Interviews generally lasted 1½-2 hours. The common interview guidelines 
can be found in Appendix 5, although these were adapte  as appropriate in each case study. 
The field trips took place between the summer of 2007 and early 2008. Prior arrangements were 
made to interview key persons in the field; but, in general, snowball sampling was used to select 
individuals to interview. The goal was to interview 15 key persons each field trip. . However, as 
Table 1 shows, each case study exceeded the goal. 
 
Present job 
Case study 
Civil servants  Researcher  Green Fishermen (or 
representatives) 
Other 
industry or 
intermediate 
organisations2 
Total 
Baltic Sea 2 1 2 20  25 
Faroe Islands  8 6  6 1 21 
North Sea 10 0 2 19 6 37 
Western Shelf  1 1 18  20 
Total 20 8 5 63 7 103 
                                                
2 E.g. industry chambers, industry marketing organisations, fish auctions, quota traders/ vessel agents etc. 
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Table 1: Professional profile of the people interviwed 
2.2. What is social robustness? 
Here we elaborate on the concept of social robustnes  as outlined in the Introduction. For the 
purpose of this report, social robustness of a fisheries management regime is defined by two
dimensions: acceptance of the regime by its stakehold rs, and institutional learning within the 
regime.  
More concretely, stakeholder acceptance of a management regime describes the position that 
fisheries stakeholders take (either in support or opposition) vis-à-vis that management regime. 
Fisheries stakeholders are groups and individuals that have an interest in the decision-making 
process and that are potentially affected by the decisions (Pomeroy and Riviera-Guieb, 2006). Most 
notably, these are: commercial fisheries interests (both primary and secondary interests); fisheries 
management actors, including scientists/advisors, government; and non-commercial interests, such 
as conservationists, recreational fishermen, and communities (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996). 
Stakeholder acceptance may be assessed through analysis of several factors, including: 
compliance/noncompliance with the management regime; th  views expressed by various 
stakeholders; stakeholder participation in management processes; and direct actions taken by the 
stakeholders in favour or against a management regime (e.g. protest, lawsuits). Thus, our approach 
to stakeholder acceptance assumes a link between compliance and acceptance (perceived 
legitimacy) for a management regime (Dietz  al., 2003; Jentoft, 2000). 
By institutional learning we mean the process in which institutions change i reaction to internal 
pressures (e.g. of rights holders or rights managers) or to external changes in the socio-economic 
context (e.g. pressures by non-rights holding stakeholders or administrators) or in the ecosystems 
themselves. A non-teleological process, Institutional learning differs from, but is built on, 
individual learning. It takes place when inferences from individual experiences are interpreted 
within networks and communities (Haas, 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), and encoded 
into organisational routines (Levy, 1994). This type of learning involves the interaction of implicit 
(tacit) and explicit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994). When assessing institutional learning in the context 
of fisheries management regimes, we make two main distinctions. First, on the process level, we 
distinguish between simple learning (‘adaptation’) and complex learning (genuine ‘learning’) (Nye, 
1987)3. Simple learning describes changes in means in order to more effectively achieve given 
goals, while complex learning describes changes in goals. Complex learning includes the more 
fundamental questioning and redefinition of underlying values and ends, the new specification of 
causal relationships, and may even encompass ‘reflexive learning’ as a revision of the very concept 
of problem solving (the ability to learn how to learn). Secondly, at the outcome-level, we 
differentiate between learning processes that address the problem at hand successfully (high 
problem-solving capacity) and learning processes that do not address the problem successfully (low 
problem-solving capacity). 
The dimensions of stakeholder acceptance and institutional learning cover processes at the micro-
level of individual actors (stakeholder acceptance) and at the meso-level of organizations and 
institutions (institutional learning). In the first case, the focus is on behaviour and attitudes (agency) 
                                                
3 Or ‘double-loop’ learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978), ‘meta-level’ learning (Hedberg, 1981), or simply ‘learning’ as 
opposed to ‘adaptation’ (Haas, 1990). 
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of actors, in the second case on the permeation of pre-existing structures with such agency, what 
Giddens referred to as structuration (Giddens, 1984). 
Based on these definitions, a number of hypotheses on ocial robustness were formulated in the 
CEVIS project. The propositions link the dimensions of stakeholder acceptance and institutional 
learning in the context of RBM systems and forms of participatory governance (including co-
management).  
Social robustness  
Stakeholder acceptance Institutional learning 
R
ig
h
ts
-b
as
ed
 m
an
ag
em
en
t (
in
cl
. 
ef
fo
rt
-b
as
ed
 m
an
ag
em
en
t)
 
1. RBM tend not to have broad stakeholder 
representation. 
 
2. Commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of 
a RBM system will be a function of the extent 
to which: a) the management system is 
perceived by the fishermen to be practical 
[and necessary]; b) the management system 
(in RBM: the initial allocation) reproduced the 
status quo of fishing opportunities when 
introduced; c) which new entrants are 
facilitated; d) which retirement options are 
provided for. 
4. RBM systems restrict capacity for 
institutional learning. 
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3.The more diverse stakeholder involvement 
in the development and/ or operation of a 
management system, the lower the acceptance 
of the affected commercial fisheries actors. 
 
5. The more diverse the stakeholders involved in 
the development and/ or operation of a 
management system, the more institutional 
learning takes place. 
Table 2 shows the five hypotheses of social robustnes   
3.0. Fisheries management and their innovations 
3.1. Introduction to the Baltic Sea case study 
The Baltic Sea is the second largest body of semi-enclosed brackish water in the world. Baltic Sea 
fisheries are dominated by three species: cod, herring and sprat. Cod is the most commercially 
important species and there are two populations inhabiting the Baltic Sea, the astern and western 
Baltic cod (Thulin and Andrushaitis, 2003).  
The fisheries are managed under EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and enacted with scientific 
advice from ICES. The nine countries permitted to fish in the Baltic agree on the total allowable 
catch (TAC). Separate TACs for cod in the western and eastern Baltic cod were first tentatively 
proposed in 2004; however the new management regime ca  in place in 2005. The aim with this 
division was to improve management of Baltic cod through more appropriate measures that could 
be applied separately to each stock. A number of technical measures relating to the cod fisheries are 
also enforced in the Baltic Sea. These include minium mesh size, minimum landing size, closed 
areas/seasons (aimed at limiting fishing effort as well as protecting juveniles), and gear specific 
measures to enhance selectivity in the fisheries. In order to enable undisturbed spawning, a regional 
closure of a main spawning area in the Bornholm Deep was implemented and enforced during the 
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main spawning seasons since the mid-1990s. Additionally, since 1995, there has been a seasonal 
closure for cod-directed fisheries in the entire Baltic. From 2005, this seasonal closure 
complemented a year-round area closure for all fisher es in specific areas of the Bornholm Deep, 
the Gotland Basin, and the Gdansk Deep (ICES Advice 2007, Book 8 and Council Regulation No 
1098/2007). Thus, the two ‘management innovations’ u der focus in this case are: 1) closed areas 
and seasons for cod fisheries; and 2) a new management regime based on the division of cod 
resources between the two areas. To analyze the stak holder acceptance and institutional learning 
regarding these innovations, two fishing communities Nexø at the Danish Island Bornholm and 
Simrishamn in Sweden, were selected for this study. These communities are dependent on the cod 
fishery and there is – or at least used to be – a cultural preference for fishing there (Delaney, 2007). 
In the Baltic case, although the stakeholders involved were not diverse, we found evidence of 
institutional learning (e.g. spawning areas, external factors affecting the cod resource, and genetic 
differences between the eastern and western stocks). A lot of learning seems to take place within 
ICES and other ecological research institutes working at the national level. These stakeholders have 
an advisory role and are not involved in decision-making. Institutional learning occurred mainly as 
a result of external changes and new knowledge about the Baltic Sea ecosystem. On the other hand, 
there is a low level of learning about generating trust between stakeholders and authorities, regime 
legitimacy, and regulatory compliance, as well as how to communicate the necessity of different 
management innovations on the local level. 
The Baltic Sea case indicates that low legitimacy of management innovations affects support and 
compliance negatively. The division of the cod stock in particular has had negative impacts on 
legitimacy because of its practical implications for ishing. There are also indications that, even 
with a rule that is perceived as “necessary” among the stakeholders, acceptance and legitimacy may 
be low if the practical implications for day-to-day fishing activities are too severe. The importance 
of protecting spawning and juveniles is unanimously recognized and is highly accepted, but the 
complex management regime with many temporal closures also reduces the legitimacy of this 
innovation. The conclusion from the Baltic case is that even in the absence of diverse stakeholder 
involvement, there can be extensive frustration with complex management processes.  
3.2. Introduction to the Faroe Islands case study 
The Faroe Islands are a group of islands in the Northeast Atlantic with a population of some 47,000. 
The Faroe Islands have been a self-governed territory since 1948. They remain a part of Denmark, 
but not of the EU (Prime Minister’s office, 2007). The Faroe Islands are tremendously economically 
dependent on the fishing and aquaculture industries compared to (almost) any other country in the 
world: 95 percent of Faeroese exports and almost 50 percent of the GDP stem from fisheries and 
fish farming (Gezelius, 2008). Faroese fisheries ar mixed, targeting three main demersal species of 
fish: cod, haddock, and saithe. 
On the Faroe Islands, they have an input-controlled system that focuses on the fishing effort 
(number of fishing days). The fishing-days system of the Faroe Islands shares many qualities of the 
ITQs. The fishing-days system is built on segmentation of the fleet into vessel groups (based on size 
of vessel and gear type). Each of these groups is annually allocated a number of fishing days per 
year and these days are allocated to the individual vessel. The fishing days are tradable within the 
group and, at the end of the year, also between the groups. The fishing-days system is supported by 
a number of technical measures for instance: minimum mesh sizes, gear restrictions, and fleet 
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capacity restrictions. Yet fleet capacity was frequntly discussed in the interviews. Most informants 
agreed that capacity had increased and that the main flaw of the system was the lack of ability to 
measure and compare capacity over time (Jákupsstovu e  al., 2007, Løkkegaard et al., 2004). 
 
Year Management system New situation Institutional le rning 
U
n
til
 1
9
9
4
 Technical measures 
such as area closures 
and regulation of 
mesh sizes 
Capacity was high, cod stock low. 
Overinvestment in the fleet lead to 
collapse of several banks. 
Denmark interfered in Faroese fisheries policy, as DK 
demanded that the Faroe Islands set up a management 
system for their fisheries in return for loans. One can only 
guess what learning would have taken place if this had not 
taken place. 
1
9
9
4-
1
99
6
 ITQ system Political demand from Denmark in return 
for loans that the Faroe Islands should 
set up a management system. A Faroese 
group suggested an ITQ, which was 
adopted 
Given the mixed fisheries on the Faroe Islands and the 
mis-match between the TACs and the actual catches, t y 
abolished the quota system as it had no legitimacy with 
the fishermen. 
1
9
9
6-
 
Fishing-days system Two very strong year classes of cod lead 
to high catch rates and too small quotas. 
Both fishermen and politicians worked to 
change the system. Today a high degree 
of acceptance among all interviewees. 
Since the introduction of the fishing-days system, the 
system has not changed much. The lack of measurement 
of capacity is often mentioned as the key flaw of the 
system; but none of the interviewees saw themselves as 
being the one to open the debate. 
Table 3 shows institutional learning on the Faroe Islands. 
Given that Faroese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is under Faroese jurisdiction, the minister and 
the parliament are powerful when setting the number of fishing days. But they do so in consultation 
with biologists and active fishermen. All people interviewed assessed that the industry had greater 
authority when setting the number of fishing days than the biologists. All participating stakeholders 
are commercial stakeholders. –The commercial fishing industry has particular influence in the 
decision-making processes.  
3.3. Introduction to the North Sea case study 
The North Sea case study looks into two management systems operating in the Netherlands and the 
UK that combine RBM  and participatory governance to form what are, in effect, ‘co-managed 
RBM systems.’ We will focus on the implementation of these fisheries in the plaice and sole 
fisheries prosecuted by mainly Dutch beam trawlers in the southern North Sea and in the mixed 
demersal fisheries for roundfish (mainly cod, haddock and whiting) and roundfish/ Nephrops 
mixtures in the northern North Sea. In both countries, these fisheries are highly relevant in 
economic terms, involve significant segments of the national fleets and are dominated by smaller 
operators. They are managed under the CFP with TACs. These are complemented by technical and 
capacity control measures, including decommissioning programmes, and national enforcement 
regimes. In addition, multi-annual management plans re in place for sole and plaice and a cod 
recovery plan limits days at sea.   
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When it comes to managing the uptake of national quotas, both the Netherlands and the UK are 
operating what we will call, ‘co-managed RBM systems.’ In the Netherlands, a system of Individual 
Quotas (IQs), transferable only with vessels, was introduced in 1976 for plaice and sole. With full 
transferability of IQs allowed in 1985, an ITQ system was created. However, TAC reductions and 
national overcapacity (Davidse, 2001) fostered non-c mpliance, continuous overshooting of the 
Dutch quota and worsening state-industry relations in the 1980s (van Ginkel, 2005). In order to 
improve the situation, responsibility for quota management was devolved to industry groups in the 
late 1980s and, more systematically, in 1993 (Dubbink and van Vliet, 1997; Hoefnagel, 2005). The 
nine, so-called ‘Biesheuvel groups,’ ensure compliance with the group quota and manage quota 
transfers. Recently, their responsibilities widened somewhat. Acceptance of the system is high both 
among the Dutch fishing industry and governmental skeholders. Interviewed members and 
managers of various Biesheuvel groups praise efficint quota uptake an end to the race for fish, 
stability of expectations, high levels of compliance, and better fish prices. They criticised practices 
to avoid the final sale of ITQs when fishermen stop fishing and the low level of new entrants to the 
sector. Membership within the Biesheuvel groups is ca. 97% of those eligible and is stable. 
Although individual incidents of non-compliance with quota rules have been reported over the 
years, the groups’ self-policing is considered to function well. For fisheries managers, the system 
did not only improve state-industry relations, but reduced the costs of public enforcement. 
Conservation groups accept that the Biesheuvel system functions well with regard to quota 
management, if less so with regard to engine power limitation.  
In the UK, industry self-governance of market supply and of withdrawal schemes within POs 
started in 1973 (Goodlad 1998, Phillipson 1999 and 2002). The PO structure was used as one pillar 
when a system of sectoral quota management was introduced in 1984. After that, allocations were 
initially based on vessels’ most recent three years of catches, and as of 1999, on a fixed reference 
period, or‘Fixed Quota Allocation’ (FQA). The allocations are assigned to three groups: ‘the 
sector,’ (i.e. fishing vessels over 10m and belonging to Pos); the ‘non-sector,’ which includes over 
10m vessels not in PO membership; and vessels under 10m. Co-management is limited to the 
‘sector,’ i.e. to POs. These manage their members’ cumulated allocations (Hatcher, 1997), which 
amount to 96 percent of the UK quota. Different systems of quota management have evolved within 
the POs, with ITQ-style systems slowly replacing the ‘traditional’ pooling of IQs (Nautilus 
Consultants, 2006). Among the interviewed members and managers of four POs, the co-managed 
RBM system is generally accepted, although less unanimously than in the Dutch case. While some 
interviewees appreciate the opportunity to fish against their own quota share and buy and lease 
quota, others see benefits in the pool system. As in the Dutch case, criticism relates to FQA-holders 
not actively involved in fishing and difficulties experienced by new entrants. In addition, there 
seems to be unease among some about the leasing and buyi g of quota (Hatcher et al., 2002:42-46; 
Anderson, 2006:5-7); concerns about insecure ownership status of FQAs; and quota being bought 
off by foreign flag vessels. PO membership is high, though less stable than in the Dutch groups. 
Self-policing and enforcement of PO quota management rules is said to have increased in recent 
years in relation to reduced TACs and the introduction in 2005 of fish buyers and sellers 
registration. Among the other industry groups, in particular, the less than 10m fleet, fears that 
members from POs and the non-sector fleet could fish against their allocation. Fisheries managers 
confirmed that the PO’s role reduced some of the administration’s burden; however, changes in 
quota management were regarded as necessary and policy-makers recommended the introduction of 
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fully-fledged ITQs (Cabinet Office 2004:105). At the time of our research, a consultation-based 
quota management change programme (UK Fisheries Departments, 2005) did have grounds to 
implement a halt due to the Scottish Government’s opposition to ITQs. Environmental 
organisations did not appear to be interested in UK quota management. Some groups, however, 
have more general positions on RBM, with World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) (2007) stating a, 
‘healthy scepticism,’ but not a general rejection of RBM.  
3.4. Introduction to the Western Shelf case study 
Fisheries are a traditional source of protein for the Basque communities (Arregi et al., 2004). 
Indeed, Basque fisheries have a long history and have evolved to what is currently one of the most 
important fisheries of Spain. Basque fisheries are aff cted by management at three levels: a) the 
local management level where the Basque government receives advice from Cofradias and POs; b) 
the national management level in which the government of Spain rules the fisheries through the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; and c) the community level of management which comprises 
the decisions made by the Commission and the Council of Ministries. Two Basque fisheries have 
been examined for the purpose of this study: the Basque industrial fisheries in the NEAFC 
(Gonzalez-Laxe, 2006) area and the coastal fisheries in the Bay of Biscay (Astorkiza et al., 2000). 
The industrial fleet is managed through an ITQ system restricted to the census of vessels in the 
NEAFC area, and originally managed by effort quotas. Participation in this fishery is narrow and 
limited only to stakeholders—conservationists and others do not participate in the management. 
POs involved in this fishery are active in participat on at the local, national and at Communitarian 
level through the RACs.  
The Basque coastal fleet in the Bay of Biscay harvests anchovy and other pelagic species. The 
management of the fishery receives meaningful input from the Cofradias. This is especially notable 
when setting regulatory parameters, such as technical measures. This fishery is considered to have a 
territorial user rights (TURF) approach in the sense that no one without membership in a Cofradia is 
able to fish in a given fishing area (Astorkiza et al., 2000). Cofradias and Associations of Cofradias 
are active in participation in local, national and EU level management through RACs. 
Conservationists or other groups do not have any role in the management of this fishery. Although 
management of the Basque fisheries studied is complex, Cofradias and POs have managed to adapt 
to EU requirements regarding participation in RACs and fleet reduction programmes. In the 
particular case of Cofradias, they exhibit a capacity to adapt to changes in the fisheries system and 
to react swiftly to challenges. This has been especially notable in the case of the anchovy fishery 
collapse, which has been closed since 2005.  
In both the Basque and Bay of Biscay cases, stakehold r acceptance is high at the local level of 
management. Stakeholders are satisfied with the Basque government, which seems to be active in 
supporting the local fisheries and presenting their n eds to the central government. However, 
management at the national level is barely accepted since stakeholders believe the Spanish 
government does not support the interests of Basque fleets. At the EU level, stakeholders accept 
management; and they consider recent innovations in participatory governance, such as RACs, 
improvements in European fisheries management. Regardin  rights, the industrial fleet accepts the 
way rights have evolved; however, some of the stakehold rs interviewed pointed out that factors 
external to the RBM have determined unequal competition with the Spanish fleets, such as the 
Asturias’s. For example, Basque harbours and crews are far more expensive than Asturias’s. 
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Regarding stakeholders’ acceptance, on the one hand, they consider their rights to fish pelagic 
species in the Bay of Biscay has allowed them to have a say in the management of the fishery. On 
the other hand, they point out that their rights are not fully respected since the French fleet harvest 
the same anchovy stock using a technology banned in Spa ish waters. In this regard, the Arcachon 
Agreement is widely criticized.  
4.0. Management regimes in the case studies  
4.1. Rights-based management (RBM) and effort-based management 
RBM is being applied more and more widely in fisheries (Christy, 1996; Arnason, 2000); the most 
studied and referred example of RBM systems is that of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) 
(Scott, 1988, Arnason, 2000). Rights are also applied, for example through territorial user rights 
(TURFs), to protect and keep community structures intact. (Christy, 1982). Often, the purpose of 
implementing RBM is to enhance a fishery’s economic efficiency (Scott, 2000; Arnason, 2000). 
RBM (especially those strongly market based, such as ITQs) can negatively impact the social 
context of a fishery by drastically reducing the number of fishery participants, disrupting local 
fishing communities, or upsetting stakeholders that view the approach as a privatisation of the 
commons (Le Gallic, 2003). On a social meso-scale, RBM tends to lock in development of a 
management regime and immunize it against innovation. Three types of RBM systems have been 
empirically investigated: quota-based; territorial-b sed, and effort-based.  
In the Basque fisheries studied, RBM is comprised of tw  approaches: ITQs for the industrial fleets 
and territorial user rights for the coastal fisheries. The ITQ system in the first case has evolved from 
an effort quota system. The base line came from the census performed in the early 1980s, which 
originated the ‘300 list.’ This list consists of all the vessels with the right to fish in EU waters after 
the 1986 entry of Spain into the European Union. Sice then, the RBM system has evolved, and the 
introduction of transferability in the effort quota system reshaped the fishing fleet. Currently, the 
transferable effort system has transformed into an ITQ system, which is still restricted to the 
original census. The other RBM system reviewed is the territorial user rights used by the Basque 
Cofradias in the Bay of Biscay. These are rights with an old history and they limit entry to the 
fisheries under the jurisdiction of Cofradias. To fish in a given area, a fisherman must be a member 
of the Cofradia concerned. Cofradias also have the right, recognised by law, of proposing technical 
measures to ensure sustainable exploitation of the resources. These measures are the base for most 
of the technical regulations for anchovy and other p lagic species. Rights of Basque Cofradias are 
widely recognised by the authorities and the civil society. These rights enable Cofradias to actively 
participate in the management of pelagic resources.  
The RBM systems studied in the North Sea cases can be characterised according to the type of 
right, initial allocation, transferability, security and durability, and further features (Scott, 1996). In 
both cases, the rights are related to catch quota. The initial allocation of Dutch sole and plaice quota 
was ‘grandfathered’ on the basis of historical recod, and one year later adjusted to include 50 
percent engine power. The British FQAs were based on catch records over a fixed three year 
reference period. Regarding transferability of quota rights, trade and ownership of both the Dutch 
ITQs and UK FQAs are restricted through several regulations. Dutch ITQs can only be traded 
among owners of EU registered and licensed vessels; are subject to ministry approval; must be 
within limited periods during the year; are traded jointly for related species (i.e. ITQs for sole are 
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connected to ITQs for plaice); and formally traded only as whole units (non-divisibility). Selling 
part of a sole or plaice quota to vessels that do not have such ITQs is not allowed (Davidse, 2001). 
Fishermen exiting the fishery for good are obliged to sell their ITQ shares within three years, but 
this requirement can and often is circumvented. In the UK, for vessels over 10m, the FQA unit is 
attached to a license entitlement. Only since 2002, is it possible in certain circumstances, to transfer 
FQAs separately from licences (usually as part of a licensing transaction). FQA units may be 
transferred among others, to ‘dummy licences’ held by a PO. Quota rights are divisible and 
transfers need to be registered with the responsible Fisheries Department. In regard to the security 
and durability of the quota rights, the Dutch ITQs are based on a Ministry regulation and have 
duration of one year (renewable). Against the backdrop of the legal concept of ‘legitimate 
expectations,’ the entitlements are evaluated as being r latively secure (Arnarson, 2002:41). This is 
different in the UK, where the status of FQAs as property rights is weaker and the subject of an 
ongoing debate (Cabinet Office 2004). Formally, FQAs are governed by rules of the UK Fisheries 
administrations. A noteworthy additional characteristic of the Dutch system is a, ‘national reserve’ 
of ca. 5 percent of the national quota that is not turned into ITQs in order to compensate for possible 
overshoots.  
Most fisheries management systems are focusing on the output of the fisheries – namely on the fish. 
Hence, the unit of management is usually quantities of fish. The fisheries rights that are distributed 
in quotas (shares of TACs) designate how many fish can be landed through the system. In effort-
based fisheries management, the focus is different: Effort-based management is so-called input 
controlled systems that focus on the effort the fishermen apply to fisheries. The fishing right on the 
Faroe Islands is formulated in number of days the indiv dual fishermen have the right to fish. 
Hence, the system is rights-based, and the fishing days are tradable within certain restrictions. The 
fishing-days system has many of the same qualities, for instance, a ITQ system approached from an 
economic and legal perspective. Both input and output based fisheries management systems are 
often supplemented with a number of technical measur s on fishing gear and area restrictions.  
4.2. Participatory governance 
Participatory governance in fisheries management means an institutional context in which 
fishermen take part in the making of various fisheries management decisions (Gray 2005a; Kearney 
et al, 2007; Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2008; Ostrom, 1990; Symes, 2006; Wilson et al., 2003). 
Participatory governance is held to internalise societal concerns and cope with uncertainty and 
change (Grote and Gbikpi, 2002; Heinelt t al., 2002; Kooiman, 2002). Hence, it may foster 
innovation and institutional learning. Participatory governance can be institutionalised in a number 
of ways. Within the ‘policy cycle’ (May and Wildavsky, 1979, Sabatier, 2004), the scope of 
involvement may range from setting the agenda, to consultation and advice, decision-making, 
implementation and/or the evaluation of a management r gime. According to the diversity of 
stakeholders involved, co-management (which involves the fishing sector and managers) or 
cooperative governance (which involves a more diverse range of stakeholders) may be appropriate 
(Gray, 2005b). There may be different levels of stakeholder involvement, including local, national, 
EU or international scales. 
The two innovations analysed in the Baltic case have been implemented through a hierarchic top-
down process with little involvement of stakeholders from the local levels. In Baltic fisheries, it is 
often high-level political negotiations that result in complex compromises. The trouble is that local 
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fishermen have little insight into the political negotiations that set the rules. 
The fishing-days system on the Faroe Islands is mainly n effort-based system; but it has strong 
elements of participatory governance. Stakeholders are consulted about both complex and trivial 
matters - e.g. the development and the daily operation of the system.  
In the North Sea case study, participatory governance was studied to the extent that it relates to 
quota management within the Dutch and UK RBM system. In the Netherlands, co-management 
was introduced, above all, to increase legitimacy of and compliance with the RBM system and 
ultimately with the EU quota regulations (van Ginkel, 2005; Dubbink and van Vliet, 1997). In the 
UK, the participatory function of POs existed prior t  RBM, but initially, related only to industry 
self-management of market supply and withdrawal schemes. The nine Dutch co-management 
groups are smaller and more homogenous in terms of regional basis, targeted species, and vessel 
and gear type than the 19 UK POs. Their prime functio s are control and management of the 
groups’ allocation of quota and, in the Netherlands, of days-at-sea. This includes facilitation and 
monitoring of quota transfers within and between groups, and annual submission to the 
administration of a joint fishing plan. Development of internal rules, including sanctions for when 
members overshoot their quota, was coordinated and is hence harmonised among the Dutch co-
management groups. This is not the case in the UK POs, each of which set its own rules. The main 
difference between the Dutch groups and the UK POs is that the Dutch system of quota 
management is ITQ-based only, while the UK POs operate with ITQs, quota-pools and mixed 
systems for quota management. Beyond their functions in quota management, the Biesheuvel 
groups have recently acquired some capacity control and technical responsibilities, whereas (some 
of) the UK POs continue their traditional engagement in marketing, including the operation of 
processing facilities.  
Participation is narrow in both Basque fisheries. It only involves fishermen. No conservationists 
have an official role in management of local fisheries. Industrial and coastal fishermen participate 
actively in management at the local level and through the Basque government in management at 
national level. Basque stakeholders are active in participation at the Communitarian level through 
RACs. Basque stakeholders state that RACs are a good platform for participation and a good 
mechanism to defend their interests. Indeed, Basque fish rmen involved in industrial and coastal 
fisheries have made a good use of it as they hold lea ing roles in four RACs, and participate 
actively in the development of the management plans for anchovy and hake.  
5.0. Synthesis of the case study reports on social robustness 
5.1. Hypothesis 1: RBM and diversity of stakeholder involvement 
The first hypothesis regarding social robustness is: RBM systems tend not to have broad stakeholder 
representation. This hypothesis was tested in the cases of the Faroe Islands, the North Sea and the 
Western Shelf.  
The thinking behind this hypothesis is that RBM systems create a sense of ownership and rights on 
the part of a narrowly defined group (e.g. vessel owners) that discourages the involvement of other 
stakeholders. Hence, RBM systems are mainly concerned with the allocation and management of 
(individually) assigned fishing rights and are therefo e are often perceived to be of little interest for 
wider stakeholders groups (e.g. conservationists, processors, local communities) to which rights are 
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not allocated. Hence, the perceived need for involvement of stakeholders with broader interests 
(such as fisheries management, marine conservation, securing the supply chain, and community 
development) during the development or implementation/operation phases is modest. 
All four case studies confirm the hypothesis; yet the causality between the RBM and narrow 
stakeholder representation can be challenged as neither the Faroe Islands nor the Basque cases have 
strong traditions for a broad group of stakeholders participating in the decision-making processes. 
In the North Sea cases, stakeholder representation was only investigated in relation to systems of 
quota management.  
The case study on the Faroe Islands partly confirmed th  hypothesis as only a narrow group of 
commercial stakeholders are included in the decision-making processes. All stakeholders have 
commercial interests—each of them organised in their own association, (e.g. for captains, fishermen 
on deck, ship owners, engine workers, people who work on shore etc.). The breadth of stakeholder 
representation remains within these groups, and would, in an EU context, be considered narrow. So, 
on the one hand, the hypothesis is confirmed on the Faroe Islands; while on the other hand, 
stakeholder representation has historically always been narrow even before the introduction of the 
fishing-days system. It is difficult to assess whether it is the RBM system that created the narrow 
stakeholder representation or if it is due to other factors. These factors could have more to do with 
tradition, and reflect the tremendous importance of fisheries on the Faroe Islands and the economic 
crises that have occurred in the past whenever the fis ries were in a bad state. 
The two quota management systems in the North Sea case also supported the hypothesis. In the 
Netherlands, only the fisheries administration and the concerned fleet segments were involved in 
the development and operation of the management system. A somewhat special role is that of the 
independent, non-industry chairman that Dutch co-management groups must have. Often, the chair 
is a local dignitary. He or she might be seen as a community representative, who mediates between 
community and fisher interests. However, the chair c n also be seen as a disinterested part of the 
fishing industry. The latter view is supported by the fact that there exists no formal feedback 
mechanism to the local communities and that the chair re lly is mandated to act on behalf of the 
fishermen.  
In the UK, stakeholder involvement extends to the fisheries managers and to the PO-organised 
segment of the fishing industry only. Non-PO members, both from the so-called ‘non-sector’ and 
from the ‘less than 10m fleet’ are not involved in the system’s operation. A certain role, however, is 
played by vessel agents, which act as non-fishing co-owners of vessels and of quota. They may 
exercise influence on quota management decisions throug  their business partners, who are PO 
members. Finally, environmental groups were not involved in the development or operation of the 
quota management systems. The cause for the narrow stakeholder representation can be seen in the 
narrow definition of responsibilities within the management system (management of predefined 
quota shares only), which results in a narrow definitio  of ‘stakeholder’. 
In the Western Shelf case study, no representation by groups other than fishermen was found in the 
two cases studied: ITQs for hake and other demersal species, and TURFs for the Bay of Biscay 
anchovy. Again, it is hard to assess whether the RBM system has created the narrow stakeholder 
representation or if it is due to other factors. A lack of participation of conservationists could likely 
be the result of the negligible room for non-traditional stakeholders in the management process at 
national or Community level. Basque green NGOs have views on fishery issues and convey their 
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opinions to the civil society through the local media. However, they do not have any officially 
recognised consultative role in the management of Basque fisheries. Although stakeholder 
representation is narrow, RBM seems to have built strong and active participation on the part of 
industrial and coastal fishermen. They have an active consultancy role in fisheries management 
within the autonomous Basque jurisdiction. They arective in lobbying, and through their 
government channels, they express their needs to the central Spanish government and to Brussels. 
Furthermore, Basque fishermen are active in four RACs and have leading roles in some of them.  
5.2. Hypothesis 2: Acceptance vs. characteristics of the RBM system 
The second hypothesis regarding social robustness is: Commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a 
(RB) management system will be a function of the ext nt to which: a) the management system is 
perceived by the fishermen to be practical [and necessary]; b) the management system (in RBM: 
the initial allocation) reproduced the status quo of fishing opportunities when introduced; c) which 
new entrants are facilitated; and d) which retirement options are provided for. 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that stakehold r acceptance is strongly related to a)–that 
fishermen perceive the management system to be practical and necessary. Acceptance is also 
strongly correlated with the perceived preservation of economic opportunities by existing users b) 
and d); and respectively by the maintenance of economic opportunities by potential future users c). 
The conclusions across case studies were that a) and b) are important determinants of commercial 
fisheries actors’ acceptance of the management system, whereas c and d) are less important. 
In the Baltic case, the overall impression from the stakeholders interviewed is that it is a complex, 
hierarchic system with many different temporary and rea closures, which make the daily fishing 
activities difficult and complicated. According to he respondents, the management innovations 
implemented are not perceived to be practical (a). The area closure is seen as necessary, but the 
division of the cod stocks is neither necessary nor practical according to a majority of the 
stakeholders interviewed. These innovations have reduc d fishing opportunities, made it more 
complicated, and have had a negative impact upon acceptance and legitimacy. Thus, these 
innovations have not reproduced the status quo of fishing opportunities when introduced (b). 
According to some of the respondents, it has also had an indirect impact on new entrants into cod 
fishing because the management system is more complicated than before – with unpredictability 
comes an unwillingness to invest. This is supported by the fact that the fisheries sector has had a 
very low recruitment in Nexø and Simrishamn during the last years (c). These two innovations have 
no impact on retirement options (d). Altogether this negatively affects the commercial fisheries 
actor’s acceptance of the management system for Baltic cod, which is also verified in the 
interviews. The result from analyzing the Baltic case from this hypothesis strongly indicatesthat low 
legitimacy for innovations negatively affects support for and compliance with a management 
regime. The result also indicates that even when a rule is perceived as “necessary” among the 
stakeholders, acceptance and legitimacy can be low if the practical implications on the daily fishing 
activities is too severe. 
On the Faroe Islands, there is an exceptionally high level of acceptance of the fishing-days system 
among the commercial actors. Acceptance took several forms: a) Fishermen found the system to be 
practical. Much of the information they needed appeared on the computer screen. Both fisheries 
inspectors and fishermen argued that it was not possible to cheat the system owing to the extensive 
satellite monitoring system. b) The system came in r sponse to some difficult years for the fisheries 
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with low cod stock and bankruptcies among vessel-owners, followed by the ITQ system with too 
low TAC. Maybe this frustration created a willingness to engage in a new system as long as it 
would take the problems of the old system into account. The introduction of the fishing-days system 
left all fishermen in a much better economic situaton. This could be one of the reasons why the 
allocation of fishing days between the fishermen did not cause conflicts as it did in other regions, 
for instance, in New Zealand. Further, nobody was forced to leave fisheries after the introduction; 
even the small non-commercial vessels were included and given a common pool of fishing days, 
which until now, has not been completely used. c) Facilitation of new entrants was not viewed as 
essential by the commercial actors. As in an ITQ system, new entrants have to buy/inherit fishing 
rights in order to enter the Faroese fisheries. d) None of the informants were concerned with 
retirement as an essential part of the system. However, people do have retirement options. If a 
vessel owner wished to retire, he can sell his fishing days and vessel. Pension schemes are provided 
for the employed fisherman. 
In the Dutch case, we find a high, and in the UK case, moderately high level of acceptance among 
the fishing industry, which can be related to three of the above mentioned characteristics of the 
RBM system. In both countries, the systems are considered to be practical (a). The initial ITQ 
allocation (b) in the Netherlands reproduced the statu  quo of fishing opportunities, though only 
after some early adjustment of the allocation basis. S milarly, in the UK, both the rolling share 
system and the fixing of the quota allocation came close to reproducing the fishing opportunities 
status quo; although the time gap between the onset of FQAs and the qualifying period was 
substantial. Regarding retirement options (d), in both countries, pension schemes for fishermen 
exist independent of the ‘windfall’ incomes generatd by selling or leasing out quota rights at the 
end of a fisherman’s professional life. Actually, many active fishermen were quite negative about 
retired quota-holders and other non-fishing quota-holders. In the UK a group of quota holders exists 
that is not part of the fishing industry. The fact that people viewed selling quota shares after 
retirement as more legitimate than leasing them out p ints to a broader moral issue about holding 
and speculating quota. One condition of our hypothesis, facilitation of new entrants (c), was not 
met. Fishermen in both countries expressed concerns about difficulties and costs of entry, although 
possibly a bit more vehemently in the UK. These concer s did not, however, undermine the 
systems’ general acceptance, perhaps because it relates to third parties rather than the fishermen 
themselves.  
The RBM approach is partially accepted in the Basque cases. The system sets certain conditions to 
satisfy industrial fishermen: a) clear rules; b) initial allocation was based on historical criteria; c) 
facilitation of new entrants although they are required to buy licenses or rights from census’s 
vessels; and d) The RBM system has facilitated retirement since fishers have been allowed to sell 
their rights and receive a scrapping bonus. Some stakeholders, however, do not feel satisfied with 
the RBM system. Unconformity is not a result of theRBM system, but of the unequal competition 
with other fleets. The evolution of the RBM has produced the reduction of the Basque fleet due to 
transferability (introduced in 1997), which has allowed the Galician fleet to grow in vessels and 
rights. Stakeholders see that factors such as running costs may have determined the predominance 
of the Galicians. In this case, acceptance of the RBM system rests on external factors. In the coastal 
fisheries, we found factors that may produce the acceptability of the RBM system: a) the system is 
practical since Cofradias partially manage the fishery; b) the rights allocation reproduced the status 
quo. Cofradias’s historical rights to exploit and manage were respected; c) new entries are allowed 
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to join the Cofradia; and d) retirement options, from incentives to decommissioning, are available. 
Acceptability of the system, however, depends on external factors. A source of complaint is the 
Arcachon Agreement, which allows French pelagic trawlers (technology banned in Spain) to exploit 
anchovy. Stakeholders interviewed blame the national government for allowing “intruders” to 
exploit resources considered as to be Cofradias’ historical rights. 
5.3. Hypothesis 3: Acceptance of RBM and diversity of stakeholder involvement 
The third hypothesis regarding social robustness is: The more diverse stakeholder involvement in 
the development and/ or operation of a management system, the lower the acceptance of the 
concerned commercial fisheries actors. 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that broad st keholder representation may lead to a 
questioning of the legitimacy of other stakeholders as well as to frustration with the complex 
process. This hypothesis has been difficult to test directly through the case studies. On the one hand, 
none of the case studies have provided examples of diverse stakeholder involvement, on the other 
hand, high degrees of commercial stakeholders’ acceptance have been found in (at least parts of) 
each case study. The hypothesis is not convincingly contradicted by the case studies.  
The Baltic Sea case study did not confirm this hypothesis. The division of the cod stocks has been 
implemented without diverse stakeholder involvement a d is operated by a centralised top-down 
management regime. Even so, there is a low acceptance mong commercial fishermen for these 
innovations – particularly for the negative practical implications of the division of the cod stock. 
Closed areas and seasons for cod fisheries have quite a high acceptance, mainly when it comes to 
protect spawning and juveniles. There is some agreement among commercial fishermen on the 
importance of protecting spawning and juveniles, and cceptance is very high, but the complex 
management process—with many temporal closures and tops—reduces the legitimacy also for this 
innovation. The conclusion from the Baltic case is that even in the absence of diverse stakeholder 
involvement in the development and operation of the management system, the frustration over 
complex processes and practical implications can be ext nsive. With or without stakeholder 
involvement, management must make sense, or at least not contradict fishing practices that may be 
highly valued within fishing communities. 
The fishing-days system on the Faroe Islands cannot test he hypothesis directly as there is no broad 
stakeholder representation in the system and the system enjoys a high degree of acceptance and 
support from both the users and the managers. The fis ing industry is strong when making 
decisions regarding fisheries management. No greens or other non-commercial interest groups are 
represented in the decision-making processes. For example, the board that originally suggested the 
fishing-days system was composed by the administrative head of Fisheries Ministry, the chief 
biologist of the Faroese Fisheries Laboratory, and three fishermen representatives (one for the 
trawlers, one for the long liners, and one for the coastal fishermen). This board only functioned 
during the establishment phase of the system. Another example is the fishing-days board. This 
board is composed of a chairman and five active fishermen. The fisheries management on the Faroe 
Islands enjoyed general acceptance from the interviewed people. Yet many informants mentioned 
two flaws of the system: 1) that the biologists’ advice was not taken into account properly when 
making decisions on the number of fishing days. And 2) that the system had failed to set up a 
system for monitoring the fishing effort. Even although both flaws are potentially strong enough to 
undermine the system, they were often considered of less importance in the overall picture. Whether 
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the decisions of these boards would have been less accepted if they had represented other non-
commercial stakeholders is too speculative to assess; but the situation on the Faroe Islands does not 
contradict the hypothesis. 
The situation in both the North Sea countries is quite similar to the situation on the Faroe Islands: 
apart from fisheries mangers, only specific industry egments have participated in the development 
and are involved in the operation of the co-managed RBM systems of the Netherlands and the UK. 
Stakeholder involvement is thus classified as ‘non-diverse.’ Acceptance of the concerned 
commercial fishermen was high among the members of the Dutch Biesheuvel groups and 
moderately high among those of the UK POs. The hypothesis could be rewritten as follows: the less 
diverse the stakeholder involvement, the higher the lev l of acceptance on the part of the concerned 
commercial fisheries actors. In this form, the proposition is confirmed. However, the causality is 
unclear. We cannot be sure whether the system’s acceptance can be attributed to the non-
involvement of wider stakeholders or whether it is actually due to other factors. 
Involvement of stakeholders is narrow in the case of the fisheries on the Western Shelf: 
conservationists and other groups are not involved in the management process. The acceptance of 
stakeholders regarding the Basque government and its intervention in management is high. Low 
acceptance is found in relation to the national Spanish management for Basque fisheries. Basque 
stakeholders seem to have disconformed with central government management since they think it 
does not fully take into consideration the needs of the Basque fleet. Basque stakeholders argue that 
the central government has many fisheries to manage and cannot assure everybody’s satisfaction. 
But the main complaint of the Basque fisheries is the low support from the central government, as 
when they allow the French fleet to fish anchovy through the widely criticised Arcachon 
Agreement. Moreover, Basque stakeholders see the complexity of managing Europe as a problem 
also faced by Basque fisheries. In this context, the interviewed stakeholders see RACs as a good 
platform to express their ideas, give their advice and defend their rights. Additionally, they view 
RACs as a point-of-encounter with counterparts of other nationalities in a sort of negotiation 
platform. To sum, in this case study, the hypothesis is confirmed at national and European level, but 
not confirmed at local level. 
5.4. Hypothesis 4: RBM and capacity for institutional learning 
The fourth hypothesis regarding social robustness is: RBM systems restrict capacity for institutional 
learning. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that creation of property rights will create new 
expectations and demands for secure investments and hence, foster resistance to change and create 
dependency, which might affect the value of investment (e.g. through diluting or abolishing rights; 
creating a new pool of rights for other purposes; opening up the system to new entrants; or 
weakening the legal status of the rights). Such lock-in effects can be expected to be particularly 
strong when there are no sunset-provisions built into the allocation of rights. But even if sunset-
provisions are given, rights holders’ resistance may prevent changes to the management system.  
The case studies show, however, that almost all the RBM systems studied have been able to 
institutionally learn after rights have been introduced. We can identify specific paths of institutional 
learning that indirectly confirms our assumption that RBM tends to narrow institutional 
development options. Learning was mostly geared towards making rights more easily transferable 
and/ or more secure and exclusive, thereby locking the systems increasingly into place. The trend 
towards greater transferability can be explained by the fact that, once differences emerge between 
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fishing capacity and available resources, pressures arise to trade rights, even when their trade was 
not originally intended. Rights become more secure and exclusive as rights-holders strive to hedge 
the investments they have made over time. In some cas s, institutional learning also included 
making the RBM systems more participatory. In such cases, the effect somewhat differs from that 
of strengthening rights: the management systems in principle become more open and responsive to 
the involved stakeholders’ demands, rather than more l cked-in. The reasons for institutional 
learning and the responses of the systems are different in the various case studies.  
Complex institutional learning has taken place in the fisheries management on the Faroe Islands 
during the last fifteen years. Prior to the national crisis on the Faroe Islands in the early 1990s, the 
fisheries were managed by capacity restriction measur s and spatial closures. In 1994, the ITQ 
system was introduced after a Faroese committee had recommended ITQs from the early 
experiences on Iceland and New Zealand. The fishermen and many of the politicians were not 
happy with the system because the cod-TACs conflicted with the experiences the fishermen had at 
sea. The ITQ system was abolished in 1996, when the fis ing-days system was introduced. Hence, 
the Faroe Islands had a RBM system, which did not restrict the capacity for institutional learning. 
This could be the only example of an ITQ system remaining in the world, as it has been abolished. 
To interpret this abolishment as a quality of the RBM system would be too hasty as a number of 
circumstances played an essential role in the abolishment: 1) The ITQ system was only in place for 
two years; and the fishing-days system was developed within this period of time. Hence, the 
fishermen did not adjust too much to the ITQ system. The lack of capacity adjustment also had to 
do with the general economic crisis on the Faroe Islands at the time. Nobody had made investments, 
which meant that nobody got caught too hard when switching systems. 2) The stock abundance of 
cod was tremendous at the time compared to how much cod the ITQ system allowed the fishermen 
to catch. Hence, everybody would gain fishing rights by changing to the new system. So, on the one 
hand, the Faroe Islands fisheries management has shown extraordninary capacity for insitutional 
learning. On the other hand, since the introduction of the fishing-days system, not much has been 
changed in the system. Although most informants agreed that the plan failed to set up a system for 
monitoring the effort and that an increased focus on the fishing capacity development was required, 
nobody wanted to take the first step. From this pers ctive, the fishing-days system has 
demonstrated a low capacity for institutional learning with regard to fishing efficiency.  
In the North Sea cases, several steps of institutional learning can be identified to have occurred after 
establishment of the IQ system in the Netherlands (1976) and of the PO system in the UK (1973). 
The institutional learning that took place was mainly directed toward making the systems work 
more smoothly, through greater accountability and by making rights more easily transferable and 
secure. In the Netherlands, the first step of learning was the introduction of the transferability of 
quota in 1985. It was a reaction to the fact that fishermen had started to trade quota anyway 
although this had not been legally intended. The next step in initiating complex learning was the 
attempt to redesign the ITQs system into a participatory ITQ system by introducing quota 
management groups between 1988 and 1990. The idea was to counter both the issue of quota 
overshooting that the ITQ system had not been able to prevent, and the problem of crisis-ridden 
state-industry relations, which resulted from these. The attempt failed at first. It succeeded the 
second time round when, in 1993, an institutionally more sophisticated approach to quota 
management groups was developed and the Biesheuvel syst m emerged. Among others, the groups 
were obliged to publicly auction landed fish, which made for easier quota monitoring and 
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enforcement. As of the year 2000, building upon the systems’ success, the system was further 
extended when the groups’ responsibility was widene from quota management to the control of 
engine power and technical measures. In the UK, the major steps of institutional learning included 
linking the existing industry self-governance strucure of POs with the RBM system, and the 
subsequent change from a sectoral quota management system (based on a rolling track record quota 
allocation introduced 1984) to a system based on fixed quota allocations in 1999. The political 
intention of this change, which was requested by at least parts of the industry, was to provide more 
stability. Emergence of quota trading and a quota market had not been intended by the fisheries 
administrations but intensified after successive rounds of decommissioning had ‘freed’ up quota 
(Hatcher and Read, 2001). These changes are unintended shifts in the system leading to new 
functions and practices rather than institutional le rning as a conscious and intentional process. 
Interestingly, however, this unintended shift was geared, like in the Netherlands, towards making 
rights more transferable and secure, even though full-fledged ITQs are still resisted in the UK. 
In the case of the Basque industrial fleet, it seems that the RBM system has not impeded the fishery 
to adapt to changes in the fishery system. Thus institutional learning has taken place regardless of 
the RBM mechanisms introduced. Rights have evolved naturally since decommissioning of vessels 
produced an excess of effort rights expressed in days at sea, which needed to be transferred to other 
vessels within the census. The shift to transferability of rights has allowed a more efficient 
distribution of rights. The recent introduction of a proper ITQ in the fishery has not been resisted, 
although it seems to be unpalatable for some of the s akeholders who have seen their effort rights 
absorbed by those more efficient (e.g. Galician fleet). Thus, it is likely that rights will continue to be 
gathered by the most efficient actors to the detriment of the less efficient. Another major welcomed 
change is the enhancement of participation in the management process at the EU level though 
RACs. This change was welcomed by fishermen because RACs are perceived as a platform to 
defend their interests and to deliver advice to managers. In the case of the Basque coastal fleet 
targeting anchovy in the Bay of Biscay, the management system has not required the fishery to 
adapt to the Brussels’ standards regarding participation in RACs, renewal of the fishing fleet and 
incorporation of measures on security on board. It is worth pointing out that Cofradias react ‘as a 
single man’ in the face of challenges. They have an active voice when proposing the closure of the 
anchovy fishery because they see the recovery of this s ock as fundamental to the sustainability of 
their fishing activity. In this context, they have questioned the opening of the fishery even for the 
experimental campaign carried out by commercial vessels in 2007. Institutional learning seems not 
to be restricted by the TURFs approach since the sense of resource ownership encourages 
stakeholders to participate actively in the RACs and to find alternative and innovative measures to 
manage the stock. For example, the coastal sector is now involved, together with scientists and 
managers, in the development of a management plan for recovering the anchovy stock. 
5.5. Hypothesis 5: : Stakeholder diversity and institutional learning 
The fifth hypothesis regarding social robustness is: The more diverse the stakeholders involved in 
the development and/ or operation of a management system, the more institutional learning takes 
place.  
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that the involvement of more diverse stakeholders widens 
the range of alternative views in deliberations andnegotiations. Alternatively, one could expect that 
the involvement of highly diverse stakeholders could lead to conflicts that forestall any significant 
 23 
change. There is a difference in whether the involvement pertains to advice or to decision-making. 
This hypothesis has been hard to test empirically as the all case studies involve narrowly defined 
groups of stakeholders. 
As with Hypothesis 3, the present hypothesis cannot be tested directly through the case studies: On 
the one hand, none of the case studies have found examples of diverse stakeholder involvement; on 
the other hand, some degree of institutional learning has taken place in all the case studies. 
In the Baltic case, stakeholders do not feel involved in the management process or feel that they 
have a say. Today, the main stakeholder group, the fis rmen, is distant from the political process 
and decision-making that governs their fishing operations. This is also supported in the interviews 
from this case, “We [ fishermen] have no way of influencing decision-making in thecod fishery and 
there is a risk that no one bother about new rules due to the frustration over the lack of influence in 
the decision-making process“ (trawl skipper, Simrishamn). In the Baltic case, there is a significant 
instance of institutional learning – about spawning areas, external factors affecting the cod resource, 
genetic differences between the eastern and western stock, etc. – although the stakeholders involved 
were not particularly diverse. A lot of learning seems to be purely ecological and primarily 
performed within ICES and other ecological research institutes on national levels. These 
stakeholders have an advisory role and are not involved in decision-making. On the other hand, 
learning seems to be low in reagrd to creating trust between stakeholders and authorities, legitimacy 
and compliance for rules and regulations, as well as how to communicate the necessity of different 
management innovations down to the local level. Theimplementation of the BS RAC can be seen 
as a way of trying to deal with these issues. If the RAC gets more influence in the future, there is a 
chance that stakeholders can have a better say in the decision-making process and that more 
institutional learning can take place. So far, the RAC has made little impression at the local level. 
On the Faroe Islands, stakeholder diversity is lacking; nevertheless, significant complex 
institutional learning has taken place as described un er Hypothesis 4. The introduction of the 
fishing-days system was an example of complex institutional learning that was initiated in the 
absence of a diverse group of stakeholders to point out he weaknesses of the system. On the other 
hand, the lack of initiative to deal with flaws in the system (e.g. the black spot with regard to fishing 
capacity), suggests that the system is slower to progress with simple institutional learning. One can 
only guess whether the system would have been more open to change if broader groups of 
stakeholders were active on the Faroe Islands. 
In the North Sea case study, this hypothesis is not confirmed by our analysis. In both the Dutch and 
UK cases, stakeholder involvement was relatively narrow, basically encompassing only the relevant 
industry segments and government. However, significant steps of institutional learning did take 
place. These include widening the Dutch RBM system o co-management and combining the pre-
existing UK industry self-governance structure of POs with RBM. Apart from these two approaches 
to participatory RBM systems, we find institutional changes within the RBM system in both cases 
to be geared towards making rights more transferabl nd exclusive. Non-diverse stakeholder 
participation has favoured an even stronger movement toward market-based fisheries management. 
Involvement is narrow in the case of the Basque fisheries. Conservationist groups, for example, do 
not participate. In addition to industrial and coastal fisheries, a third stakeholder, the Basque 
government could be thought to play a meaningful role f r the sake of Basque fisheries, which are 
considered as strategic to the Basque region. Even though participation is narrow in the 
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management process of Basque fisheries, institutional learning has taken place in the last years in 
both fisheries. This fact does not confirm the hypothesis 5. Simple learning has taken place in both 
fisheries, for example, the swift adaptation to the new requirements of Brussels on modernisation 
and withdrawal of fishing capacity and involvement in RACs. In the particular case of the coastal 
fisheries, institutional learning at a complex level has taken place when shifting objectives from rent
maximisation to resource protection. Coastal stakeholders were active in requesting the closure of 
the anchovy fishery and supportive to scientific advice even when it meant the indefinite closure of 
the fishery. Now they are actively involved in the d velopment of the anchovy management plan. 
Moreover, the swift reaction and opposition to what they perceive as threats (e.g. experimental 
surveys in spring 2007) has proved their high problem-solving capacity.  
 
6.0. Conclusions 
This report has presented a framework for analysing the social robustness, – defined by the two 
dimensions stakeholder acceptance and capacity for institutional learning – of fisheries management 
regimes. The framework was then applied to four innovative management regimes in European 
fisheries which all combined some form of RBM with participatory governance. We discussed five 
hypotheses on the interrelations between these two management features and the two dimensions of 
social robustness. 
We found that two of the management innovations – the North Sea and Faroe Islands cases – seem 
to be socially robust with relatively high degrees of stakeholder acceptance and the ability, in many 
situations, to institutionally learn. In the case of Basque fisheries, management seems to be socially 
robust with high institutional learning, but the stakeholders do not fully accept the system. The 
Baltic case seems to be less socially robust compared to the other cases: the innovations in the 
Baltic were implemented in a more traditional top-down fashion, and complex learning – that 
contains more fundamental questioning of redefining the underlying values and ends – has not taken 
place, affecting social robustness negatively. All the case studies only include narrow groups of 
stakeholders and it is easy to assume that a broader representation of stakeholders would have 
affected stakeholder acceptance and institutional learning and thus, social robustness.  
Looking more closely at the factors influencing stakeholder acceptance, the North Sea, the Faroe 
Islands and the Western Shelf case enjoy a generalis d acceptance among, at least, industry 
stakeholders. The systems are all perceived to be practical and necessary by the people who have to 
work them i.e. the commercial actors, and in some of the cases, the management. Conservation or 
green organisations do not play a central role in any of the cases studied although they are 
represented in some through the Commission’s RACs. Yet, on the Faroe Islands, critical voices that 
say that the fishing industry is too strong and thebiologists are ignored in decision-making 
processes can be found even though no green organisatio s are represented in fisheries 
management. Stakeholder acceptance of the management in the Baltic case is much lower than in 
the other case studies. The management system is not perceived to be practical and necessary, and 
as a consequence issues of stakeholders’ acceptance and compliance have arisen. These same issues 
do not seem to be as large in all the other case studie .  
Regarding institutional learning, the studied systems of the North Sea, the Faroe Islands and the 
Western Shelf have demonstrated capacities to institutionally learn and keep a fairly high 
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stakeholders’ acceptance among the commercial actors. This happened in spite the involvement of 
narrow defined groups of stakeholders. The finding was not consistent with our initial hypotheses. 
However, we found that institutional learning within the RBM systems mostly took a very specific 
path: It was typically geared towards making rights more tradable and/ or secure or exclusive. This 
actually creates a paradoxical situation where options for future learning in the system may be 
reduced since rights-holders will want to maintain the value of their investment in the rights. 
Let us briefly sum up the conclusions on the five hypotheses that were discussed: 
Hypothesis 1 stated that RBM systems tend not to have broad stakeholder representation. This 
hypothesis was confirmed by the three case studies that had elements of RBM. Indeed, none of the 
RBM systems had broad stakeholder representation. Yet none of the case studies could establish a 
connection between RBM and narrow stakeholder repres ntation as none of them had strong 
traditions for broad stakeholder representation before the introduction of the RBM system.  
Hypothesis 2 regarded the commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a management system 
considering it to be a function of the extent to which: a) the management system is perceived by the 
fishermen to be practical and necessary; b) the management system (in RBM: the initial allocation) 
reproduced the status quo of fishing opportunities when introduced; c) new entrants are facilitated; 
and d) retirement options are provided for. The conclusions across case studies were that (a) and (b) 
are important for commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of system, whereas (c) and (d) are less 
crucial.  
Hypothesis 3 asserting that more diverse stakeholder involvement lowers the acceptance of the 
concerned commercial fisheries actors was impossible to test as none of the case studies featured 
broad stakeholder representation. An alternative conclusion could be made, since the RBM systems 
with narrow stakeholder representation seemed to have igh degree of acceptance among those 
stakeholders involved.  
Hypothesis 4 proposed that RBM systems restrict capa ity for institutional learning. This 
hypothesis was rejected as institutional learning could be identified in the development of each of 
the studied RBM systems.  
Neither was Hypothesis 5 confirmed by our cases. It tated that the more diverse the stakeholders 
involved in a management system, the more institutional learning takes place. Stakeholder 
involvement was not diverse in any of the systems, yet all cases demonstrated capacity for 
institutional learning. 
Finally, we find that in the various case studies, different factors have influenced the social 
robustness of fisheries management systems favourably, which cannot be assigned to the 
management systems and their characteristics themselves. On the Faroe Islands, cod have until 
recently4 been exceptionally abundant since the introduction of the fishing-days system – this took 
the pressure off the fisheries management system. In the case of Basque fisheries, the emergence of 
RACs is seen as a positive development that allows the Basque fishing groups to defend their 
interests and to participate in giving advice– hence the RAC could take the pressure off the regional 
fisheries management. In the North Sea cases, social r bustness of the co-managed RBM systems 
was fostered by the fact that inequitable quota concentrations have so far, been avoided. In addition, 
in both countries, capacity reduction, days-at-sea schemes and strengthening enforcement 
                                                
4 ICES recommended no fisheries for cod on the Faroe Bank in 2008 and 2009 (ICES, 2008). 
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frameworks supported the systems’ working over the years, maintaining economically viable 
fishing opportunities for those still involved. Looking at co-management, social robustness was 
promoted in the Netherlands in particular by the Dutch neo-corporatist and consensus-oriented 
culture, which pervades many aspects of social life. 
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Appendix 1: Report from Baltic Sea case study 
Carl Rova 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent scientific advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES) indicates that the cod stock in the ICES Subdivisions 25 to 32 of the Baltic Sea 
has declined to levels where it is suffering from reduced reproductive capacity and that 
the stock is being harvested unsustainably… the cod st ck in ICES Subdivision 22, 23 
and 24 of the Baltic Sea is over-exploited and has re ched levels where it is at risk of 
reduced reproductive capacity (Council Regulation No 1098/2007). 
 
The ICES5 has been calling for drastic quota reduction during several years due to the severe 
situation for the Baltic cod stocks. To prevent furthe  overfishing, two “management innovations” 
have been introduced aimed at improving management of Baltic cod stocks: (1) closed areas and 
seasons for cod fisheries and (2) a new management regime based on division of cod resources 
among two areas – eastern and western cod stocks. The aim with closed areas and prolonged ban 
season is to ensure better protection of cod during spawning time while division of cod resources 
into two separate management units will improve management of Baltic cod through more 
appropriate measures that could be applied separable to one or another cod stock. These two issues 
affect a substantial part of Swedish and Danish fishermen, as well as fishermen from other Baltic 
countries who are operating on both stocks and willlead to serious economic and social 
implications (Delaney, 2007:9).  
 
Fisheries management does not always work according to the intention of policy and decision-
makers. The migratory nature of fish resources and the large area to monitor make regulations 
heavily dependent on voluntary contributions and cooperation of fishermen and other stakeholders. 
When the fisheries management implement regulations, such as the two described above, the 
fishermen change their behaviour and adapt to new conditions and a discrepancy between intention 
and result may arise – thus, the success of these management innovations depends on how it is 
perceived by stakeholders. Stakeholders not only provide legitimacy, knowledge and 
implementation capacities but can obstruct the imple entation of the innovation when refusing 
support. The success of management innovations also depend on their ability to adapt to internal 
developments and to external changes, such as changes i  their natural, social and economic 
environment (CEVIS).  
 
                                                
5 International Council for the Exploration of the Sa, ICES, is the organisation that coordinates and promotes marine 
research in the North Atlantic. This includes adjacent seas such as the Baltic Sea and North Sea (ICES). 
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The social robustness of a fisheries management regime6 is (in WP6 of the CEVIS project) defined 
by two dimensions: acceptance of the regime by its stakeholders, and institutional learning within 
the regime. While stakeholder acceptance describes processes at the micro level of individual 
actors, institutional learning is about processes at the meso-level of organizations and institutions. 
Within WP6 of the CEVIS project, the following hypotheses are discussed in the Baltic Sea case: 
 
1. Commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a management system will be a function of the extent 
to which: 
a) the management system is perceived by the fishermen to be practical and necessary 
b) the management system reproduced the status quo of fishing opportunities when introduced 
c) which new entrants are facilitated 
d) which retirement options are provided for 
2. The more diverse stakeholder involvement7 in the development and/or operation of a 
management system, the lower the acceptance of the conc rned commercial fisheries actors.  
3. The more diverse the stakeholder involved in the development and/or or operation of a 
management system the more institutional learning takes place.  
 
Thus, the aim with this report is to analyse how different stakeholders perceive these “innovations” 
described above, do they accept and comply with them? Stakeholder acceptance of a management 
regime – in this case exemplified by these innovatins - describes the position that fisheries 
stakeholders take vis-à-vis a management regime. In this report, stakeholder acceptance have been 
assessed through analysis of views expressed by various stakeholders (positive, neutral, negative) 
and through actions taken by the stakeholders as well as (non-) compliance with the management 
regime. Institutional learning is another key concept in this report. Institutional learning is the 
process in which institutions change in reaction to in ernal pressures (e.g. of right holders or right 
managers) or external changes in the ecosystems and ocio-economic context (e.g. pressures by non 
rights holding stakeholder or administrators).  
 
                                                
6 In this report, management regime refer to the two management innovations in the Baltic Sea case, thus; (1) closed 
areas and seasons for cod fisheries and (2) a new management regime based on division of cod resources among two 
areas – eastern and western cod stocks.   
7 E.g. NGOs, processors, communities, etc.  
 31 
 
Figure 1. The Baltic Sea with ICES subdivisions and the two fishing communities under focus in this study (modified 
from Delaney, 2007:12). 
 
To be able to analyse the stakeholder acceptance and the consequences of these two innovations, 
two “cod communities”, Nexø at the Danish island Bornholm and Simrishamn in Sweden, has been 
selected for this study (see Figure 1). These two communities are highly dependent on the cod 
fishery and there is a strong cultural preference for fishing there. Downturns and forced closurers in 
cod fishing can therefore often result in negative impacts – thus, “the future of these communities 
are tied closely to the cod fishery” (Delaney, 2007:7).  
 
Present job 
Background 
Civil servants and 
environmental NGOs  
Researcher Fishermen (and their 
representatives) 
Total 
Biologist/scientist 4 1 1 6 
Social science    1 1 
Fisherman   18 18 
Total 4 1 20 25 
Table 1. Profiles of interview persons. 
 
This study is built on data collected from two main sources: (1) semi-structured in-depth interviews 
Bornholm 
Simrisham
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with stakeholders (see Table 1); (2) written materil, such as program documents, reports, official 
statistics and other documents concerning cod fisheries in the Baltic Sea. Semi structured interviews 
with local fishermen has been done in two communities; seven interviews in Simrishamn and 
eleven in Nexø. The main purpose with these interviews has been to receive information about how 
well these two management innovations have been accepted by local fishermen and how it affect 
their daily fishing activities. Additionally, interviews with the local chairman of the National 
Federation of Swedish Fishermen in Simrishamn, with the chairman of the Bornholms and 
Christiansøs Fishing Association in Bornholm and an interview with the chairman of The National 
Federation of Swedish Fishermen have been done. To be able to contrast between the responses 
from different stakeholder groups, interviews has also been done with representatives from two 
different environmental NGOs, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the Swedish Society 
for Nature and Conservation (SNF) – these NGOs are also members of the BS RAC Executive 
Committee8. Additionally, interviews with a biologist from ICES and two representatives from the 
Swedish Board of Fisheries have been carried out. Thus, this study consist of 25 semi-structured 
interviews that each lasted between 45 minutes and 3.5 hours. 
  
1.1 Simrishamn fishing community 
Simrishamn is a small town with a population around 20.000 and is situated in the county of Skåne 
(Scania) on the southeast coastline of Sweden. It is a municipal ty with a high level of focus on 
marine issues. Simrishamn started out as a small fishing town in the 13th century with fishermen 
fishing for herring. During the 1880s fishermen caught cod, herring, salmon, flatfish and eel. Today, 
Simrishamn is the main port for the Swedish Baltic Sea fleet (Gustavsson, 2007). 
 
The number of fishermen has fluctuated quite a lot over time – from approximately 250 in the late 
1890s to around 320 in mid-1950s – until today with its all-time low of around 80 fishermen. The 
decrease in the number of vessels has continued during the last years in Simrishamn where the 
number of registered vessels is down to 62 in 2007, whereas in the year 2000 these were 77 (SBF 
database in Gustavsson, 2007:51 ). In the Simrishamn area nearly all fishermen are organised in the 
local branch of SFR and according to local fishermen in the area they seem to have no internal 
problems – this is also confirmed in interviews done by Gustavsson 2007.  
 
Around 50 percent of Swedish cod catches in the Baltic rea are taken by vessels from the Baltic 
coastline and Simrishamn stood for 24 percent of the total Swedish cod landings in 2006.9 A 
majority of the cod vessels in the Simrishamn are rther small (15 m or less). In 2006 there were 40 
vessels less than 15 m from Simrishamn that reported catches of cod and their landings amounted to 
57.5 percent of the total cod landings by Simrishamn vessels. The location of Simrishamn – 
northwest of Bornholm – means that cod landing are dependent on both the eastern (ICES 
subdivision 25, see Figure 2) and western (ICES subdivision 24) cod stock (Interview 1, respondent 
                                                
8 The BS RAC is one of seven Regional Advisory Councils established by the European Council to increase stakeholder 
involvement in the development of a successful Commn Fisheries Policy.   
9 Also vessels from the Swedish west coast fish in the Baltic Sea. The Baltic fleet almost exclusively fish in the Baltic 
whereas vessels from the west coast use all possibilities of fishing in Swedish waters – larger vest coast vessels from the 
vest coast land 50 percent of the the Balic cod TAC. 
 33 
from the Swedish Board of Fisheries).  
 
Figure 2. ICES Sub-divisions in the Baltic (ICES, 2004). 
 
1.2 Nexø fishing community 
Nexø is small town and located on the Danish island Bornholm which is situated in the Baltic Sea 
between Sweden and Poland. Nexø is the main cod fishing community at Bornholm and, in this 
study; interviews has accordingly mainly been done in Nexø. Due to the location, fishing has 
always been an important activity for the people of B rnholm. Fisheries in the water surrounding 
Bornholm have also attracted people from Denmark and other countries around the Baltic to land 
their catches there (Christensen and Hegland, 2007). 
The fisheries sector is more important to Bornholm than Denmark in general. The fishery sector in 
Bornholm has traditionally been dependent on a relativ ly limited number of species, namely cod, 
herring, sprat and salmon. Cod is by far the most important of these and the development of the 
sector is therefore particularly sensitive to the development of the catch and landings of cod. Today, 
cod stand for approximately 90 percent of landed value on Bornholm (Interview 14, the chairman of 
the Bornholms and Christiansøs Fishing Association).  
 
There were approximately 400 fishermen on Bornholm in 1996, as opposed to 1.000 in the mid-
1980s and in 2003 only 251 persons were registered as full-time fishermen. After a peak in 1997, 
the tonnage on Bornholm has decreased with more than 15 percent. The introduction of the FKA 
 34 
system in 2007 has changed the fleet of Bornholm dramatically (Christensen and Hegland, 2007).10 
The chair of the local fishermen’s association, Birger Rasmussen, estimated in an interview that the 
fleet would consist of less than 100 vessels and approximately 230 commercial fishermen at the end 
of 2007. The fishermen’s organization on Bornholm was a fierce opponent of the FKA system as 
they feared quota concentration. This is also the reason why fishermen on Bornholm is not 
organised in the national Danish Fishermen Associati n (advocate of FKA). It is primarily the 
smaller vessels that have been bought and emerged with other vessels. However, according to 
Rasmussen, a large part of the traded vessels have st y d on Bornholm (Interview 14). Not only the 
actual cod fishing by Bornholm vessels has decreased but also the bigger processing companies 
have moved the main part of their production to Poland. 
  
2. The Baltic Sea  
More than 200 rivers empty into the Baltic Sea, providing a catchment or drainage area of about 
1.700.000 km2 – that is approximately four times larger than the sea itself. The Baltic Sea is a semi-
enclosed brackish water area, the second largest in the world after the Black Sea. Saltier, heavier 
and oxygen-rich water from the North Sea enters the Baltic Sea through the shallow, narrow 
entrance and propagates along the deeper regions, while a counter of freshwater flows outwards at 
the surface. The Baltic Sea is characterised by a series of deep basins separated by shallow sills, and 
an inflow will usually fill up the first basin – the Bornholm Deep – only, with little or no transport 
in an eastern direction. The turnover time for fullexchange of its water mass is estimated to 25-30 
years (Thulin and Andrushaitis, 2003).  
 
The Baltic Sea ecosystem is dominated by three species: od, herring and sprat. Their overall 
abundance is greatly determined by the specific hydrographic conditions and the fishing pressure in 
the Baltic. There are two populations of cod (Gadus morhua) inhabiting the Baltic area: eastern 
Baltic cod (subspecies Gadus morhua morhua) and western Baltic cod (subspecies Gadus morhua 
callaris) with different morphometric characteristics and population genetics – one population east 
and the other one west of Bornholm. The eastern cod o curs in the central, eastern and northern part 
of the Baltic but not in significant amounts north of Aalands Islands. Areas west of Bornholm 
Island including the Danish Straits are inhabited by western cod population. This stock has 
historically been much smaller than the eastern stock but it appears to be a highly productive stock 
which has sustained a very high fishing mortality for many years. Recruitment is highly dependent 
upon strength of incoming year classes. The two stock  verlap in the area near Bornholm and there 
is some migration of fish between these areas. The eastern population is bigger and constitutes 90% 
of the total resource, but it may fluctuate due to differences and changes in exploitation level and 
recruitment.  
                                                
10 In 2007 (January 1st), the FKA (i.e. in English “vessel quotas system”) was introduced in Denmark to replace the 
previous system. Each vessel was allocated a quota based on historical rights and the quotas follow the vessel when 
sold. 
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Figure 3. Historical spawning areas for cod in the Baltic Sea (ICES, 2004).  
 
The spawning areas for eastern Baltic cod have in the past been the Bornholm, Gdansk, and Gotland 
Deeps (see Figure 3). The Bornholm Deep has been important in all time while Gdansk and Gotland 
Deeps have been important only in years when salinity and oxygen conditions have allowed 
successful spawning, egg fertilisation, egg development and when the spatial distribution of the cod 
stock has included these areas. This has especially been the case in years with a large cod stock 
(Thulin and Andrushaitis, 2003). In practice, this concatenation of circumstances has resulted in the 
existence of only one functioning spawning area for c d in the eastern Baltic Sea - the Bornholm 
Deep - with the Gdansk and Gotland Deeps being suitable only in those years in which there has 
been a strong influx of North Sea water. Thus, since the mid-1980s reproduction has only been 
successful in the Bornholm area. The spawning time for Eastern Baltic cod has varied over the last 
100 years. In the first half of the 20th Century the peak spawning was in July-August. Then t  peak 
spawning changed to May until the mid-1980s when it slowly moved backwards in time year by 
year to June and July by around 1995. Since then th main spawning time has been June-July-
August (ICES, 2004). 
  
Three major changes to the Baltic ecosystem occurred during the 20th century: intensification of 
fishing activity, eutrophication and eradication of nearly all marine mammals. Other changes have 
also occurred including species invasions and introductions, pollution by persistent contaminants (e. 
g., heavy metals, PCBs) and river runoff regulation due to hydroelectric power dams. It is not clear 
how these changes have affected the ecosystem and its animal populations, nor is it clear what 
impact a reversal of these changes might have (ICES, 2002). However, in the second half of the 
1990s, the ecosystem of the Central Baltic Sea has c nged from a state of high productivity for the 
cod stock – characterized by high salinity/oxygen co ditions and low temperature - to a state of 
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high productivity for the sprat stock, characterized by low salinity/oxygen conditions and high 
temperatures (Delaney, 2007:10).  
 
2.1 The history of Baltic cod fisheries 
The fish community in the Baltic Sea has been exploited for centuries. The total annual catch of 
commercial dominant open sea fish stocks in the Baltic has increased tenfold in the past half 
century. Catches remained at about 120.000 tonnes util the 1930s, increased to about 500.000 
tonnes by the late 1950s and almost reached a million tonnes by the end of the 1970s. During the 
past three decades overfishing and thus the failure to maintain sustainable fisheries has become 
increasingly pronounced. Baltic cod is the most important species in the area and this fishery targets 
mainly pre-spawning aggregations in late winter and spring. In the mid-1980s, the stock 
experienced a peak in abundance, but this has sincedropped rapidly to about 20 percent of its 
former peak (Larsson, 2000). From a maximum annual catch of cod in the mid-1980s of nearly 
450.000 tonnes, the catch declined by 1992 to about 50.000 tonnes and has been around 100.000 
tonnes since then. The reason for the peak in cod fisheries (mainly the eastern stock) in the 1980s 
was unusual strong year classes in 1976, 1979 and 1980. These extremely good catches in the 1980s 
also resulted in an extensive expansion of the cod fleet in the Baltic Sea (Finfo, 2005:7).  
 
The eastern Baltic cod is mainly fished by Denmark, Sweden and Poland. Between 150.000 and 
250.000 tons of cod were caught per year in the Eastern Baltic (ICES areas 25-32) from 1970 to 
1980. The maximum catch was reached in 1984 with 391.000 tons and the minimum so far in 1994 
with 38.000 tons. Between 1995 and 2005 the size of the Danish and Swedish fleet (in kW) 
decreased by about 25%, while the Polish fleet did not begin to decrease until 2004 when the EU-
withdrawal programme was launched. The western Baltic cod is primarily fished by Denmark and 
Germany. Comparing the size (in Kw) of the total Danish and German fleets with the fishing 
mortality of cod, illustrates that the fishing mortality has not declined significantly despite the fact 
that the main fleet (Danish) fishing for this stock was diminished by around 25% from 1995-2005 
(WWF, 2006). The TACs for both stocks has been reduc  quite significantly from 220.000 tonnes 
in 1989 to 40.000 tonnes in 1993 after which it went up to 180.000 tonnes in 1997. From 1997 and 
onwards the TAC has yet again declined to 61.600 tonnes in 2004. 
 
 
Table 2. TACs for Baltic cod in 2008 (Delaney, 2007:11). 
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For 2008 the Commission was proposing a reduction of 23 percent in the eastern stock, from 40 805 
tonnes to 31 561 tonnes, and on 33 percent in the western stock, from 26 696 tonnes to 17 930 
tonnes. However on the Council of Fisheries Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on fishing 
opportunities for 2008 in the Baltic ministers agreed that for the eastern stock, the TAC will be cut 
by 5 percent to 38 765 tonnes and for western stock he TAC will be reduced by 28 percent to 
19 221 tonnes (Council Regulation No 1098/2007). The scientific advice of ICES was a zero catch 
for eastern Baltic cod stock and a significant reduction for the western stock (ICES Advice 2007, 
Book 8). 
 
3. Current management strategy in Baltic cod fisheries 
In the Baltic, vessels fishing for cod range from sall boats of some few meters in length to large 
trawlers of up to 40 m. The most common gear types ar  gillnets and trawls. Today, cod fisheries in 
the Baltic Sea are mainly performed with vessels in the following segments; cod trawlers ≥24m, cod 
trawlers ≤24m, gill-netters ≥12m and gill netters ≤12m. Since the EU expansion, management of 
Baltic fish stocks, including cod as well as other fish species under TAC is almost entirely under 
competence of EU countries (Russia is the only country being outside of EU).11 Thus, the Baltic Sea 
is managed under the EU’s DG fish12 with the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) as the prima y 
background policy. This means that the future of Baltic fisheries management will be based on 
bilateral cooperation between EU and Russia. The Baltic cod fishery is managed in the following 
way; first a total allowable catch (TAC) is agreed upon (as a result of political bargaining) by the 
nine countries permitted to fish in the Baltic. Each country is then allotted a predefined percentage 
of the TAC, which is ultimately used up by their professional or licensed fishermen. Within the 
framework laid out by the CFP, the national governme t may determine their own policy. The EU 
Baltic fisheries policy is developed with scientific advice from ICES, which is based on comparing 
the current status of the stocks to reference points for the biomass and the fishing mortality rates. If 
possible, this is done separately for both stocks. The TAC for cod was for the first time tentatively 
proposed separately for both the western and eastern tock in 2004; however the new management 
regime comes formally into force in 2005. The aim with this division of cod resources among two 
areas – eastern and western cod stocks, wa  to improve management of Baltic cod through more 
appropriate measures that could be applied separable to one or another cod stock. Originally, the 
idea with this division came from researchers at ICES (Interview 2, researcher from ICES).  
 
A number of technical measures relating to the cod fisheries are also in force in the Baltic Sea. 
These measures include minimum mesh size, minimum landing size, closed areas/seasons (aimed at 
limiting fishing effort as well as protecting juveniles) and gear specific measures to enhance the 
selectivity in the fisheries. Especially the introduction of the Bacoma trawl in 2004 (diamond 
meshed trawl with a square meshed window in the cod end) has been considered as a main factor 
that reduced the catches of undersized cod. In 2005, two additional closed areas were established on 
Baltic Sea and the third was expanded - Gotland, Gdansk and Bornholm Deeps. There is currently a 
                                                
11 Earlier, the fisheries in the Baltic was managed by the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC) which 
had six members; Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and EU. The commission requested scientific advice from 
ICES. IBSFC was dissolved 1 January 2007. 
12 DG stands for Directorate General.  
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seasonal closure of the cod fisheries in the western Baltic area (area 22-24) between 1 to 30 April. 
The eastern Baltic cod (area 25-28) is subject to closures from 1 July to 31 August. In addition to 
the more general closures, there are specific closures of three areas from 1 May to 31 October – the 
Bornholm Deep, the Gotland Deep and the Gdansk Deep (Council Regulation No 1098/2007).  
 
In order to enable undisturbed spawning a closure of a central part of the main spawning area in the 
Bornholm Deep has been implemented and enforced during the main spawning seasons since the 
mid-1990s for all fisheries. Additionally, since 1995 a seasonal closure was enforced for cod-
directed fisheries in the entire Baltic (1 June – 31 August). This closure covered the main spawning 
season of the eastern Baltic cod stock. In 2005 the seasonal closure was enforced from 1 May to 5 
September for all cod-directed fishery as well as year-round area closures for all fisheries in specific 
areas of the Bornholm Deep, the Gotland Basin, and the Gdansk Deep with the aim to reduce 
fishing mortality. In 2006, the area closures are enforced from 1 May to 31 October, while the 
closed period for cod-directed fisheries was scheduled from 15 June to 14 September, with 27 days 
extra closure to be distributed individually by the m mber states. In 2007, closures are enforced for 
Subdivisions 25-27 from 1-7 January, 5-10 April, 1 July - 31 August, and 31 December, with 67 
days additional closure to be distributed individually by the member states (ICES Advice 2007, 
Book 8). In 2008, there is currently a seasonal closure of the cod fisheries in the western Baltic area 
(area 22-24) between 1 to 30 April. The eastern Baltic cod (area 25-28) is subject to closures from 1 
July to 31 August. In addition to the more general closures, there are specific closures of three areas 
from 1 May to 31 October – the Bornholm Deep, the Gotland Deep and the Gdansk Deep (Council 
Regulation No 1098/2007).  
  
Additional, by way of derogation from Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1627/94 of 27 June 
1994, all Community fishing vessels of an overall length equal or greater than 8 m carrying on 
board or using any gear of a mesh size equal to or greater than 90 mm shall hold a special permit for 
fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea (Ibid).  
 
In July 2006, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a Council Regulation (EU 
2006a) for a multi-annual management plan for the cod stocks in the Baltic Sea aimed at rebuilding 
them. The plan defines a yearly reduction in fishing effort by 10 percent (counted as days-at-sea) 
until the defined target for fishing mortality is reached. Thus, a harvest control rule based on fishing 
days, so fishing effort are going to be reduced gradually by a fixed percentage every year until the 
recovery objectives and long-term targets have been r ached. No timeline is given for the recovery 
of the stock or how it should be estimated. The proposal also lacks a strategy for how the fleet 
should adapt to proposed changes. In June 2007, the European Council agreed on a joint 
management plan for the two cod stocks in the Baltic. Under the new management regime, the 
Baltic cod fisheries are managed through a days-at-se  system from 1 January 2008. Vessels will be 
able to pick their fishing days under a total cap of 223 days in the western Baltic and 178 days in 
the eastern Baltic. If a vessel chose to fish in both areas, the maximum number of days is 223 per 
year with a maximum of 178 days in the eastern area(Ibid).  
   
The Baltic Sea Regional Advisory Council (BS RAC) was established in March 2006 in order to 
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increase stakeholder involvement in managing the Baltic Sea. The BS RAC has an advisory role 
and their main purpose is to prepare and to provide a vice to the European Commission and 
member states on matters relating to management of the fisheries in the Baltic Sea. It consists of 
representatives from the fishing sector and other interests groups (e.g. fisheries associations, POs, 
environmental NGOs, etc.) affected by the CFP. The BS RAC has three advisory working groups to 
help the Executive Committee to prepare advice: working groups on Demersal Fisheries (e.g. cod 
fisheries), Pelagic Fisheries and Fisheries for salmon and sea trout. According to the interviewed 
fishermen, the BS RAC has so far made little mark on the local fishermen. 
 
3.1 Swedish commercial fishing  
Sweden has a long coastline – almost 10 000 km and there are also many rivers. The west coast 
borders the Kattegat and the Skagerrak, and the south and east coast border the Baltic. The Baltic 
Sea with its brackish water has gradually become Swden’s most important fishing area. The 
fishing sector in Sweden is declining – landings (value as well as quantity), vessel numbers and 
numbers of fishermen are all decreasing. Swedish commercial fishing activities at sea are mainly 
carried out in the Baltic Sea and in the eastern parts of the Atlantic Ocean. The conditions for 
fishing differ between the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. In the Baltic there are a few 
commercial species, the most important being cod, herring and sprat while in the eastern parts of the 
Atlantic Ocean there are several commercial species to fi h. Other interesting commercial species in 
the Baltic Sea, which travel long distances during their lifetime, are salmon and eel. 
 
The Swedish Board of Fisheries (SBF) was created in 1948 and is the governmental agency for 
fishery policy and implementation of the political decisions.13 The SBF is governed by an Executive 
Board which is chaired by the director General and the members of the Board are nominated by the 
government. Within the Swedish system of government, ministers are rather small units focusing on 
policy making, whereas the SBF implement, survey, investigate and give advice on policy issues. 
SBF is also responsible for collecting and analysing data which are used for quota management and 
stock assessments. It has also a large research and development department which for instance 
produce the stock assessments and examines the selectivity of fishing gears. The National 
Federation of Swedish Fishermen (SFR) was created in 1949 and building upon the earlier regional 
fishermen’s associations. SFR is responsible for fishermen’s unemployment fund – through this 
fund fishermen can enjoy unemployment benefits during bad weather and also during times of 
fishing stops due to management decisions (Piriz, 2004:18ff). Today SFR is struggling with image 
problems as it claims that fishermen are often accused of illegal and unreported fishing by media 
and the Swedish Board of Fisheries. It is also a quite comprehensive debate going on in Sweden 
whether consumers should boycott Baltic cod or not.  
  
Since 1995, as a member of the European Union and in line with the Common Fisheries Policy, 
Sweden transferred parts of its decision-making andmanagement authority to the European 
institutional level. Thus, fisheries in Sweden are lmost entirely regulated through TACs - about 95 
percent of the landed value comes from species subject to TACs - and technical regulations and the 
                                                
13 The first name of the Board was the National Board of Fisheries.  
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governing organs of the EU (in particular the Commission and the Council of Ministers) are 
involved in decisions regarding resource conservation, setting targets for the size structure of 
national fleets and regulation of the market. The dir ction of Swedish work within the CFP can be 
summarised through the goals set by the government and Swedish parliament in their instructions to 
the Swedish Board of Fisheries and also in Sweden’s environmental objectives (Finfo, 2005:7).  
 
According to EU regulations the Swedish Board of Fisheries issue special permits for cod fishing in 
the Baltic Sea and these permits are primarily based upon previous catch records and not on 
geographical residence. The general Swedish trend in later years is a decrease in the number of 
vessels and in fishermen. The number of fishermen under the age of fifty has also steadily 
decreased particularly along the Baltic coast. On 14 December 2007, the Swedish Board of 
Fisheries decided on a national plan for Baltic cod. The plan is complementary to the EU plan and 
includes some additional rules for the Swedish fleet. The political priority in Sweden is the small-
scale fishery with passive gears and a new component is the division of the Swedish cod quota 
between trawlers and other – generally smaller coastal – vessels (from 2008). For the western stock, 
40 percent of the quota will be allocated to trawling vessels and 60 percent to other vessels. For the 
eastern stock the figure are opposite with 60 percent to trawlers and 40 percent to other vessels. The 
aim with this strategy is to strengthen the small-scale coastal fisheries in Sweden which has 
declined for several decades (the Swedish Board of Fisheries). 
 
3.2 Danish commercial fishing 
Denmark consists of 400 islands of various sizes and the coastline is approx 7 300 km. For a long 
period of time, Denmark has been a fishing nation and fisheries constitute a very important 
economic activity in specific regions of Western and Northern Jutland and the island of Bornholm 
in the Baltic Sea. The Danish fishing fleet is, in general, flexible. Vessels often take part in different 
fisheries throughout the year, and fishing patterns change from year to year (FAO, 2004). As in 
Sweden, Danish fisheries management works within the framework of CFP of the EU and the key 
instrument is the total allowable catch (TAC). The Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 
(MFAF) has the right to define access to and exclusion from fisheries through the distribution of 
licences, to set up operational rules and management tasks, and finally the authority to decide on the 
regulation of the commercial exploitation of the Danish quotas (Christensen and Hegland, 2007). 
Once the TAC/quota agreement is adopted, the national management scheme is decided by 
Ministerial Order. The principles used in the management scheme are discussed with the 
Fishermen’s organisation and the fishing industry before the conditions are finally assigned. The 
Danish Association of Fishermen represents the interes s of most Danish fishermen and they are 
organized in 75 local branch associations around the country, however not the Bornholm fishermen 
(see page 5). From a peak in the late eighties, there as been a gradual decline in fleet size through 
scrapping, taking advantage of EUs decommissioning schemes, co-financed by national 
governments (FAO, 2004). 
 
From mid-1990s up til 2007, the distribution of cod quotas in Baltic Sea has taken place through 
two parallel systems; one for smaller vessels and one f r bigger vessels. The smaller vessels had the 
option of annual quotas while the bigger vessels were given a share to catch within a week, a 
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fortnight, or a month. However, it was also a few regulations connected to the system of annual 
quota; e.g. how much of the quota they should catch during different times of the year (Christensen 
and Hegland, 2007).  
  
In 2007 (January 1st), the FKA (i.e. in English “vessel quotas system”) was introduced in Denmark 
to replace the previous system. Each vessel was allocated a quota based on historical rights and the 
quotas follow the vessel when sold. The owner of the vessel can as well buy other and more 
tonnage (vessels) and quotas but authorities cannot i fluence who gets to own the quotas. “As the 
system has built in mechanisms for transferability and as the system has built in mechanism to join 
quotas through vessels but not to separate quotas out again, the system can be characterised as a 
system for centralisation of quota” (Christensen and Hegland, 2007:96). A common opinion in the 
interviews was that the introduction of vessel quota shares in 2007 has meant the consolidation of 
quota into larger boats with the small scale fleet being the losers (Interview 14, the chairman of the 
Bornholms and Christiansøs Fishing Association). 
 
4. Stakeholder acceptance of the two management innovations in the Baltic Sea 
case? 
4.1 Closed areas and seasons for cod fisheries 
A quite general opinion among stakeholders interviewed is that the closure of the Bornholm, 
Gdansk and Gotland Deeps is necessary but not practical in its shaping.14 21 respondents are of the 
opinion that it is in some way necessary with these closures to protect spawning while only 4 
respondents is entirely against a closure to protect spawning. The main argument among those 
against is that there are so few fishermen left that i  is not necessary any more: “the closure of the 
deeps are not necessary anymore because we are so few fishermen and vessels left and the pressure 
on the resource has been substantially reduced” (Interview 25, trawl skipper from Nexø).  
 
Stakeholder acceptance of closed areas and seasons for cod fisheries in the Baltic 
Positive: 17 Neutral: 3 Negative: 5 
Table 3. Stakeholder acceptance of closed areas and seasons for cod fisheries in the Baltic 
 
However among those that are positive to a closure to protect spawning there are a lot of opinions 
against how it has been done in practice – only 4 respondents answered that it was both necessary 
and practical in its shaping, thus that they are totally satisfied with this management innovation. 
One common argument is that: “I am definitely positive for a closure during spawning in these 
areas but the closure in the Bornholm Deep is partly in wrong area – some parts are on just 50-55 
meters depth and no cod spawn where it is so shallow”  (Interview 11, trawl skipper from 
Simrishamn). One common argument from the Swedish side i  that the shape of the Bornholm 
closure is a result of political bargaining: ”The closure of the Bornholm Deep is OK but the real 
spawning area in the Bornholm Deep is more to the southwest than the closure today – from 
                                                
14 For further explanation see page 1-2. 
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beginning to the end it was a political and not an ecological question, Denmark wanted to protect 
their own fishing opportunities” (Interview 6, the chairman of The National Federation of Swedish 
Fishermen, SFR). “Bornholm is a well functioning spawning area but the closure is partly in the 
wrong area, it should be more southwest but Denmark oppose this because it would have restricted 
Danish fisheries to much” (Interview 5, respondent from the Swedish Board of Fisheries). The 
argument that it is a lot of political reasons behind the closures was also an opinion expressed by 
one of the representatives from an environmental NGO: “The closure of the Gotland and Gdansk 
Deeps is a political question because these areas are useless from a reproduction perspective” 
(Interview 2007-11-14, respondent 5 from an environme tal NGO). 
  
A common argument is also that even though spawning is not so successful in Gdansk and 
definitely not in Gotland deeps there is a reason to keep these areas closed to protect and lower the 
pressure on “larger cods” and to be “ready” when the prerequisites are right for spawning in these 
areas. “Spawning success has diminished in the Gotland Deep and it is uncertainty about the 
success in Gdansk, but the closure in these areas can have a function to lower the fishing pressure 
on large cods” (Interview 2, respondent from ICES). However, also many Danish stakeholders are 
discussing the actually shape of these closures “The closure of the Bornholm Deep was in principal 
right – where it is spawning it should be closed an I think that all of our fishermen accept that, but 
both the area and time has been expanded too much. This affect legitimacy negatively since it is 
right in principle but wrong in practice (Interview 14, the chairman of the Bornholm and 
Christiansøs Fishing Association). Also many fisherm n in Nexø are of the opinion that the actual 
closure is too large and too much on shallow Swedish waters: “…the closure is too large, on the 
Swedish side, it is large parts on pure shallow waters where the cod never could reproduce” 
(Interview 16, trawl skipper from Nexø).  
 
A quite common opinion in the interviews was that an overwhelming majority of the respondents 
are in favour of closed seasons that reflect spawning periods, however, many of them do not think 
that the actual closures reflect spawning periods and would like to discuss changing them. But 
opinions differ and range from those who think it is enough with just one months closure to those 
who think that it would be closed during the whole year: “In principle, spawning areas should be 
closed during the whole year because this will favour the fishing industry in the long-
run…(Interview 4, respondent from an environmental NGO). However, even if many of the 
respondents are discussing practical issues in the shaping of this management regime it seems like a 
majority of the respondents understand and accept this management innovation as legitimate and 
necessary.  
  
4.1.1 Division of cod resources among two areas 
The figures for stakeholder acceptance of the division of cod resources into an eastern and western 
stock is almost the opposite too closed areas and seasons. 17 respondents are negative while 7 are 
positive and 1 is neutral. This regulation has upset fi hermen in both Simrishamn and Nexø and also 
other stakeholders have problem to see how it can work in practice. As much as 20 (80 percent) 
respondents consider this regulation as not practical and 16 consider it as not necessary. 
Accordingly, 9 respondents believe that it is a necessary rule and 5 apprehend it as practical.  
 43 
 
Stakeholder acceptance of a new management regime bas d on division of cod 
resources among two areas – eastern and western cod stocks.  
 Positive: 7 Neutral: 1 Negative: 17 
Table 4. Stakeholder acceptance on the division of cod resources among two areas. 
 
One of the most common arguments against the division i  that it has complicated the daily fishing 
activities a lot: “the division has made it much more complicated to be a fisherman and it will 
probably not affect the stock situation” (Interview 24, trawl skipper from Nexø). There are many 
reasons why fishermen think that it has been much more complicated and difficult to be a fisherman 
after the division of the cod stock. They argue that t e natural fishing pattern has been destroyed 
due to the fact that they cannot travel between the western and eastern area as they use to do. A 
Danish fisherman needs to land and report his catch before he enter into a new area while a Swedish 
fisherman cannot change to the western area for a calendar week if he has started to fish in the 
eastern area (this was implemented in 2008). According to many fishermen, it is not as flexible as it 
uses to be and the fishing pressure is much more concentrated in certain areas than it was before. 
“In the beginning of this autumn [2007] it was too high pressure on the western stock when it was 
closed in the eastern area” (Interview 9, skipper on a gill-netter from Simrishamn). Thus, the 
division has put a much harder pressure on the western stock because when it is closed in the 
eastern area almost every trawler and gill-netter is fishing on the western stock. Another common 
argument is that they cannot se the biological reasons for this division or as one Swedish skipper 
expressed it “now we just have to learn the cod to swim either west or east of Bornholm” 
(Interview 12, trawl skipper from Simrishamn). Another argument is that when fishermen cannot se 
the usefulness or the reason behind rules and regulations it affects legitimacy negatively: “The 
division of the eastern and western stock is totally insane; we can follow the fish when it travels 
between these areas. The only result with this regulation is that it has been so much harder to 
behave legal… the legitimacy for rules and regulations decreases when we as fishermen cannot se 
the usefulness with this legislation” (Interview 16, trawl skipper Nexø).  
 
Also the incentives to cheat increases according to some of the fishermen: “It increases the 
incitement to misreport catches, you report catches from the wrong area which make catch 
statistics incorrect“ (Interview 11, trawl skipper Simrishamn). The division is biological justifiable 
but not practically feasible according to the chairman of the Swedish Fisherman Association. He 
believes that in the long-run it will be a common management of the stocks again. As it is now it 
increases the incitement for fish poaching and illega  behaviour according to him – “this approach 
provides opportunity for misreporting area of capture” (Interview 6).  
 
There are other stakeholders besides the fishermen and their representatives that also have doubts 
against the practical implications of the division f the cod stock. “The practical problems with the 
division of the stock has resulted in a lower legitimacy for rules and regulations among fishermen… 
this management has created a lot of cheating” (Interview 1, respondent from the Swedish Board 
of Fisheries). “The division has resulted in problems with monitoring and surveillance – it is hard 
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to monitor which affect legitimacy negatively, the overall problem in the Baltic Sea is the non-
compliance behaviour and the lack of resources for surveillance and monitoring” (Interview 5, 
respondent from an environmental NGO). However, according to another Environmental NGO they 
are entirely positive to the division because it is built on a proposal from ICES (Interview 4). The 
respondents among the fishermen that are in some way positive to the division is equally distributed 
between Simrishamn and Nexø and they all have either small gill-netters or trawlers under 15 
meters. The main reason why they are positive is that i  does not affect their daily fishing so much. 
Together with the days-at-sea system that have beenimplemented in 2008 (see page 10) they look 
quite positive on the future. A huge majority of the respondents are very positive of the days-at-sea 
system instead of the previous system with a lot of temporal closures – they express the opinion that 
they can plan their fishing activities much better now and that their flexibility regarding 
management and daily fishing has increased.  
 
To sum up, the two innovations are only partly seen to be practical and necessary in an overarching 
sense. The closure yes but the division of the cod st cks no. These innovations have reduced fishing 
opportunities make it more complicated and this impact negatively on acceptance. According to 
some of the respondents it has also had an indirect impact on new entrants into cod fishing because 
the management system appears to be more complicated than before. These two innovations have 
no impact on retirement options.  
 
4.1.2 Do fishermen comply with the management system? 
The fear about reduced legitimacy and non-compliance for rules and regulations in Baltic cod 
fisheries seems to be a real threat and a severe problem. During 2005 and 2006, the EU 
Commissions fisheries inspectors conducted more than 200 inspections on the reliability of the 
system in place for the verification of declared catches of cod in: Germany, Denmark, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Poland, Sweden, Estonia and Finland. The inspectors carried out 22 inspection missions to 
the relevant states and analysed the catch records fr m 1040 fishing trips in respect of the vessels 
inspected.15 They compared the catches during the inspection and the reports of four other landings 
of the same vessels. In all cases, the vessels have reported larger catches at the days of inspections. 
For Polish vessels, the difference is 48.7%, Swedish 21.4%, Lithuanian 15.6%, German 13.6%, 
Danish 12.7% and Latvian vessels 7.5%. The commission  evaluation report concludes: “It was 
observed by Commission Inspectors that the serious level of unrecorded catches was inter alia as a 
result of the poor inspection and surveillance in particular, the poor quality and frequency of 
inspection in place to ensure the accuracy of the reco ded data. These findings are in line with 
assessment of ICES for the region” (European Commission Evaluation Report 2007:3). At the end 
of 2007 summer ban, the Swedish, Polish and German cod fisheries in the Baltic remain closed 
because estimates of illegal fishing indicated that they had already exhausted 2007 quotas. 
According to ICES, the level of illegal fishing on Baltic cod is at least 35 percent (The Fisheries 
Secretariat). These are catches that were not reported to the authorities and hence are missing from 
the official landings statistics. This makes it more difficult for fisheries scientists to produce 
reasonable stock estimates. This is also verified in the interviews where many fishermen give 
                                                
15 Finland and Estonia’s catches of cod are nearly non existent and the inspectors focused their mission on visiting the 
centre for registration of the catches (European Commission Evaluation Report 2007). 
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expression for the opinion that the main problem is illegal and unreported catches in other parts of 
the Baltic Sea.  
 
One of the main issues in the Baltic Sea according to the BS RAC is the sustainability of the cod 
stock and that non-compliance is a serious threat for a long-term sustainable fishery: “The BS RAC 
recognises that non-compliance is one of the main brriers to maintaining a sustainable cod fishery 
in the Baltic Sea” (BS RAC, 20071025). They also stated that they extended their support to the 
fishermen who perform their activities in accordance with the rules of CFP. The BS RAC urge all 
fishing organizations to build up a culture of compliance in the Baltic cod fishery and urge member 
states to establish appropriate sanctions (ibid). A majority of stakeholders in this report apprehend 
the division of cod resources among two areas as not practical and not necessary. A majority 
consider closed areas and seasons for cod fisheries are necessary but not practical in its shaping. 
This have certainly not beneficial effects on the compliance and support for the current management 
system of Baltic cod and can at worst further increase non-compliance behaviour.  
 
4.2 Evolution of the management system and institutional learning 
In the CEVIS project, institutional learning is defined as the process in which institutions change in 
reaction to internal pressures or external changes in cosystems and socioeconomic context. When 
assessing institutional learning in the context of European fisheries management regimes we 
distinguish:  
- At the process level: between simple learning (or ‘adaptation’) and complex learning (or 
genuine ‘learning’). Simple learning describes changes in means in order to more effectively 
achieve given goals, while complex learning describes changes in goals. Complex learning 
includes the more fundamental questioning and redefinition of underlying values and ends, 
the new specification of causal relationships and may even encompass ‘reflexive learning’ 
as a revision of the very concepts of problem solving (the ability to learn how to learn).  
- At the outcome-level: between learning process that address the problem at hand 
successfully (high problem-solving capacity) and learning processes that do not address 
problem successfully (low problem-solving capacity). 
As been described earlier in this report, the principal policy instruments for managing the Baltic Sea 
fisheries are annual TACs supplemented by technical regulatory measures, such as minimum 
landing sizes, mesh size regulations (BACOMA trawl introduced 2004) and closed periods for 
fishing. Due to the severe situation, the international Baltic Sea Fisheries Commission (IBSFC) 
adopted a recovery plan for the Baltic cod stock in 2002. In addition to the catch quotas, a spawning 
closure of variable length has been established since 1995, prohibiting the fishery every year from 
late spring to summer and the IBSFC also implemented a seasonal area closure on all fishing in the 
Bornholm Deep. This closure was extended by several weeks in 2005, then lasting from 15 May to 
31 August. Also in 2005, the IBSFC established additional spawning area closures in the Gdansk 
and Gotland Deep. In 2008, there is currently a season l closure of the cod fisheries in the western 
Baltic area (area 22-24) between 1 to 30 April. The eastern Baltic cod (area 25-28) is subject to 
closures from 1 July to 31 August. In addition to the more general closures, there are specific 
closures of three areas from 1 May to 31 October – the Bornholm Deep, the Gotland Deep and the 
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Gdansk Deep (Council Regulation No 1098/2007). There was not however, consensus on the 
duration of the spawning closures. The fishing industry argued that a shorter spawning closure i.e. 
one month in West and two in East, would enable the small-scale fishery to survive with a days-at-
sea system regulating their effort to the remainder of the year, and that there was no unambiguous 
scientific documentation that spawning closures would enhance stocks. The green organisations 
argued for a spawning closure of two and three months respectively (BS RAC 2006). 
 
Time Management innovation Type of institutional learning 
1995 Seasonal closure in the Bornholm Deep To protect spawning and after recommendations from ICES 
– complex learning to achieve a new goal. Adaptation to 
high fishing pressure combined with poor reproduction 
success. The good catches of the mid-1980s had declined 
dramatically – simple learning. 
2005 Separate TACs for eastern and western cod 
stocks 
Separated on biological grounds and after recommendations 
from ICES. Adaptation to ecological knowledge about 
differences in genetic characteristics between the two 
stocks and to the severe situation for the eastern ock - 
complex learning to achieve a new goal. 
2005 Gotland and Gdansk Deeps were 
established as closed areas and the 
Bornholm Deep was expanded. Time and 
area closure (summer ban, spawning area 
closure) 
The scientific basis was provided by ICES after a request 
from IBSFC on the 9th September 2003 (ICES 2004). 
Adaptation to high fishing mortality protects cod spawning 
without at the same time including a risk of redirecting 
fishing efforts towards juvenile cods - simple learning. 
Table 5. Management innovation and type of institutional learning 
 
The main reasons behind the implementation of the management innovations earlier described have 
been to cope with the severe situation and the highfishing pressure on Baltic cod. The adaptation 
and learning has been merely in accordance to scientific facts (ICES, 2004). They have been 
implemented through a hierarchic top-down implementation process with little involvement of 
stakeholders from the local levels. In Baltic fisheries, it is often high-level political negotiations that 
results in complex compromises (Delaney, 2007). However, as always in legislation on the 
European level and according to some of the respondents for this report it has been a quite intensive 
lobby campaign from both green NGOs and fisheries interests in legislation concerning fisheries in 
the Baltic. The trouble is that local fishermen have little insight into the political negotiations that 
set the rules (Gustavsson, 2007).  
 
Many fishermen in the interviews describe management of Baltic cod like a “never ending story 
with more and more regulations that are more and more complicated resulting in more and more 
frustrated fishermen” (Interview 21, skipper on a gill-netter from Nexø). However not only the 
fishermen but also other stakeholders describe the management system as centralised and not well 
functioning: “the management of Baltic fisheries has completely failed with ecosystem-based 
approach to management and BS RAC can be seen as a simple way for the Commission to get rid of 
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the debate” (Interview 5, respondent from WWF). Even if individual fishermen are of the opinion 
that BS RAC has, so far, made little mark on the local level, the representatives for the fishermen 
organisations in the interviews consider that BS RAC work well and is a good initiative for the 
future, but as Rasmussen express it “I would say that the RAC work well but I wonder why the 
Commission do not take into consideration the advice from the RAC” (Interview 14). Maybe it is 
like one trawl skipper from Simrishamn expressed it “fisheries managers need to learn how to 
better communicate with fishermen” (Interview 11). 
 
5. CEVIS hypothesis on social robustness 
 
The CEVIS hypotheses under focus in the Baltic Sea case are: 
1. Commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a management system will be a function of the extent 
to which: 
a) the management system is perceived by the fishermen to be practical and necessary 
b) the management system reproduced the status quo of fishing opportunities when introduced 
c) which new entrants are facilitated 
d) which retirement options are provided for 
2. The more diverse stakeholder involvement in the devlopment and/or operation of a management 
system, the lower the acceptance of the concerned commercial fisheries actors.  
3. The more diverse the stakeholder involved in the development and/or or operation of a 
management system the more institutional learning takes place.  
 
The first hypothesis about “commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a management system will 
be a function of the extent to which ...” is clearly verified in this case. An overall opinion from the 
stakeholders in the interviews is that it is a very complicated hierarchic system with many different 
temporary and area closures which make the daily fishing activities difficult and complicated. This 
is particularly a problem for smaller vessels that are more dependent on weather conditions. Many 
of the fishermen also answer that it is very difficult to make business planning due to constantly 
changing time and area closures. The management system i  not predictable. It is flexibility in rules 
and regulation but not in fishing operations – “management and control seems to change 
continuously” (Interview 15, trawl skipper from Nexø). Some of them can even accept stronger 
enforcement (particularly in other parts of the Baltic Sea, notably Poland) if the management 
system can provide clear and stable “rules of the game” in the fishery. Thus, the two innovations are 
only partly seen to be practical and necessary in an overarching sense. The closure yes (necessary) 
but the division of the cod stocks no (necessary and practical). These innovations have reduced 
fishing opportunities and made it more complicated and have had a negative impact upon 
acceptance and legitimacy. According to some of the respondents it has also an indirect impact on 
new entrants into cod fishing because the management system apprehends as more complicated 
than before – with unpredictability come an unwillingness to invest, this is supported by the fact 
that it has been a very low recruitment to the fisheries sector in Nexø and Simrishamn during the 
last years. These two innovations have no impact on retirement options. Altogether this affects the 
commercial fisheries actor’s acceptance of the management system for Baltic cod negatively which 
is also verified in the interviews. The result from analysing the Baltic case from this hypothesis 
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strongly give indications that low legitimacy for management innovations affect support and 
compliance for a management regime negatively. In this case particularly the division of the cod 
stock has affected legitimacy for the management regime negatively due to the practical 
implications for fishing. The result also give indications that even with a rule that is apprehended as 
“necessary” among the stakeholders the acceptance ad legitimacy can be low if the practical 
implications on the daily fishing activities is too severe. 
 
The second hypothesis about “the more diverse stakehold r involvement in the development and/or 
operation of a management system, the lower the accptance of the concerned commercial fisheries 
actors” is not one-sided supported in this case. Th division of the cod stocks has been implemented 
with no diverse stakeholder involvement but it is anyhow a low acceptance among commercial 
fishermen – not one-sided on the biological reasons f r the division but with huge majority for the 
negative practical implications of the division. However, closed areas and seasons for cod fisheries 
have a quite high acceptance particularly when it comes to protect spawning and juveniles. The 
importance of protecting spawning and juveniles is almost a common opinion with very high 
acceptance but the complex management regime with many temporal closures and stops lower the 
legitimacy also for this innovation. The analysis behind this hypothesis is that diverse stakeholder 
representation may lead to a questioning of the legitimacy of other stakeholders as well as to 
frustration with complex process. The conclusion from the Baltic case is that even without diverse 
stakeholder involvement the frustration over complex processes can be extensive.  
 
The third hypothesis about “the more diverse the stakeholder involved in the development and/or or 
operation of a management system the more institutional learning takes place”. The analysis behind 
this hypothesis is that the involvement of more diverse stakeholders widens the range of alternative 
views in deliberations and negotiations. At the moment the impression is that stakeholders do not 
feel invested in the management process or feel that they have a say. It is the classical tendency of a 
purely centralised top-down management system (Rova, 2004). Today, the main stakeholder group 
– the fishermen – are far away from the political process and decisions that govern their fishing 
operations. On one hand, it is in the Baltic case a significant instance of ecological learning – 
spawning areas, external factors affecting the cod resource, about genetic differences between the 
eastern and western stock, etc – although the stakeholders involved were not particularly diverse. A 
lot of learning seems to be pure ecological and prima ily performed within ICES and other 
ecological research institutes on national levels. These stakeholders have more of an advisory role 
and are not involved in decision-making. Institutional learning in this case has merely been done 
due to external changes and new knowledge on the ecosystem in the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, 
learning how to create trust between stakeholders and authorities, legitimacy and compliance for 
rules and regulations as well as how to communicate the necessity of different management 
innovations down to the local level seems to be very low. However, the implementation of the BS 
RAC can be seen as a way of trying to deal with these issues but so far it has made little impression 
on the local level. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
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The Baltic Sea case shows that the two management innovations have been implemented as a result 
of external changes and new ecological knowledge on the Baltic cod stocks. The institutional 
learning that has happened has merely been so called simple learning or adaptation to changes in 
the ecosystem with low problem-solving capacity. More complex learning that contains more 
fundamental questioning and redefinition of underlying vales and ends has not taken place. This, in 
turn, has affected social robustness and stakeholder acceptance for this management regime 
negatively. If the management system does not have the “ability to learn how to learn” the 
stakeholders involved understanding the aim with rules and regulations that have been 
implemented, the acceptance will most likely be low. With low stakeholder acceptance legitimacy 
and compliance for the management regime will also be low. Certainly, low legitimacy and non-
compliance in management is still a serious threat for Baltic cod fisheries also after these 
innovations - thus, resulting in low problem-solving capacity. This is particularly important in a 
case like this, where local fishermen express the opini n that management and control changes 
continuously and that the management system becomes more and more complicated. In this case it 
is obvious that many stakeholders can see the nec ssity with for example closure during spawning 
but the management regime has failed to communicate how to design these closures so that they are 
practical for the local users. It highlights the importance of communication down to the local level 
to succeed with new innovations and regulations. Stakeholders need to feel part of the process and 
feel they have a say. With more diverse stakeholder involvement in the development and operation 
of the Baltic cod fishery the probability is high ta  more institutional learning had taken place. The 
BS RAC can be an initiative in that direction but is still to new and was not in force when the 
management innovations under focus in this report we e implemented. This case also, to a certain 
extent, disconfirms the hypothesis that diverse stakeholder involvements in the operation of a 
management system lower the acceptance of the concerned commercial fisheries actors. Thus, even 
without a diverse stakeholder involvement the acceptance is quite low. 
  
With reference to this case, the degree and consequences of any management innovation is a 
function of the extent it is perceived by the fisherm n to be practical and necessary. If these 
innovations also affect fishing opportunities negatively when introduced this aggravate the 
situation. The innovations under focus in this repot have not affected new entrants and retirement 
options to any major extent and it is therefore impossible to draw any conclusions from these two 
parts of the hypothesis. However, it is quite easy to speculate that if, for example, retirement options 
had improved; legitimacy for the management system had also improved. Dissatisfied fishermen 
could retire and the “classical mismatch” in many fisheries between the resource base and the 
harvesting capacity could be reduced. One innovation that is not under focus in this report but worth 
to mention is the newly introduced day-at-sea system hat has affected many local fishermen 
positively. They are more positive about the future, times of bad weather can be compensated and 
they can more easily plan their operations, it allows for more flexibility and could ease for more 
weather dependent small-scale vessels. This is a step in the right direction, as it allows for more 
flexibility. With this innovation, local users can see the necessity and its practical use. Thus, it 
increases both stability and flexibility at the same time. 
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Appendix 2: Report from the Faroe Islands case study 
Anne-Sofie Christensen 
 
1.0  
 
This report is an evaluation of the social robustness of the Faroese fisheries management 
system, ‘the fishing-days system’. The evaluation is conducted as part of work package 6 
regarding social robustness of CEVIS (Comparative Evaluations of Innovative Solutions in 
European fisheries management). CEVIS is funded by the EU under the 6th Framework 
Programme under Integrating and Strengthening the European Research Area - Policy-oriented Research. 
CEVIS is focused on performance evaluation of fisheries management regimes with regard to 
economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness of management, and social and biological robustness. 
Other parallel studies have been conducted on the Faroe Islands as part of CEVIS with regard 
to biological robustness, cost efficiency of the management system, and economic robustness. 
 
The report is based on two sources of information: 1) Desk studies including review of 
literature and web pages, and 2) field studies producing qualitative interviews with key persons. 
The desk studies were conducted both previous to the field study to get acquainted with the 
field and after returning from the field to check up on data etc.  
 
The interviews took place during two weeks in October 2007 in Tórshavn (the Faroese capital) 
and Klaksvig (the biggest fishing port on the Faroe Islands). Kjellrun Hiis Hauge, who works as 
a fisheries biologist in Institute of Marine Research (IMR) Bergen, Norway, participated in the 
interviews of the first week. Prior arrangements had been made to interview key representatives 
from the Ministry of Fisheries, industry representatives and relevant people from academia. In 
total 21 people were interviewed; Table 4 provides an overview of the profiles of the persons 
interviewed.  
 
Present job 
 
Background 
Civil servants 
(People in Ministry 
or inspection)  
Researcher Fishermen (and their 
representatives) 
Total 
Biologist/scientist 2 2  4 
Social science  3 4 1 8 
Fisherman 2  6 8 
Other 1   1 
Total 8 6 7 21 
Table 4 Professional affiliation and background of the interviewees 
 
The interviews were in-depth, open-ended interviews with stakeholders of the Faroese fisheries 
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management system. The aim of the interviews was to get an insight into the social robustness 
of the Faroese fisheries management system. In order to achieve this, a general understanding 
of how the system works and of the trade-offs in the system was necessary. Moreover, the 
interviews were intended to identify day-to-day issues in the management of fisheries and 
contingency measures that are being taken to counteract threats to the well-being of the 
resource, such as non-compliant behaviour. The interviews covered the history and 
development of the Faroese system, the changes in costs and benefits for fisheries management 
operations associated with the innovation, what indicators they use to monitor and improve 
outcomes, and what they see as the best practices in implementing, monitoring and enforcing 
the innovations, and the resulting management measures.  
 
1.1 Social robustness  
 
In the CEVIS working group, five hypotheses were formulated regarding the relations between 
the management innovation (participatory governance and rights-based management including 
effort-based management) and the social robustness (stakeholder acceptance and institutional 
learning). These are the key concepts of our analysis and need further definition:  
 
Social robustness of a fisheries management regime (innovation) will for the purposes of the 
CEVIS project be defined by two dimensions: acceptance of the regime by its stakeholders, and 
institutional learning within the regime. While stakeholder acceptance describes (agency) 
processes at the micro level of individual actors, institutional learning is about processes at the 
meso level of organizations and institutions.  
 
Social robustness  
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1. Rights-based management systems tend not 
to have broad stakeholder representation. 
2. Commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a 
RBM system will be a function of the extent to 
which: a) the management system is perceived 
by the fishermen to be practical [and necessary]; 
b) the management system (in RBM: the initial 
allocation) reproduced the status quo of fishing 
opportunities when introduced; c) which new 
entrants are facilitated; d) which retirement 
options are provided for. 
4. Rights-based management systems restrict 
capacity for institutional learning. 
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3.The more diverse stakeholder involvement in 
the development and/ or operation of a 
management system, the lower the acceptance 
of the affected commercial fisheries actors. 
 
5. The more diverse the stakeholders involved in 
the development and/ or operation of a 
management system, the more institutional 
learning takes place. 
Table 5 The five working hypotheses of CEVIS 
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Stakeholder acceptance of a management regime describes the position that fisheries 
stakeholders take vis-à-vis a management regime. Fisheries stakeholders are groups that have an 
interest in the decision-making process and that are potentially affected by the decisions. 
Stakeholder acceptance may be assessed through analysis of: 1) Views expressed by various 
stakeholders. 2) Participation of the stakeholders in the management regime: attendance, 
engagement. 3) Actions taken by the stakeholders (against a management regime, e.g. protest, 
lawsuits) as well as (non-) compliance with the management regime. 
 
Institutional learning is the process in which institutions change in reaction to internal pressures 
or external changes in ecosystems and socio-economic context. It is no teleological process and 
may occur unintentionally. When assessing institutional learning in the context of European 
fisheries management regimes, we may distinguish between process-level and outcome-level 
learning. 
 
Process-level learning can take place in different ways: Through simple learning (or adaptation) 
and complex learning (or genuine learning). Simple learning describes changes in means in order 
to more effectively achieve given goals, while complex learning describes changes in goals. 
Complex learning includes the more fundamental questioning and redefinition of underlying 
values and ends, the new specification of causal relationships and may even encompass 
‘reflexive learning’ as a revision of the very concept of problem solving (the ability to learn how 
to learn).  
 
Outcome-level learning is defined as the learning processes that address the problem at hand 
successfully (high problem-solving capacity) and learning processes that do not address 
problems successfully (low problem-solving capacity). 
 
2.0 The Faroe Islands and their fisheries  
 
The Faroe Islands consist of eighteen smaller islands with a population of some 47,000 of 
which about 17,000 live in the capital Tórshavn, about 5,000 in Klaksvig, and the rest is 
scattered around seventeen of the Islands. The islands are situated between Scotland and 
Iceland in the Northeast Atlantic with a total land area of some 1400 sq. km and a sea area of 
274,000 sq. km. The distance from Enniberg on Viðoy in the north to Sumbiarsteinur south of 
Suðuroy is 118 km, but the coastline of the Faroes is more than 1.100 km. The language of the 
Faroe Islands, Faroese, is a west Nordic language, which derives from an old Nordic language 
(www.tinganes.fo). Danish is also an official language and is widely spoken, but not used in the 
public documents – e.g. the Commercial Fisheries Act only exists in an unofficial Danish 
version.  
 
The Faroe Islands has been a self-governed territory since 1948 (Home Rule Act, 1948) but 
remains a part of the Kingdom of Denmark. The relation to Denmark is important in 
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understanding the fisheries management of the Faroe Islands: The Faroe Islands legislate and 
govern a wide range of areas in accordance with the Home Rule Act of 1948. These include the 
conservation and management of living marine resources within the 200-mile fisheries zone, 
sub-surface resources, trade, fiscal, industrial and environmental policies, transport, 
communications, culture, education and research (www.tinganes.fo). Hence, when Denmark 
joined the European Community (later European Union) in 1973, the Faroe Islands chose not 
to be a part of Denmark’s membership as the Faroe Islands wanted to negotiate their own 
trade and fisheries agreements with the EU and other countries (www.tinganes.fo). This was 
possible given the Home Rule Act.  
 
When you look at the importance of fisheries on the Faroes, you immediately understand the 
Faroese wish of being in complete control of the marine resources. The Faroe Islands are to a 
tremendous degree economically dependent on the fishing and aquaculture industries 
compared to (almost) any other country in the world. Hence, the fisheries are a significant 
aspect of Faeroese self-governance, as the Faeroese economy is almost entirely dependent on 
this industry (Gezelius, 2008): 95 per cent of Faeroese exports and almost 50 per cent of the 
GDP stem from fisheries and fish farming (Gezelius, 2008). Faroese fisheries are mixed 
fisheries, but the Faroese EEZ has three main demersal species of fish: Cod (Gadus morhua), 
haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), and saithe (Pollachius virens). 
 
 
3.0 Fisheries management on the Faroe Islands 
 
On the Faroe Islands, they have a system for managing their demersal fisheries that is unlike 
most other fisheries management system. Most fisheries management systems are focusing on 
the output of the fisheries – namely on the fish. Hence, the unit of management is most often 
the fish. The fisheries rights are distributed in quotas, i.e. shares of total allowable catches 
(TAC), which designate how many fish the system allows to be caught.  
 
On the Faroe Islands, the focus of the management system is opposite: They have a so-called 
input controlled system that focuses on the effort that the fishermen apply to fisheries. The 
fishing right on the Faroe Islands is formulated in number of days, during which the individual 
fishermen have the right to fish. Hence, the system is rights-based, and the fishing days are 
tradable within certain restrictions. The fishing-days system of the Faroe Islands has many of 
the qualities of the individual transferable quotas. Both input and output based fisheries 
management systems are most often supplemented with a number of technical measures on 
fishing gear and spatial areas.  
 
3.1 The fishing fleet of the Faroe Islands 
 
The Faroese fishing-days system is based on a segmentation of the fleet. Table 6 shows the 
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number of vessels in 2007, segmented into the vessel groups for type of regulation. The 
segmentation is based on size of vessel and gear type. The table shows that the vessel groups 
with the numbers 2, 3, 4A-line, 4A-trawl, 4B-line, 4T-trawl, 5A, and 5B are under the regulation 
of the fishing-days system. Each of these groups is annually allocated a number of fishing days 
per year; these days are allocated to the individual vessel.  
 
 
 
Table 6 Definition of fleet categories used in the Faroese effort management system, the associated number of 
licenses issued, and the main tools for regulating their activities (Jákupsstovu et al., 2007:731) 
 
3.2 Transferability of fishing days 
 
The Faroese fishing vessels can throughout the year trade their fishing days internally in the 
group. They can both lease out the fishing days for one year or sell them for good. The last 
three months of the fishing year (from June to August), all commercial fishermen can trade 
fishing days, but only for the current year.  
 
As one fishing day for a large trawler and small long liner is far from the same with regard to 
fishing mortality, they have developed a key for transforming the fishing days from one kind of 
vessel to another (Kunngerð nr. 13 frá 25. Februar 2005 um avhending av fiskidøgum sum 
broytt við kunngerð nr. 76 frá 13. Juni 2006). Table 7 shows the weights between the vessels. 
Please note, that the categories of the vessels do not follow the groups of vessels as shown in 
Table 6, but is more detailed with regard to fishing capacity using three different measures for 
weighting fishing capacity between the different kinds of vessels.  
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This trading of fishing days is monitored by the fisheries inspection. There is no official 
institution for the trading – the connection between buyer and seller is informal, so is the price 
formation of the fishing days.  
 
From 1996 to about year 2000 no trading took place between the vessels across the groups. 
This possibility was introduced to ensure that as many fishing days as possible were used. Since 
then this system has been in place and has not been essentially revised. The system will be 
revised when the rest of the fisheries management system is to be revised. 
 
  Pair 
trawler 
>1500 
Pair 
trawler 
1100 - 
1499 
Pair 
trawler < 
1100 
Trawler 
> 300 
kW  
Trawler 
< 300 
kW 
Long 
liner 
>600 
Long 
liner 
300 - 
599 
Long 
liner 
200 - 
299 
Long 
liner 
120 - 
199 
Long 
liner 
<120 
Pair 
trawler>1500 
1,00 1,17 1,40 1,56 1,87 1,40 2,33 3,11 4,00 5,60 
Pair trawler 
1100 - 1499 
0,86 1,00 1,20 1,33 1,60 1,20 2,00 2,67 3,43 4,80 
Pair trawler < 
1100 
0,71 0,83 1,00 1,11 1,33 1,00 1,67 2,22 2,86 4,00 
Trawler> 300 
kW 
0,64 0,75 0,90 1,00 1,20 0,90 1,50 2,00 2,57 3,60 
Trawler< 300 
kW 
0,54 0,63 0,75 0,83 1,00 0,75 1,25 1,67 2,14 3,00 
Long liner 
>600  
0,71 0,83 1,00 1,11 1,33 1,00 1,67 2,22 2,86 4,00 
Long liner 300 
- 599 
0,43 0,50 0,60 0,67 0,80 0,60 1,00 1,33 1,71 2,40 
Long liner 200 
- 299 
0,32 0,38 0,45 0,50 0,60 0,45 0,75 1,00 1,29 1,80 
Long liner 120 
- 199 
0,25 0,29 0,35 0,39 0,47 0,35 0,58 0,78 1,00 1,40 
Long liner 
<120 
0,18 0,21 0,25 0,28 0,33 0,25 0,42 0,56 0,71 1,00 
Table 7 Weights in fishing days between the different kinds of vessels in the last three months of the fishing year. 
The measure in the table for the pair trawlers is (length*breadth*depth)*HP/1000, for trawlers engine power in 
kW, for long liners and small long liners length*breadth*depth. (Kunngerð nr. 13 frá 25. Februar 2005 um 
avhending av fiskidøgum sum broytt við kunngerð nr. 76 frá 13. Juni 2006). 
 
3.3 Technical measures and closed areas 
 
The fishing-days system is supported by a number of technical measures, for instance minimum 
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mesh sizes, gear restrictions, and restrictions to ensure that the capacity of the fleet does not 
increase16.  
 
However, the key component of the Faroese fisheries management system, apart from the 
fishing–days system, is spatial management of the waters around the Faroe Islands. They have a 
detailed and complex system of area closures, e.g. within 6 miles (the red line in Figure 1) long 
liners are not allowed to fish.              Figure 2 shows areas that are closed for the trawlers, and 
Figure 3 shows areas that are closed for spawning season part of the year. 
 
They also have temporary area closures. If for instance 30 % of the catch is under a certain size 
limit, then the area is closed for two weeks. The fishermen are obliged to report catches of 
juvenile fish.  
 
Figure 1 Inside the red line, long liners are not allowed             Figure 2 Areas where trawling is not allowed 
                                                
16 The development in capacity of the Faroese fleet was most often discussed in the interviews. Most informants 
agreed that capacity had increased and that the main flaw of the system was the lack of ability to measure and 
compare capacity over time. 
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Figure 3 Areas closed for spawning seasons 
 
 
3.5 Participation in the management system 
  
The structure of the decision-making system on the Faroe Islands is similar to that of other 
Scandinavian countries, and the Danish system in particular. The system can be characterised as 
negotiated economy (Christensen et al. 2007). The negotiated economy works through an 
institutional set-up, where advisory boards consisting of stakeholders advise the Minister. The 
Minister can make some decisions, while others have to go through the Faroese Parliament, 
Lagtinget. As the Faroe Islands are not a member of the European Union, the Faroese 
Parliament makes the decisions on the number of fishing days, area closures and technical 
measures. 
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Figure 4 The process of setting the number of sea-days (Løkkegaard et al., 2004:14) 
 
The idea behind the fishing-days system was that the fishing capacity and the number of fishing 
days should be fixed. The fishermen should absorb the fluctuations of the stocks meaning that 
they would have some years with good cod fisheries, and when the cod stocks went down then 
the fishermen would shift to another more lucrative fishery, leaving the cod stock in peace so 
that it could grow. This idea has partly been abandoned as the fishing capacity has probably 
increased during the last ten years17. 
 
Hence, one of the most important decisions for the Minister to make is that of setting the 
number of fishing days, which takes place in consultation with biologists and active fishermen. 
An overview of the procedure is sketched in Figure 4.  
 
The board of fishermen is centrally set by the Ministry: §5 stk. 9. of the Faroese Commercial 
Fisheries Act says: ‘The Ministry of Fisheries elects a fishing-days board representing 
commercial fisheries to give the Ministry an evaluation of stock abundance in the demersal 
fisheries and suggestions on the number of fishing days to be allocated and on how the 
fisheries should be planned for the coming year. The board and substitutes are elected for a 
period of four years. The Ministry of Fisheries makes the rules for election and the work of the 
board and distributes necessary information for the board to do its work. The Minister of 
Fisheries elects a chairman, a deputy chairman, and employs a secretary’ (Anon., 1994)18. 
                                                
17 This is a highly controversial statement. The officials on the Faroe Islands and a few industry representatives 
thought that fishing efficiency had gone up since the introduction of the system. Other people from the industry 
argue that the efficacy has gone down or stayed unchanged as the number of vessels has gone down. Little 
attention has been paid to measuring the fishing capacity; hence it is difficult to say. 
18 Author’s translation from: ’Fiskeriministeriet vælger en fiskedagebestyrelse, som repræsenterer 
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When setting the number of fishing days, the first step is the biologists’ report, which the 
Ministry receives every year, June 15th. Even though the shift from input control to output 
control reformed the entire management system the system is still monitoring stock abundance 
through stock assessments. The biologists’ report contains recommendations for the number of 
fishing days.  
 
This report is given to the fishing-days board. The board only consists of active fishermen (not 
their organisational representatives). They make a second report based on the biologists’ report 
and experiences from their everyday life at sea.  
 
After the biologists and the fishermen have made their recommendations, the Minister 
develops a third report based on the previous two reports. Usually he mainly follows the advice 
given by the fishermen. E.g. for the fishing year 2007/8 the biological recommendation was to 
cut the number of fishing days by approximately 30 percent. The industry recommended no 
change in the number of fishing days. The Ministry suggested a reduction of approximately 1 
percent.  
 
The report from the Ministry is handed out to the Parliament, which has the final decision-
making power – but they usually follow the line of the report produced in the Ministry.  
 
3.6 The stakeholders and their organisation 
 
Before the field trip a definition of stakeholders across the four case studies was made: 
Stakeholders were defined to be a person in one (or more) of these four groups: 1) Commercial 
fisheries interests: both primary interests (harvesters of all commercial scales) and secondary 
interest (processors, marketing, other businesses directly depending on the fisheries business, 
e.g. boat builders, gear suppliers, chandlers etc.). 2) Fisheries management: managers and 
scientists/advisors. 3) Non-commercial interests: Conservation NGOs; community and family; 
recreational/angling interests; consumers etc., and 4) Other commercial interests related to the marine 
environment: aquaculture, oil, energy, tourism etc. 
 
On the Faroe Islands, the breath of the stakeholders is much smaller than in the definition. 
Apart from stakeholder group number 2), only the people whose work is related to fisheries 
were organised and played any role at all in the decision-making processes and the public 
debate. No green organisation or the like play an active role on the Faroe Islands.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
erhvervsmæssigt fiskeri, som giver fiskeriministeriet vurdering om tilstanden i bundfiskeriet og forslag om 
fiskedage, og hvordan fiskeriet skal tilrettelægges kommende fiskeår. Udvalget og suppleanter vælges for en 4 års 
periode. Fiskeriministeriet laver regler for valg og udvalgets virke og sørger for nødvendigt materiale så 
bestyrelsen kan udføre sit arbejde. Fiskeriministeren vælger formand, næstformand og ansætter sekretær’. 
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In Denmark, most fishermen (across gear type, vessel size, fishing water/species) are organised 
trough one organisation, Danish Fishermen’s Association. This is primarily a political 
organisation to serve the interests of the Danish fishermen and to assist the fishermen in legal 
matters. This is different in the Faroese system, which is more similar to the system of Iceland. 
The fishermen are organised in different associations, which work together when needed or 
work against each other when disagreeing. The individual fisherman on the Faroes is often 
member of several associations. 
 
Fundamentally they have three kinds of associations: 1) For vessel owners, e.g. Føroya 
Reiðarafelag (for the larger vessels), Meginfelag Útróðramanna (for the smaller vessels – this 
association also has a few members that do not own their own vessel), and many other for the 
specific gear types. 2) For people employed on the vessel, e.g. Føroya Fiskimannafelagið (like a 
workers’ union for all employed fishermen), Skipara og Navigatørfelagið (for skippers and 
navigators), Maskinmeistarafelagið (for engineers), Føroya Motorpassarafelag (for engine 
workers), Felagið Trolbátar (for people working on trawlers). 3) The sales association 
Ráfiskaseljarafelagið (for all fishermen). Apart from these three categories some of the fishermen 
are also members of the processors union – this is the case when the processing industries and 
vessels are horizontally integrated.  
 
4.0 Political and historical background for the fishing-days system 
 
Up until 1994 fisheries around the Faroe Islands were regulated through technical measures 
such as area closures and regulations of mesh sizes. In 1991 and 1993, the most important 
demersal species were at a historically low level (Løkkegaard et al. 2004). At the same time the 
economy of the Faroe Islands was collapsing and the Danish government stepped in with 
loans. According to Jákupsstovu et al. (2007) and Løkkegaard et al. (2004), part of the demands 
from the Danish Government when giving the loans were that fisheries should be managed so 
that the usage of the resources could be economically optimised and sustainable. Hence, a 
board was established to look into how fisheries were best managed on the Faroe Islands. At 
that time, Iceland and New Zealand had just introduced individual transferable quotas (ITQs) 
and had success with their management systems. Hence, the key instrument in the management 
system that the advisory committee came up with was ITQs.  
 
The quota regulations were established in 1994. But the users of the system and some 
politicians were highly against the system. The main criticism of the system was the problem of 
single species management of a mixed fishery: The fishermen complained of the amounts of 
discard that occurred when they hit the quota ceiling of one of the species. Another ‘problem’ 
was that the cod surprisingly returned in 1996-1997. The rapid return of the cod was a great 
surprise to the biologists (and many others) of the Faroe Islands. As the TAC had been based 
on the low cod stock, the fishermen had very low quotas and very high catch rates.  
 
Already in November 1995, the Faroese government Landsstyret set down a board for 
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evaluation of the possibilities for changing the quota system. The board was composed of 
representatives from the industry and civil servants. The purpose of the board was: To evaluate 
the use of technical measures within the framework of the fisheries political objectives concerning biologic and 
economic sustainability including an evaluation of advantages and disadvantages of different ways of regulating 
based on biological, economical, and enforcement criteria19 (Løkkegaard et al., 2004, p.10).  
 
The recommendation of the board was to establish an effort-based management system for the 
demersal fleet segments, supplemented with technical measures and area closures. The 
suggestion was decided upon by Government and the system was in place for the fishing year 
1996/9720. 
 
Year Management 
system 
New situation Institutional learning 
U
nt
il 
19
94
 
Technical 
measures such as 
area closures and 
regulation of 
mesh sizes 
Capacity was high, cod stock 
low. Overinvestment in the 
fleet lead to collapse of 
several banks. 
Denmark interfered in Faroese fisheries policy as 
Denmark demanded that the Faroe Islands set up 
a management system for their fisheries in return 
for loans. One can only guess what learning would 
have happened if this had not taken place. 
19
94
-1
99
6 ITQ system 
Political demand from 
Denmark in return for loans 
that the Faroe Islands 
should set up a management 
system. A Faroese group 
suggested an ITQ, which 
was adopted. 
Given the mixed fisheries on the Faroe Islands 
and the mix-match between the TACs and the 
actual catches, they had to abolish the quota 
system as the system had no legitimacy among the 
fishermen. 
19
96
- 
Fishing-days 
system 
Two very strong year classes 
of cod lead to high catch 
rates and too small quotas. 
Both fishermen and 
politicians worked to change 
the system.  
Since the introduction of the fishing-days system, 
the system has not changed much. The lack of 
measurement of capacity is often mentioned as the 
key flaw of the system; but none of the 
interviewees saw themselves as being the one to 
open the debate. 
 
 
5.0 Testing social robustness on hypotheses  
                                                
19 Author’s translation from Danish: At vurdere anvendelsen af tekniske bevaringsforanstaltninger inden for rammerne af de 
fiskeripolitiske målsætninger om biologisk og økonomisk bæredygtighed herunder at vurdere fordele og ulemper ved forskellige 
reguleringsmetoder ud fra såvel biologiske, økonomiske og kontrolmæssige kriterier 
20 The fishing year is starting in September and ending in late August. 
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5.1 H1: Rights-based management systems tend to not have broad stakeholder 
representation 
 
The thinking behind this hypothesis is that RBM systems create a sense of ownership and 
rights on the part of a narrowly defined group (e.g. vessel owners) that discourages the 
involvement of other stakeholders. Hence, RBM systems are mainly concerned with the 
allocation and management of (individually) assigned fishing rights and are therefore are often 
perceived to be of little interest for wider stakeholders groups (e.g. conservationists, processors, 
local communities) to which rights are not allocated. Hence, the perceived need for 
involvement of stakeholders with broader interests (such as fisheries management, marine 
conservation, securing the supply chain, and community development) during the development 
or implementation/operation phases is modest. 
 
The case study on the Faroe Islands confirmed the hypothesis as their fishing-days system is 
fundamentally a RBM system, and as only a narrow group of stakeholders are included in the 
decision-making processes. All stakeholders have commercial interests, each of them organised 
in their own association (e.g. for captains, fishermen on deck, ship-owners, engine people, 
people who work on shore etc.) and the breath of stakeholder representation is between these 
groups, which all have commercial interests at stake and, in a European context, would be 
considered narrow.  
 
So on one hand, the hypothesis is confirmed on the Faroe Islands; on the other hand 
stakeholder representation has historically always been narrow even before the introduction of 
the fishing-days system. It is difficult to assess whether it is the RBM system that has created 
the narrow stakeholder representation or it is due to other factors which perhaps has to do with 
tradition. It could be based in the tremendous importance of the fisheries on the Faroe Islands 
and the economical crises that historically have occurred whenever the fisheries were in a bad 
state. 
 
5.2 H2: Commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a (rights-based) management 
system will be a function of the extent to which 
a) the management system is perceived by the fishermen to be practical21 [and 
necessary];  
b) the management system (in RBM: the initial allocation) reproduced the status quo of 
fishing opportunities when introduced;  
c) new entrants are facilitated;  
d) retirement options are provided for.  
                                                
21 E.g. is transparent; not too complicated; no necessity to break the rules; easy to monitor so that others are 
prevented from cheating etc. 
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The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that stakeholder acceptance is strongly related to a) –
that fishermen perceive the management system to be practical and necessary. Acceptance is 
also strongly correlated with the perceived preservation of economic opportunities by existing 
users b) and d); and respectively by the maintenance of economic opportunities by potential 
future users c). 
 
On the Faroe Islands, they have a situation of extraordinary acceptance of the fishing-days 
system. Some informants rose critical voices to parts of the system (especially that the biologists 
did not have a strong enough voice and that too little effort had been put into measuring the 
developments in fishing capacity), but even these informants expressed their overall support to 
the fishing-days system because of the high degree of compliance, the production of good data, 
the handling of the mixed fisheries issues etc. 
 
a) The fishermen found the system practical. Large parts of the information they needed 
appeared on the computer screen. Both people from the fisheries inspection and people from 
the fisheries argued that it was not possible to cheat the system owing to the extensive satellite 
monitoring system. 
 
b) The system came in contrast to bad years for the fisheries with low cod stock and 
bankruptcies among vessel-owners, followed by the ITQ system with too low TAC. Maybe this 
frustration created a willingness to engage in another system as long as the new system would 
take the problems of the old system into account. So the introduction of the fishing-days 
system left all fishermen in a much better economic situation than under the previous system. 
This could be the reason why the allocation of fishing days did not cause conflicts among 
fishermen as seen in for instance New Zealand. Furthermore nobody was forced to leave 
fisheries after the introduction; even the small non-commercial vessels were included and given 
a common pool of fishing days, which until now has never been completely used up. 
 
c) None of the informants were concerned with facilitation of new entrants. Like in an ITQ 
system, new entrants have to buy/inherit fishing rights in order to enter the Faroese fisheries.  
 
d) None of the informants were concerned with retirement as an essential part of the system. If 
a vessel owner wants to retire he can sell his fishing days and vessel. Pension schemes are 
provided for the employed fisherman (each employer pays 35 DKK per fishing day and the 
fisherman himself pays 35 DKK per fishing day22). 
 
                                                
22 Figures are from January, 2008. 
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5.3 H3: The more diverse the stakeholder involvement23 in the development and 
/or operation of a management system, the lower the acceptance of the concerned 
commercial fisheries actors 
 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that broad stakeholder representation may lead to a 
questioning of the legitimacy of other stakeholders as well as to frustrations by complex 
processes. 
 
The case of fishing-days system on the Faroe Islands confirms the hypothesis as there is no 
broad stakeholder representation in the system and the system enjoys a high degree of 
acceptance and support from both the users and the managers. 
 
On the Faroe Islands, the fisheries industry is in a very strong position when decisions 
regarding fisheries management are made. No greens or other interest groups are represented in 
the decision-making processes. E.g. the board that originally suggested the fishing-days system 
was composed by the administrative head of the Ministry of Fisheries, the chief biologist of the 
Faroese Fisheries Laboratory and 3 fishermen representatives (one for the trawlers, one for the 
long liners, and one for the coastal fishermen). This board was only in function during the 
establishment of the system. Another example is the fishing-days board (‘Havdageudvalget’ on 
Figure 4). This board is composed of a chairman and 5 active fishermen. It is a bit unusual that 
the board consists of active fishermen rather than of people who represent the fishermen. 
 
The fisheries management system on the Faroe Islands was generally accepted by all the people, 
who were interviewed. Many informants mentioned two flaws of the system: 1) That the 
biologists’ advice was not taken properly into account when making decisions on the number 
of fishing days, and 2) that the system had failed to set up a system for monitoring the effort. 
Even though both flaws are potentially strong enough to undermine the system, they were 
often considered of less importance in the overall picture. 
 
5.4 H4: Rights-based management systems restrict capacity for institutional 
learning 
 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that creation of property rights will create new 
expectations and demands for secure investments and, hence, foster resistance to change (path 
dependency), which might affect the value of investment (e.g. through diluting or abolishing 
the rights; creating a new pool of rights for other purposes; opening up the system to new 
entrants; weakening the legal status of the rights). Such lock-in effects can be expected to be 
particularly strong when there are no sunset-provisions built into the allocation of rights. But 
even if sunset-provisions are given, rights holders’ resistance may prevent changes to the 
                                                
23 E.g. greens, processors, communities - but also other parts of the fishing industry. 
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management system. If institutional learning takes place, it can be expected to be geared 
towards making rights more exclusive and more easily transferable. Once differences emerge 
between fishing capacity and available resources, pressures arise to trade the rights (even when 
trade was not originally intended). 
 
Complex institutional learning has taken place in the fisheries management on the Faroe 
Islands during the last 15 year. Until the national crisis on the Faroe Islands in the early 1990es, 
the fisheries were managed by capacity restriction measures and spatial closures. In 1994, the 
ITQ system was introduced after a Faroese committee had recommended ITQs based on the 
early experiences on Iceland and New Zealand. As already mentioned, the fishermen and many 
of the politician were not happy with the system as the size of the cod TACs conflicted with 
the experiences the fishermen had at sea. The ITQ system was abolished in 1996, when the 
fishing-days system was introduced.  
 
Hence, the Faroe Islands had a RBM system, which did not restrict the capacity for institutional 
learning as this could be the only example in the world of an ITQ system that has been 
abolished. To interpret this abolishment as a quality of the RBM system would be too hasty a 
conclusion as a number of extraordinary circumstances made it possible to abolish the RBM 
system: 1) The ITQ system was only in place for two years; and the fishing-days system was 
developed within this period of time. Hence, the fishermen did not adjust too much to the ITQ 
system. The lack of capacity adjustment also had to do with the general economic crisis on the 
Faroe Islands at the time: Nobody had made investments, which meant that nobody got hit too 
hard when switching system. 2) The stock abundance of cod was tremendous at the time 
compared to how much cod the ITQ system allowed the fishermen to catch. Hence, everybody 
would gain fishing rights if switching system. 
 
Since the introduction of the fishing-days system, not much has been changed in the system. 
Even though most informants agreed that the system had failed to set up a system for 
monitoring the effort and many informants agreed that an increased focus on the fishing 
capacity development was required, nobody wanted to take the first step. From this 
perspective, the fishing-days system has a very low level of ability to ensure simple institutional 
learning with regard to fishing capacity. 
 
5.5 Hypothesis 5: The more diverse the stakeholders involved in the development 
and/or operation of a management system, the more institutional learning takes 
place 
 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that the involvement of more diverse stakeholders 
widens the range of alternative views in deliberations and negotiations. On the other hand, one 
could expect that through the involvement of highly diverse stakeholders conflicts arise that 
forestall any significant change. There is a difference in whether the involvement pertains to 
advice or to decision-making. 
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On the Faroe Islands the situation is that they do not have a diverse set of stakeholders 
involved, still significant complex institutional learning has taken place as described under 
Hypothesis 4: The introduction of the fishing-days system was an example of complex 
institutional learning that was initiated without a diverse group of stakeholders to point out the 
weaknesses of the system. On the other hand the lack of accommodation of the flaws of the 
system, e.g. the black spot with regard to fishing capacity, suggests that the system is slower to 
progress with simple institutional learning. One can only guess whether the system would have 
been more open to change if broader groups of stakeholders were active on the Faroe Islands. 
 
6.0 Conclusions  
 
On the Faroe Islands, they have managed to come up with a fisheries management system that 
has appeared to be overall socially robust:  
 
• The system has been accepted and supported by the the users, but also in general, from 
the very beginning. 
o The management system is perceived by the fishermen to be practical24 and 
necessary. 
o The management system improved everybody’s fishing opportunities when the 
initial allocation took place. 
• The fact that the system emerged after an ITQ system demonstrates that the politicians 
of the Faroe Islands had an open mind to complex institutional learning. 
• Yet the system has at least one flaw, which nobody in the system seems to be willing to 
deal with, namely the lack of monitoring of fishing capacity. 
• The commercial stakeholders have a strong voice and can influence the decision-making 
processes. 
• Yet the range of stakeholders is limited and all of them have commercial interests in the 
fisheries. The case study from the Faroe Islands cannot assess what would happen if a 
broader range of stakeholders was present on the Faroe Islands. 
 
Note on literature and contacts on the Faroe Islands 
 
The Faroe Islands is a very small field to research into. Even though the Faroese fisheries 
management system is unique in some ways, very little has been written on it. Making a search 
under ‘Faroe Islands’ and ‘Fisheries’ in ScienceDirect in all ‘social science’ and ‘humanities/arts’ 
books and journals in the ‘full text’ since 1990 yields only 27 articles and none of them with the 
Faroe Islands in the heading or the abstract. 25 of these articles only mention the Faroes once 
                                                
24 E.g. is transparent; not too complicated; no necessity to break the rules; easy to monitor so that others are 
prevented from cheating etc. 
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or twice and usually in a table or foot note. Only two articles, Sen and Nielsen (1996) and 
Jentoft and McCay (1995), mention the Faroe Islands in more than a subordinate clause. 
However, none of these are focusing on the Faroes alone, and both of them are written during 
a turbulent time before the introduction of the fishing-days system. 
 
I have contacted the Faculty of History and Social Sciences at the University of the Faroe 
Islands (Fróðskaparsetur Føroya). They answered me that their institute had not been engaged 
in fisheries related research in recent years; and hence, they could not help me. Only four 
scientific staff members are employed at this faculty all together. 
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Appendix 3: Report from North Sea case study 
Co-managed rights-based systems in Dutch and UK North Sea 
fisheries – a case study in social robustness25 
Franziska Wolff,26 H. Anne McLay,27 Bonnie McCay28 
Introduction 
Rights-based management (RBM) – particularly in the form of Individual Transferrable Quotas 
(ITQs) – is being applied more and more widely in fisheries. Often, the purpose is to enhance a 
fishery’s economic efficiency. As has been shown by a number of studies, such management 
systems can impact negatively on the social context of a fishery, by drastically reducing the number 
of fishery participants, disrupting local fishing communities or upsetting stakeholders that view the 
approach as a privatisation of commons (Symes 2000; McCay 1995). On a social meso-scale, RBM 
tends to lock in development of a management regime and immunize it against further innovation 
because the holders of rights, which quickly obtain investment value, resist change (cf. McCay 
2000). Participatory governance is a feature of management regimes whereby groups of fishermen 
and possibly other stakeholders have some power to make decisions in the planning and 
implementation of management (Gray 2005a; Mikalsen and Jentoft 2008; Symes 2006; Wilson et 
al. 2003). Co-management is a specific type of participatory governance that involves formalised 
arrangements between fishing industry groups and government, so that the industry groups have 
sole or shared authority to make decisions on some matters (Pomeroy et al. 2001). Such a co-
managed system, even accompanying rights-based management, can help open and maintain the 
potential for institutional learning and innovation (cf. Grote and Gbikpi 2002; Kooiman 1993, 
2002). 
In the following, we will analyse the ‘social robustness’ of two cases of co-managed RBM systems, 
that is, fisheries management regimes that combine rights-based management with formal co-
management. By social robustness we mean acceptance of a management regime by its stakeholders 
and the capacity for institutional learning. While stakeholder acceptance describes (agency) 
processes at the micro level of individual actors, in titutional learning is about processes at the 
societal meso-level of organizations and institutions. 
The first case examined is the Dutch system of ITQs which is combined with the ‘Biesheuvel’ co-
management system. The second is the UK’s system of sectoral quota allocations and the role of 
fishermen’s Producer Organisations in the management of these allocations. These two European 
fisheries management regimes are of particular intees  not only because they combine RBM with 
co-management, but also because the respective systms have evolved in from different starting 
points: the Dutch system started as a pure ITQ regim  which over time took on participatory 
features, while the UK system was a co-management system to start with which is now developing 
                                                
25 We would like to thank Norma Schönherr, Öko-Institut, for her comments and support, including in understanding 
Dutch language sources. 
26 Öko-Institut, Berlin Office, Germany. 
27 FRS Marine Laboratory, Aberdeen, United Kingdom. 
28 Department of Human Ecology, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA. 
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more and more into a quasi-ITQ system. This contrast will provide us with interesting opportunities 
for comparison with regard to social robustness. Our guiding questions will be the extent to which 
and why the levels of stakeholder acceptance differ in the two cases, and the causes and outcomes 
of changes in the systems over time (institutional learning) in the two cases.  
In the following (Chapter 2), we will first present the analytical framework within which we will 
work and which was developed jointly with other researchers as part of an EU-funded research 
project (CEVIS).29 The chapter will also provide some background information on the fisheries we 
are dealing with. We will then elaborate the two cases (Chapter 3) and analyse their social 
robustness according to the two dimensions laid out – s akeholder acceptance and institutional 
learning (Chapter 4). On the basis of this analysis, we will discuss a number of hypotheses 
concerning the social robustness of fisheries management regimes which were also developed 
within the CEVIS project with a view to being applied to a number of case studies (Chapter 5). 
Finally, we will draw conclusions from this discussion (Chapter 6).  
The empirical basis of our study is two qualitative nterview-based case studies. The interviews 
were carried out in early 2008 at various locations in the Netherlands30 and the UK (with a focus on 
Scotland)31. We interviewed members of the fishing industry,32 other industry or intermediate 
organisations,33 the fisheries administration,34 and conservation organisations. 
Table 8: Case study interviewees 
Professional background 
of interviewees 
Fishermen  
or represen-
tatives 
Other industry 
or intermediate 
organisations 
Fisheries 
administration 
Conservation 
NGOs 
Total 
Number of interviewees 19 6 10 2 37 
Source: authors. 
                                                
29 Research Project “Comparative Evaluations of Innovative Solutions in European Fisheries Management” (CEVIS), 
funded within the EU’s 6th Framework Programme, Project No. 022686. Project rsults do not necessary reflect the 
European Commission’s views and in no way anticipates its future policy in this area. 
30 Including Den Haag, Den Oever, Urk, Utrecht and Texel. 
31 Including Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Fraserburgh, London and Peterhead. 
32 In the Netherlands, this included managers and members of the following Biesheuvel Groups: Group Nederlandse 
Visserbond I-III, Group PO Oost, Group PO Wieringen, Group PO Texel; as well as representatives of two fishermens’ 
associations. In the UK case study, members of three Scottish POs (Aberdeen FPO/ AFPO, North East of Sc tland 
Fishermen’s Organisation/ NESFO, Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation/ SFO), one England-based flag vessel PO (North 
Sea PO) and representatives of two fishermen associations were interviewed. 
33 In the Netherlands, this included a representative of a fish auction (Visafslag Urk) and two members of the Dutch 
Fish Board (Productschap Vis). In the UK, a vessel agent and the UK and Scottish marketing organisations (Seafish, 
Seafood Scotland) were talked to. 
34 This comprised several representatives each of the Dutch, UK and Scottish fisheries ministries and fisheries 
enforcement agencies.  
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Background 
We will now specify the analytical framework of this report and detail the background of the 
fisheries whose management systems will be studied lat r.
The analytical framework: social robustness of fisheries management 
regimes 
We have introduced the concept of social robustness in Section 1 above. For the purpose of this 
report, the social robustness of a fisheries management regime will be defined by two dimensions: 
acceptance of the regime by its stakeholders and institutional learning within the regime.  
More concretely, stakeholder acceptance of a fisheries management regime describes the position 
that stakeholders take vis-à-vis a management regime. Fisheries stakeholders are groups that have 
an interest in the decision-making process and that are potentially affected by the decisions (Gray 
2005a; Wilson et al. 2003). These are, most notably, commercial fisheries interests (both primary 
and secondary interests); those involved in fisheries management including policy-makers, agency 
managers, advisors and scientists; and, finally, non-commercial interests such as conservationists, 
recreational fishermen, and communities.35 Stakeholder acceptance may be assessed through 
analysis of attitudes and perceptions on the one had, nd behaviour and action on the other. In 
particular, we will look at: the views expressed by various stakeholders; (non-) compliance of those 
governed by the regime; participation of stakeholders in the management regime; and actions taken 
by the stakeholders in favour or against a management regime (e.g. protest, lawsuits). Stakeholder 
acceptance depends on a range of factors and is the result of interactions between a fisheries 
management system and its stakeholders. 
By institutional learning we mean the process in which institutions change i reaction to internal 
pressures (e.g. of rights holders or rights managers) or external changes. The latter may occur in the 
socio-economic context (e.g. pressures by non-rights holding stakeholders or administrators) or in 
ecosystems. It is not a teleological process. Learning in institutions differs from, but is built on 
individual learning. It takes place when inferences from experiences that individuals make – and 
interpret within networks and communities (P. Haas 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) – are 
encoded into organisational routines (Levy 1994). Institutional learning involves the interaction of 
implicit (tacit) and explicit knowledge (Nonaka 1994). When assessing institutional learning in the 
context of fisheries management regimes, we distinguish:  
- at the process level: between simple learning (or ‘adaptation’)36 and complex learning (or 
genuine ‘learning’) (Nye 1997)37. Simple learning describes changes in means in order to 
more effectively achieve given goals, while complex arning describes changes in goals. 
Complex learning includes the more fundamental questioning and redefinition of underlying 
values and ends, the new specification of causal rel tionships and may even encompass 
                                                
35 Stakeholders furthermore encompass consumers and wider commercial interests related to the marine enviro ment. 
36 Other authors refer to this phenomenon as ‘single-loop learning (Argyris/Schon 1978), ‘normal’ learning (Hedberg 
1981), ‘adaptation’ (E. Haas 1990). 
37 Or ‘double-loop’ learning (Argyris and Schon 1978), ‘meta-level’ learning (Hedberg 1981), or simply ‘learning’ as 
opposed to ‘adaptation’ (E. Haas 1990). 
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‘reflexive learning’ as a revision of the very concepts of problem solving (the ability to learn 
how to learn). 
- at the outcome-level: between learning process that address the problem at hand successfully 
(high problem-solving capacity) and learning processes that do not address the problem 
successfully (low problem-solving capacity). 
The dimensions of stakeholder acceptance and institutional learning cover processes at the micro 
level of individual actors (stakeholder acceptance) and at the meso-level of organizations and 
institutions (institutional learning). In the first case, the focus is on behaviour and attitudes 
(‘agency’) of actors, in the second case on the permeation of pre-existing structures with such 
agency (‘structuration’) (Giddens 1984). 
Based on these definitions, a number of hypotheses on ocial robustness were formulated in the 
CEVIS project. The propositions link the dimensions of stakeholder acceptance and institutional 
learning in the context of rights-based management systems and forms of participatory governance 
(including co-management). We will present them below and will discuss them at the empirical 
material in Chapter 5. Note that some of the hypotheses were formulated with a view to comparing 
a broader range of case studies within CEVIS, not oly the two cases considered in the following 
sections.38 
Propositions on stakeholder acceptance 
Firstly, we propose that rights-based management systems tend not to have broad stakeholder 
representation. This is, because among other things, RBM systems create a sense of ownership and 
rights on a part of a narrowly defined group (e.g. vessel owners) that discourages the involvement 
of other stakeholders. Hence, RBM systems are mainly concerned with the allocation and 
management of (individually) assigned fishing rights and are therefore are often perceived to be of 
little interest for wider groups of stakeholders (e.g. conservationists, processors, local communities) 
to which rights are not allocated, Therefore, there is little perceived need for the involvement in the 
system’s development or implementation/operation of stakeholders with broader interests such as 
fisheries management, marine conservation, securing the supply chain, and community 
development. 
Our second proposition is that the more diverse the stakeholder involvement39 i  the development 
and / or operation of a management system, the lower the acceptance of the concerned commercial 
fisheries actors. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that diverse stakeholder representation may 
lead to a questioning of the legitimacy of other stakeholders as well as to frustration with complex 
process. 
Thirdly, we suggest that commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a rights-ba ed management 
system will be a function of the extent to which a) the management system is perceived by the 
                                                
38 The other case studies are contained in Anne-Sofie Christensen (ed), Detailed study of social robustness in four cases: 
Baltic Sea, North Sea, Western Shelf, and Faroe Island . Deliverable D13 of CEVIS (Comparative Evaluations of 
Innovative Solutions in European Fisheries Management) project. 
39 E.g. greens, processors, communities - but also other parts of the fishing industry. 
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fishermen to be practical;40 b) the management system (in RBM: the initial alloc tion) reproduced 
the status quo of fishing opportunities when introduced; c) provisions for new entrants exist; d) 
retirement options are provided for. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that acceptance is 
strongly related to the effort that fishermen need to put into making the system work (a above); the 
perceived preservation of economic opportunities by existing users (b, d above), and whether 
economic opportunities for potential future users are kept open (c). 
Propositions on institutional learning 
As regards institutional learning, we assume that rights-based management systems restrict 
capacity for institutional learning. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that creation of property 
rights will create new expectations and demands for ecure investments and hence foster resistance 
to change41 which might affect the value of investment (e.g. by diluting or abolishing the rights; 
creating a new pool of rights for other purposes; opening up the system to new entrants; weakening 
the legal status of the rights). Creation of indiviual rights will thus encourage path dependence42 
and lock-in effects (National Research Council 1999). These can be expected to be particularly 
strong when there are no sunset-provisions built into the allocation of rights. But even if sunset-
provisions are given, rights holders’ resistance may prevent changes to the management system.  
Finally, we expect that he more diverse the stakeholders involved in the development and/ or 
operation of a management system, the more institutional learning takes place. Involvement of 
more ‘diverse’ stakeholders will widen the range of alternative views in deliberations and 
negotiations (Wilkinson et al. 2003). The ‘deeper’ the involvement – on a scale ranging from advice 
to decision-making –, the more likely is institutional learning.  
The fisheries 
To analyse the combined RBM and co-management systems in the Netherlands and the UK we will 
geographically focus on the North Sea (ICES Division IV). In particular, the focus is on the plaice 
and sole fisheries and in addition, for the UK part of the study, on the wider mixed demersal 
fisheries (whitefish43/nephrops) in the northern North Sea. These fisheries were selected because of 
their economic importance and their relevance in the quota management systems. 
The fisheries are managed under the CFP with annual catch quotas (Total Allowable Catch limits, 
TACs) which are divided into national quotas among EU Member States. These are complemented 
by technical and capacity control measures: technical measures include the Plaice Box (an all-year 
closure to protect the nursery areas of plaice), the Sole Border (or ‘80-mm mesh size derogation 
area’), and various other measures. Some fleets have been subject to capacity reduction 
(decommissioning) programmes. In addition, multi-annual management plans are in place for sole 
                                                
40 e.g. is transparent; not too complicated; no necessity to break the rules; easy to monitor so that others are prevented 
from cheating etc. 
41 For a similar argumentation on resistance against the introduction of RBM, see McCay (2000). 
42 By ‘path dependence’ we mean evolution patterns in which previous decisions determine some of the alternatives 
available at a given point of time (David 2000). 
43 Apart from plaice and sole this includes cod, haddock, whiting, monkfish and halibut. 
 77 
and plaice44 and a cod recovery plan45 places limits on days at sea. In both countries, rather 
stringent enforcement regimes exist. 
The sole and plaice fishery is a mixed fishery carried out above all with beam-trawlers. Both stocks 
are considered to be overexploited. The sole stock at risk of being harvested unsustainably, the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) in 2007 was at 12,800t, 75% of which were allocated to the 
Netherlands and 4% to the UK. The plaice stock is held to be harvested sustainably and its 2007 
TAC was 49,000t. Of these, the Netherlands were allotted 38% and the UK 28%. Ecosystem 
impacts of the fisheries include benthic impact, high levels of bycatch of other flatfish and some 
roundfish (cod, whiting), and large discards. In the Dutch fishing sector, the sole and plaice sector 
constitutes the most important part of the national fleet – sole being a high priced species –, and 
represents 90% of effort in kW-days. The Dutch fleet is dominated by skipper-owners and family 
businesses. For the UK, the fleet is less important and a large part of the vessels are actually Dutch-
owned flag vessels. 
The demersal fisheries of the northern North Sea targe  either a mixture of roundfish species 
(mainly cod, haddock, and whiting) or Nephrops with a variable bycatch of roundfish. Anglerfish 
are also an important component of the catch particularly around Shetland and towards the shelf 
edge. Gear types vary among fisheries – otter trawls, pair trawls, Nephrops trawls are the most 
important methods but gill nets and seine nets are also used, the latter particularly for haddock. The 
trawlers range in size from under 10 to over 40 metres and most are owner operated.  
Cod recovery measures have dominated the management of demersal fisheries in recent years. 
These have included reduced TACs, various technical conservation measures and, in the UK, 
capacity reduction. In 2007 North Sea cod was classified by ICES as being at risk of being 
harvested unsustainably and suffering reduced reproductive capacity. The TAC for 2008 was set at 
8,628t of which the UK has a 39% share. Haddock, which is particularly important to Scotland, is 
classified as at full reproductive capacity and harvested sustainably. The TAC in 2008 was set at 
36,466t of which the UK has an 87% share. The state of the whiting stock is unknown but 
assessments indicate a declining spawning stock biomass. The TAC for 2008 was set at 17,850t, 
with a UK quota share of 9,336 tonnes (52%). With the decline in the roundfish fishery, Nephrops 
have assumed greater importance and has been the singl  most valuable species landed into 
Scotland since 2005.  
Stock assessments indicate that most of the stocks are table or increasing and harvesting is set at a 
level which does not allow for an increase in effort. The UK has an 87% share of the TAC 
(26,144t), which amounted to 22,644t in 2008. Ecological considerations related to the fisheries 
include the extent of bycatch, discarding of target and non-target species and the bycatch of cod in 
Nephrops fisheries. Various technical conservation measures are deployed to reduce these and some 
fisheries are relatively clean. However, variations in year class strength and the mixed nature of the 
fisheries combined with management based on single species TACs make it difficult to eliminate 
discards. Impacts of otter trawling on benthic habitats and biota are also of concern but the gears are 
                                                
44 Council Regulation (EC) No 676/2007 of 11 June 2007 establishing a multiannual plan for fisheries exploiting stocks 
of plaice and sole in the North Sea. The plan stipulates a reduction of fishing mortality rate on plaice and sole by 10% 
each year, with a maximum TAC variation of 15 % pery ar until safe biological limits are reached for b th stocks 
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2004 of 26 February 2004 establishing measures for the recovery of cod st cks.  
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not considered to be as damaging as beam trawls.  
Description of the cases 
When it comes to managing the uptake of national quotas under the CFP, both the Netherlands and 
the UK are operating ‘co-managed RBM systems’. Rights-based management systems include any 
‘formalised system of allocating individual fishing rights to fishermen, fishing vessels, enterprises, 
cooperatives or fishing communities’ (European Commission 2007). They basically define the 
rights to use fisheries resources, with greater or lesser degrees of transferability and other 
dimensions of property rights (cf. Scott 1996). The focus in the cases of our study is on rights to 
quota shares. Co-management means that industry groups have a partnership with government 
bodies in which they share or are delegated responsibility and authority for aspects of fisheries 
management (Gray 2005; Pomeroy et al. 2001; Wilson 2003). In our study, co-management relates 
to the implementation of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in the Netherlands and management 
of sectoral quota allocations in the United Kingdom. In both cases, co-management goes beyond the 
market-based coordination of rights transfers between indiv dual rights holders, which is at the core 
of many ‘pure’ ITQ systems. Rather, it involves network- or negotiation-based coordination 
(Mayntz 1998; Powell 1990; Vodden et al. 2006; Williamson 1996). In particular, this includes 1) 
devolved decision-making on the part of groups of rights-holder, pertaining to the setting and 
enforcement of allocative and other rules (self-governance); and 2) cooperation with government 
agencies in the development of management plans and in wi er aspects of fisheries management. 
In the following, we will elaborate upon the Dutch system of ITQs which was created in 1976 and 
combined in the early 1990s with the ‘Biesheuvel’ co-management system, and the UK’s system of 
sectoral quota allocations and the role of Producer Organisations in the management of quota and 
quota uptake. The first UK Production Organisations were established in 1973 (Nautilus 
Consultants 2006: 3) and took on quota management func ions in 1984. We will first outline the 
characteristics of the quota rights and then the co-management of these rights in each of the cases. 
Characteristics of the quota rights 
We will first compare the Dutch and UK systems by characterising the fishing rights according to 
their type, initial allocation, transferability and restrictions on trade and ownership, their security 
and durability, and further features (cf. Scott 1996). 
Most fundamentally, in both cases we are dealing with rights related to output (catch quota) the 
right to take a share of the national quota. The initial allocation of Dutch sole and plaice quota in 
1976 was ‘grandfathered’ on the basis of historical record and after a year was adjusted to include a 
50% factor of engine power. In the UK, allocation was and still is based on historical catch data 
only. From 1984 to 1999, the basis was vessels’ catches during the previous three years. However, 
this ‘rolling track record’ system was replaced by ‘Fixed Quota Allocations’ (FQAs) which are 
determined on the basis of vessels’ track records from a single fixed reference period (1994-96, 
slightly updated in 2002). 
In both countries the transferability of quota rights is restricted, although in practice this plays a 
smaller role in the Netherlands. Dutch ITQs can only be traded46 among owners of EU registered 
                                                
46 For the following provisions see Regeling contingetiering zeevis 1997, Hoofdstuk 3, Art. 12-13. 
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and licensed vessels and subject to ministry approval, which is to be requested within statutory 
periods. ITQs can be traded as whole units or partially to one or more vessel operators (i.e. quota is 
divisible). The recipient vessel owners have to hold a quota for the traded species as well as for 
related species (i.e. ITQs for sole are connected to ITQs for plaice) and must have fished 90% or 
less of their quota for the traded species at the tim of the deal. Selling sole or plaice quota to 
vessels that do not have such ITQs is therefore not allowed. Fishermen exiting the fishery for good 
are obliged to sell their ITQ shares within three years, but this requirement can be and is often 
circumvented. It is also possible to bequeath ITQ shares. In the UK, for vessels over 10m the FQA 
unit is attached to a license or licence entitlement. Only since 2002 is it possible, in certain 
circumstances, to transfer FQAs separately from licences, above all as part of a licensing 
transaction.47 However, the restriction on the transfer of units from active licences still prevents 
‘real time’ adjustments of FQAs. FQA units may be transferred among others to “dummy 
licences”48 held by a Producer Organisation (PO). All or some of the units may be transferred 
(‘divisibility’ of rights), and transfers need to be registered with the responsible governmental 
Fisheries Department.49 Note that in the UK, unlike in the Netherlands,50 a proportion of quota 
shares is held by non-fishing actors, such as professional quota traders, financial institutions and 
vessel agents. 
As regards the security and durability of the quota rights, the Dutch ITQs are anchored in a 
regulation51 by the Fishery Ministry which stipulates that vessel owners annually receive a quota 
share equivalent to the percentage they received th previous year. This continuity of rights 
replaced an annual allocation process in 1997 (Davidse 1997). The annual allocation of ITQs is 
carried out by the Ministery but ITQs are expected to be automatically renewed. Furthermore, the 
quota entitlement is accepted by banks as collatera (Anarson 2002: 41). Hence, against the 
backdrop of the legal concept of ‘legitimate expectations’, the entitlements can be evaluated as 
being relatively secure. This is different in the case of the UK Fixed Quota Allocations: while 
legitimate expectations can be claimed to have built up among FQA holders in the UK as in the 
Netherlands, the weak legal status of FQAs as property rights has made them subject to 
controversies (Cabinet Office 2004). Formally, FQAs are governed by rules of the UK Fisheries 
administrations.52 
A noteworthy further feature of the Dutch system is a ‘national reserve’ of ca. 5% of national quota 
that is not turned into ITQs in order to compensate possible overshoots. Since this ‘buffer’ turned 
out not to be necessary, the reserve has decreased over the years, is being used for international 
quota swaps and might be abolished in future. No such system exists in the UK but a certain 
                                                
47 Such transfers be done “by the holder of an unattached licence entitlement at any time during the lifof the 
entitlement; by the holder of a vessel licence who is in the process of transferring his licence to some ne else, or who is 
disposing of his vessel while retaining his licence in the form of a licence entitlement” (Defra 2006: 6). 
48 i.e. a non-active licence functioning as a quota holding mechanism. 
49 There are four Fisheries Departments in the UK, one each in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
50 In the Netherlands, the provision that only owners of licenced vessels which have an allocation for the species in 
question and for related species are eligible to trade quota (Art. 12, Regeling contingentiering zeevis) de facto excludes 
non-vessel owning stakeholders from trading. 
51 Regelgeving contingentiering zeevis (Hoofdstuk 2, Art. 10.1). 
52 Quota management is based principally on the exercise of discretionary powers by all UK Ministers acting jointly. No 
legislation exists that specifies how quota is to be managed, with the exception of licensing and enforcement aspects 
(UK Fisheries Departments 2008: 4). 
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proportion of the quota is retained and managed by government. Those are the allocations for the so 
called ‘non-sector,’ which includes over 10 metre vessels not in PO membership, and for vessels 
under 10m.  
Co-management of the quota rights 
How are the quota rights co-managed in the Netherlands and the UK? For both cases, we will 
address the rationale for introducing co-management, composition of the quota-management 
groups, their responsibilities and rules, decision-making modalities and organisational structures. 
Finally, we will set out the remaining powers of the state in quota management. 
In the Netherlands, the rationale for introducing co-management was to increase legitimacy of and 
compliance with the RBM system and ultimately with EU quota regulations, in addition to 
improving economic performance (van Ginkel 2005, Dubbink and van Vliet 1997). Policy-makers 
hence created extra incentives for the industry to participate in the groups: group members were 
provided with extra days-at-sea and could trade ITQs during longer periods within a year than non-
members. The groups are based on fish Producer Organisations (POs),53 in which 95% of the fleet 
was organised in 1993, and within each PO one or moe c -management groups are active 
(Hoefnagel 2005: 175). In the UK, Producer Organisations (POs) that were to take over important 
co-management functions in the sectoral quota allocti n scheme, had existed prior to introduction 
of the sectoral quota allocation (RBM) system (Goodlad 1998). They originated in European 
Community marketing legislation as voluntary marketing associations and their initial function was 
industry self-management of market supply and of withdrawal schemes.54 From the early 1980s on, 
the UK fisheries departments made available quota allocations to ‘the sector’ – i.e. fishing vessels 
over 10 metres and belonging to fisheries Producer Organisations – in an increasing number of 
quota stocks (UK Fisheries Departments 2008). The 19 UK POs today manage 96% of the UK 
quota entitlements at their members’ discretion. 
In terms of composition, the Dutch co-management groups are smaller and more homogenous than 
the British POs. In the Netherlands, there are nine groups which range in size from 12 to 58 
vessels,55 making up altogether 324 vessels (PVIS 2006: 20). Participants typically come from the 
same region, are members in the same national fishermen’s association (two of which exist in the 
Netherland), and work with similar types of vessel, gear and species. In the UK, 19 POs 
accommodate 1,100 vessels, with the largest of them aving 258 vessels (as of 2005). The POs 
differ more strongly than the Dutch groups with regard to regional basis, targeted stocks, fleet 
segments, group homogeniety and the quota management systems that they have developed 
(Nautilus Consultants 2006, Phillipson 1999).  
As regards responsibilities and rules, in both cases control and management of the groups’ 
allocation of quota (and, in the Netherlands, of days- t-sea) are the prime purposes. This includes 
facilitation and monitoring of quota transfers within and between groups and annual submission to 
the administration of a joint Fishing Plan (Netherlands), and an Operational Programme/ Catch Plan 
                                                
53 In legal terms, however, the groups were only recently merged with the POs. 
54 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2142/70. The new role of POs in managing quotas – at the discretion of Memb r States 
– is recognised since 1993 in Article 4.1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3759/92. 
55 Group PO Redersvereniging is an exception with 3 vessels, but differs structurally from the other groups. 
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(UK).56 While development of internal rules, including sanctions for when members overshoot their 
quota, was coordinated among the Dutch co-management groups and is hence harmonised, this was 
not the case in the UK where each PO has developed its own set of rules. A major difference 
between the Dutch groups and the UK POs is that the Dutch system is ITQ based only, while in the 
POs four distinct systems have evolved to internally manage the group’s quota allocation. They 
range from common ‘pool solutions’ to ITQ-style systems as practiced in the Netherlands, with a 
gradual shift towards the latter. The four systems include (Nautilus Consultants 2006: 13-15):  
- pure ‘pool systems’: FQA units of all members (plus possibly FQAs acquired by the PO itself) 
are combined. On this basis, monthly catch limits are set for each member, either for each the 
same, or subject to a formula. This system existed from the beginning of the sectoral allocation 
system. 
- ‘pool plus systems’: the pool solution dominates but is combined with members managing own 
‘ring-fenced’ individual quota (IQ). The IQ is based on the FQA units equivalent to their track 
record plus quota fishermen have leased or bought;  
- ‘pool plus IQs’: in these mixed systems some members collaborate in a pool, and others operate 
IQs only; 
- ‘IQ-only systems’: each vessel fishes its own FQAs, based on its track record, plus purchased or 
leased IQ. The sum of these make up the PO’s allocation. This arrangement corresponds most 
closely to the Biesheuvel group’s ITQ management. 
Both in the Netherlands and in the UK, offences against the groups’ quota management rules are 
penalised within the groups.57 In the UK POs, the strictness and application of disciplinary 
measures varies more strongly since these are not harmonised among the groups as in the 
Netherlands. Groups submit annual reports to the administration on the number of non-compliance 
cases.58 Typically, groups can cover over-quota fishing through leases by the end of the year. 
However, in the case that the group overshoots as a whole, public sanctions become effective, with 
deductions of the groups’ quota shares in the previous year.  
Both types of co-management groups perform some functions beyond quota management. The 
Biesheuvel groups have recently acquired co-management responsibility with regard to capacity 
control and technical issues. They are not directly onsulted, however, when it comes to national 
policy debates on fisheries management. This works indirectly through consultation of the two 
fishermen’s associations the groups are affiliated with. In contrast with this, the British POs are 
regularly involved into national-level policy debates. Furthermore, a limited number of them have 
continued the traditional PO engagement in marketing, cluding the operation of processing 
facilities.  
As regards decision-making modalities, in both the Dutch and UK quota-management groups, 
management decisions are taken by the groups’ elected boards, the major difference being that the 
                                                
56 These plans are typically considered as administrative requirements more than as definite statements o  how the 
groups will manage their members’ activities. 
57 In the Biesheuvel groups, while individual quota overshoots result in heavy fines being paid by the off nder to the 
group, group overshoots require that the group pays a penalty to the research fund of the Dutch Fish Product Board 
(Productschap Vis). 
58 In the Netherlands, the General Inspection Service in turn notifies the groups if they observe violations when 
controlling fish auctions, and monitors the steps the groups take. 
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Dutch groups’ board need to have an independent, non-industry chairman. In the smaller 
Biesheuvel groups there is no formal mechanism to inv lve members into decision-making apart 
from the annual general meeting, while in some British POs, occasional (consultative) member 
meetings are organised by regional liaison offices and regional directors. These organisational 
structures reflect the larger size of the POs and the fact tha e connections between the groups’ 
offices and the members are much looser than in the Netherlands. In Scotland, a PO association 
exists which serves to loosely coordinate the POs; in the Netherlands, the national Fish Product 
Board (FPB) coordinated the groups during their formation but withdrew from this role. Only 
indirectly, the FPB’s cutter committee exerts a coordinating function as it assembles representatives 
of all groups. In both countries, (parts of) the co-management groups cooperate through fishermen’s 
organisations, too. 
In the Dutch system, the state retains a slightly lower role in quota management than in the UK. In 
both countries, fisheries departments are responsible for the annual allocation process; they need to 
formally approve of harvesting plans and quota transfers; they monitor quota uptake and are 
ultimately responsible for enforcing quotas. However, while the Netherlands rely on a private 
auction duty to complement the groups’ quota monitori g, the UK has introduced a functionally 
equivalent public ‘Fish Buyers and Sellers registration’.59 Both systems make easier the traceability 
of landed fish and hence monitoring of quota uptake. Also, the UK annual allocation process is less 
automatised since all right-holders do not automatically receive the same percentage of national 
quota each year as in the Netherlands. Furthermore, UK fisheries departments directly manage the 
quota allocations for those fleet segments that are not organised in POs, i.e. the ‘non-sector’ (over 
10 metre vessels not in PO membership) and the under-10 meter vessels.60 
Analysis of social robustness 
We will now present our findings with respect to the social robustness of the Netherlands and UK 
co-managed RBM systems. This includes an analysis of stakeholder acceptance and of the systems’ 
capacity for institutional learning. 
Stakeholder acceptance 
First of all we need to clarify who are the stakeholders of the quota management systems analysed. 
We will distinguish between core stakeholders – those directly involved in the systems’ operation – 
and wider stakeholders, not directly involved in the operation. In both cases, core stakeholders 
include parts of the fishing industry (ITQ holders in the Netherlands, and the fleet segment 
organised in POs in the UK) and state actors (fisher es departments, enforcement agencies). Wider 
stakeholders include other segments of the fishing industry, intermediate organisations and non-
commercial interests, above all conservation organisations. 
When looking at the core stakeholders, we find thatere is a high acceptance of the combined 
RBM and co-management systems in the Netherlands, a a somewhat lower (but still moderately 
                                                
59 For Scotland, see ‘The Registration of Fish Buyers and Sellers and Designation of Fish Auction Sites (Scotland) 
Regulations 2005’, Scottish Statutory Instrument 2005 No. 286; analogous regulations exist in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. 
60 This is done by placing mainly monthly catch restrictions per vessel in the licences of the vessels concerned (UK 
Fisheries Departments 2008: 7). 
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high) acceptance in the UK. Acceptance among wider stakeholders is more varied and will be 
detailed in the following paragraphs.61 We will describe stakeholders’ views and perceptions as 
identified through semi-structured interviews as well as other indicators of their acceptance, such as 
compliance data. 
In the Netherlands, members and managers of the interv ewed Biesheuvel groups find that 
introduction of co-management made quota uptake more efficient. Also, the race for fish – which 
had not been effectively checked by the ‘pure’ ITQ system (Smit 1997) – was brought to an end. 
Informants contend that not only did the stability of expectations and compliance increase, but also 
that fishing activity is better spread out over theyear and black landings are prevented through 
coordination and self-control in the groups. As a consequence, better fish prices could be achieved. 
This positive appraisal is confirmed by the fact that some 97% of those that are eligible participate 
within the Biesheuvel groups (Gray 2005: 127).62 Note, however, that this may also be a 
consequence of the incentives set by the government to stimulate participation and the threat of the 
Dutch parliament to generally limit horsepower if not more than 75% of fishermen organised in the 
groups. Membership within the Biesheuvel groups is highly stable. This is assessed to not only 
result from an agreement between the groups not to accept offenders that have left or were expulsed 
from another group, but also from strong group identiti s. Relations between the groups are 
assessed to be generally cooperative though some tensions exist. Aspects that group members 
criticise refer mostly to the RBM component rather than the co-management dimension of the 
system. They include practices to avoid the final sale of ITQs when fishermen stop fishing (locally 
dubbed ‘sofa fishermen’) and the low level of new entrants to the sector. Though individual of our 
interviewees pointed to the limits of social control, the groups’ self-policing is assessed by most to 
function well. More than to group fines this is attributed to the social stigma within small groups 
and small communities if individuals overshoot and thus deprive fellow group members of parts of 
their quota. Only few incidents of ITQ overfishing, non- or misdeclaration of flatfish to circumvent 
quota limitations and evasion of the auction duty have become public over the years (for example in 
1999 and 2007).  
The Dutch Inspection Service confirms that compliance with quota regulations has increased and 
that violations with regard to engine power, the new r mit of the groups, are rare. In both cases, 
social control and involvement of the groups in rule development are said to play a role, though 
other factors63 were also relevant. As a consequence, the national sole and plaice quotas have not 
been overshot significantly since introduction of the co-management system. This is one of the 
reasons why fisheries managers support the system as well: not only did it improve state-industry 
relations, but it reduced the costs of public enforcement.  
Among the few Dutch conservation groups that work on quota management issues, the Biesheuvel 
system itself is accepted to function well with regard to quota management though less so with 
                                                
61 Acceptance among wider stakeholders which we did not interview can be assumed from the relative lack of media 
coverage, law suits, and other expressions of critical response to fisheries systems. 
62 Non-members are mainly fishermen with small vessels that do not fish in ITQ fisheries (e.g. shrimp), or fishermen 
that due to disputes with other fishermen or conflicts within a region prefer to stay outside the groups (Interview 
information).  
63 Conservation organisations highlight that the Biesheuvel system’s improved enforcement provisions coincided with a 
decline in stocks which may have reduced black landings in a ‘natural’ way. High fuel prices promote compliance with 
engine power limitations.  
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regard to capacity limitation, one of its newer fields of responsibility. However, environmental 
organisations criticise that the sole and plaice fisheries in general are still unsustainable – a fact that 
is influenced more by the absolute level of TACs and national quota than by the concrete form of 
quota management. 
In the UK we find that among the interviewed fisherm n (members and managers of four POs), the 
co-managed RBM system is generally accepted, although less unanimously than in the Dutch case. 
As regards the system’s RBM component, some interviewees appreciate the opportunity to fish 
against their own quota share and buy and lease quota, while others see benefits in the pool system. 
The pool system provides fishermen with flexibility in terms of quota uptake since regulating quota 
in a pool system is regarded as less difficult and less expensive than trading quota; small under-or 
overshoots can be compensated within the PO. It also enables young fishermen to start up. By its 
proponents, the pool system is hence regarded to bemor  ‘community oriented’. Other fishermen 
prefer IQ systems as a means to protect their fishing r ghts as quasi-property. This cannot be 
granted by the pool system to the same extent where v ssels with larger FQAs often have to 
compensate operators with smaller FQAs. The present quota management arrangements 
accommodate the preferences of both groups of fishermen, since they are able to move between 
POs which operate different systems – though they ma not always be accepted by some POs if 
they do not hold sufficient FQAs.  
For most of fishermen, the system currently ‘works’ due to a broader set of measures that include 
reduced fleet capacity (decommissioning), enhanced enforcement through the fish buyers and 
sellers registration, expansion of alternative viable fisheries (such as nephrops), and fairly strong 
market conditions as of 2007. Similar to the Dutch case, criticism on the part of PO members relates 
mostly to the RBM component of the system, including the problem of FQA-holders not actively 
fishing (here called ‘slipper skippers’) and difficulties in facilitating new entrants. In addition, there 
seems to be unease among some about the leasing and buyi g of quota (see also Hatcher et al. 2002: 
42-46; Anderson 2006: 5-7), which is considered too expensive and for some species not always 
available when needed. From this perspective, the fixed quota allocation is perceived by some as 
‘inflexible’ as it does not reflect current catching opportunities, although this may in part reflect the
absolute level of the TAC. While some parts of industry are concerned about the insecure 
ownership status of FQA units, members and especially managers of POs that still operate pool 
systems reject the notion of ‘private property’ of fisheries resources altogether; they resist further 
individuation and transferability. A further concern voiced is that quota can be ‘bought off’ by 
foreign (including Dutch) flag vessels when these are registered in the UK.  
As regards the co-management component, the PO rules and sanctions are generally accepted and 
PO membership is considered to be relatively stable lthough, with 67 membership changes in 2007 
in Scottish POs, movement between groups is significantly higher than in the Dutch groups. A 
major motive for a membership change is preference for a different PO mode of quota 
management.64 The cooperative working relations between POs are hence potentially undermined 
by competition for members, especially for fishermen rich in FQA units. Regarding the POs’ quota 
management rules, the major compliance issue is (not necessarily intentional) individual 
overshooting, which is more problematic in POs that operate pool systems. Overshooting of UK 
quota as a whole, however, was significantly reduce. Repeated breaches of PO rules are rare, as 
                                                
64 A possible other motive might be that the groups’ quota management and compliance rules differ in their strictness. 
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are exclusions from a PO. Self-policing and enforcement of PO rules seem less effective than in the 
Netherlands: before the introduction of the buyers and sellers registration legislation in 2005, black 
landings were still widespread and acknowledged if not tacitly tolerated by POs. Self-policing, 
however, is said to have increased with lower TACs and stronger public enforcement, as non-
compliance is increasingly seen as one vessel stealing fishing entitlements of another. 
From the perspective of public enforcement agencies, the presently satisfying compliance with the 
quota management regime is therefore above all due to the buyers/ sellers registration rather than 
PO self-policing. Generally, however, fisheries managers confirmed that the Producer Organisation 
system takes a burden off the fisheries administraton, but changes are regarded as necessary. In 
2004, the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit had published a report (Cabinet Office 2004: 105) which 
found the current FQA system to be ‘confused and confusing’, bureaucratic and not sufficiently 
transparent. Since the uncertain legal status of FQAs would inhibit investment and long-term 
planning, introduction of fully-fledged ITQs was recommended. As a response, the UK fisheries 
administrations developed a UK-wide consultation-based Quota Management Change Programme 
(UK Fisheries Departments 2005). At the time of ourresearch, however, this consultation process 
had ground to a halt due to the new Scottish Governm nt’s opposition to ITQs, or to fully 
transferable quota allocations.  
As regards the management system’s acceptance by wider stakeholders, there is a certain tension 
within industry among the three sectors. The under-10m fleet in particular fears that members of 
POs and the non-sector fleet could compete for and fish against their allocation, using high-powered 
so called ‘super-under-10m’-vessels. Environmental organisations are not involved in POs and 
appeared disinterested in the UK quota management system, partly despite participation in the 
Quota Management Change Programme. Some, however, have developed more general positions 
on RBM. WWF (2007) for example ‘maintains a healthy scepticism about the ability of “rights-
based management” per se to fix the problems of overcapitalisation and overfishing and sustain 
fishing communities and livelihoods’. Depending on context (e.g. fisheries characteristics) and 
design, however, they can be ‘valuable operational incentives’. 
Evolution of the management system and institutional learning 
What is the capacity of the described systems of co-managed RBM to adapt to internal or external 
pressures and changes? To what extent were observed adaptations intentional (‘learning’)? Did 
institutional changes aim at improving the means to achieve given goals (simple learning), or were 
the goals themselves and underlying assumptions on causal relationships redefined (complex 
learning)? Could institutional learning contribute, in the perception of stakeholders, to solving the 
problem it was to address? In the following, we will d scuss these questions for the Dutch and UK 
cases. 
The Netherlands: Opening RBM for co-management 
For the co-managed RBM system in the Netherlands, we can identify at least four steps of learning 
after Individual Quotas (IQs) had been introduced for plaice and sole in 1976 – which in itself was a 
major institutional innovation. The overall direction of institutional change was making RBM more 
efficient (increased transferability and security of rights) and extending it by co-management. 
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Table 9: Institutional learning in the Dutch case 
Time Management System Institutional learning  
Till 1976 Open access fishery, no output control = Baseline 
1976 IQ system: Introduction of IQs, 
transferrable only with vessel 
• Complex learning: institutional change to address new 
goal (externally set by NEAFC) of meeting national 
quotas and TACs → ‘spontaneous’ dealing with new 
challenge under uncertainty 
• Complex learning as regards equity of initial allocation 
(1976 vs. 1977)  
1985 ITQ system: Introduction of quota 
transferability 
•  Simple learning: Internally induced adaptation to 
fishermen’s deviant practices 
1988-90 Prototype of co-managed ITQ system: 
1st introduction of quota groups 
•  Complex learning: new approach to counter non-
compliance/ quota overshooting and crisis-ridden state-
industry relations 
1993 Co-managed ITQ system:  
2nd introduction of quota groups 
(‘Biesheuvel’ system) 
•  Simple learning: institutionally more sophisticated 
approach to counter non-compliance, crisis-ridden state-
industry relations and reduce overburdening enforcement 
regime 
2004 Broadening of co-management  
within the Biesheuvel groups 
• Simple learning: widening of groups’ responsibility from 
quota management to capacity and technical issues 
(engine power, nets) as reaction to systems’ success 
Source: authors. 
Summing up the past history of the IQ system, establi hment of IQs was a reaction to the 
introduction through the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) of TACs, for sole and 
place among other species, as of 1975. In order to comply with the required catch reductions (10% 
for plaice, 40% for sole, cf. Hoefnagel and Smit 1995: 157), the Dutch government delegated the 
management of national quotas to the Fish Product Board, a chamber-like intermediate sector 
organisation, which introduced rules to limit effort and landings. However, after the sole fishery had 
to be closed prematurely in 1975 because the national quota was exhausted, the Fish Product Board 
returned its quota management responsibilities to the government in 1976. Only then did the 
Ministry introduce IQs, with the reasoning that these could increase operational certainty and profits 
by regulating landings (ibid). IQs were transferrable only together with vessels.  
This system change can be regarded as an instance of ‘ omplex learning’, since new goals – 
meeting national quotas – had been defined and the in roduction of output control itself constituted 
a major shift in the problem solving philosophy. Though the new goals were ‘externally’ set (by 
NEAFC), this happened with the consent of the Dutch government as a NEAFC contracting party. 
The new challenge and the uncertainty connected with such a major shift were dealt with rather 
‘spontaneously’, in the sense that there were very ha dly any model solutions to copy or learn from: 
at that time, only very few I(T)Q systems existed worldwide. Once the government had introduced 
the IQ system, a first minor adjustment was the revision of the allocation basis: quota allocations 
were initially based on historical catch record only, with quota for larger ships being determined by 
the Ministry. This resulted in significant quota differences between vessels of similar capacity and 
hence in industry discontent. The allocation was revised a year later to also account for engine 
power (Smit 2001). Though only a minor change in the system, it can be labelled an instance of 
‘complex learning’, too, because it led to the consideration of a further management goal, namely 
equity of the initial allocation. While this adjustment met with the satisfaction of the industry 
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stakeholders and can thus be assessed to have been successful (i.e. addressing the perceived 
problem), this cannot be said for the overall introduction of IQs: during the 1980s, national quota 
was constantly exceeded so that neither the goal of output limitation nor the underlying problem of 
overfishing were addressed satisfactorily.  
Once the IQ system – and hence a (still weak) form f RBM – was set up, the first fundamental step 
of learning was the introduction of IQ transferability. Initially, with weak enforcement, fishermen 
regarded IQs as limitations rather than rights and s little more than a ‘piece of paper’ (Davidse 
2001: 15). However, their actual relevance increased in the mid 1980s and they started to be 
informally traded. Reacting to this, policy-makers allowed transferability in 1985, turning the IQs 
de facto into ITQs. Though it had major consequences on property rights in fisheries, this 
adaptation to fishermen’s deviant practices can be ass ssed to be an instance of ‘simple’ learning: it 
aimed (successfully) at making an existing system work more efficiently, rather than at introducing 
new goals. 
With steady European TAC reductions on the one hand and rising fleet overcapacity on the other, 
the 1980s were at the same time characterised by massive non-compliance (i.e. landing of ‘grey’ 
and ‘black’ fish), continuous overshooting of the Dutch quota and worsening state-industry 
relations. Overcapacity was a consequence of high flatfish demand and prices, favourable bank 
loans, national investment stimulation and the desire of fishermen to become independent and set 
up their sons with own vessels (Davidse 2001; Dubbink and van Vliet 1997, van Ginkel 2005). The 
discrepancy between fishers’ fishing rights and their fishing capacity, fuelled by weak enforcement, 
resulted in a situation where the ITQ system did not prevent quota overshoots. Weak monitoring 
and enforcement, including low fines for detected violations, created the threat that rights-holders 
could not fully take up their own ITQs when other holders would overfish their quota – a classical 
Prisoners’ Dilemma (Steins and Langstraat 2003). This was worsened by the fact that sole and 
plaice fishermen from other European countries exceded their national quotas as well, putting 
pressure on the Dutch operators to quickly secure their quota shares. Hence, a race for fish 
continued and market prices decreased as a result of the growing ‚grey’ market.  
However, after establishment of the European Common Fisheries Policy in 1983, calls intensified 
for stricter policing and an end to over-quota landings. The Dutch government introduced various 
measures in the late 1980s to limit capacity and effort, including a licensing and a ‘days-at-sea’ 
regime, and efforts to tighten monitoring and enforcement. Continued non-compliance on the part 
of fishermen, partly with the logistic and administrative support of fish auctions (van Ginkel 2005: 
123), increasingly strained the relations between th  industry and fisheries administration. This led 
not only to fisticuffs between fishermen and inspectors but to greater political turmoil (ibid), and 
was to result in 1990 in the resignation of the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries.  
In order to calm down the situation, a first ‘prototype’ of co-management groups was created in the 
late 1980s (Davidse 2001: 26). The idea was to improve fisheries governance by devolving 
management responsibility to industry, pre-empt industry resistance, re-establish trust and increase 
the legitimacy of fisheries management. This new problem-solving approach, following a phase of 
strict command-and-control politics, can be seen as a form of complex learning. It presupposes 
recognition of the value of participatory approaches for effective governance. Though 
consociationalism and corporatism are deeply rooted in the Dutch politica  culture (Lijphart 1968; 
van Hoefnagel 2005), transferring management responsibility to small groups of fishermen was a 
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first in the Netherlands.  
However, the co-management approach was not well institutionalised: there were two rather large 
groups (Group East and Group West) which were not yet bound by any statutes or external control. 
It failed in 1990, when the fisheries crisis peaked. A new and more systematic attempt at co-
management was made when the present Biesheuvel co-management groups were introduced in 
1993. After the minister’s resignation, a tight consultation and discussion process was started 
between representatives of the Fisheries Ministry, the fishery sector and the trading and processing 
industry. This took place within a steering group under the chairmanship of former Prime Minister 
Barend Biesheuvel which was set up in 1991. In its White Paper ‘Balanced fisheries’ (MLNV 
1993), the ‘Stuurgroep Biesheuvel’ recommended a) distribution of responsibilities between 
government and fishing industry, and b) cooperation between fishermen themselves within the 
existing Producer Organisations (POs).  
The objectives of the reform were better quota compliance and economic performance as well as, 
implicitly, improved state-industry relations and reduction of the overburdening enforcement 
regime. In February 1993, groups were formed to ensure compliance with the group quota and to 
manage quota transfers within and between the groups. Institutionally, and in contrast with the 
‘prototype’ groups, the Biesheuvel groups were requir d to have an independent chairman; to 
develop statutes and a penalty system;65 to publicly auction landed fish; not to exceed a group size 
of 100 members; and to achieve at least 75% fishermen participation. Finally, a threat (‘shadow of 
hierarchy’) was built-in that co-management would be replaced by compulsory capacity limitation 
if not enough fishermen participated and if management functions were not fulfilled satisfactorily (a 
clause called ‘stok van Mok’).  
All these conditions contributed to self-management, social control and the system’s overall 
functioning. In terms of institutional learning, we suggest that the Biesheuvel system represents an 
institutionally more sophisticated and effective approach to achieve the objectives of the described 
‘prototype’ co-management groups, and hence is an instance of simple learning. The objectives of 
the system have largely been accomplished, so that the learning can be termed on the whole 
‘successful’. National sole or plaice quota is not overrun anymore; with landings spread evenly over 
the year and no black fish market, fish prices and revenues have increased; and industry’s 
confidence in the government is restored (see e.g. Hoefnagel and Smit 1995; LEI-DLO 1996; 
MNLV 1995 and 2002; Steins and Langstraat 2003). As was elaborated above, however, 
stakeholders perceive the system to have some downsides, too.66 
The most recent step of (‘simple’) institutional learning in the management system is a widening of 
the groups’ responsibilities from quota management to capacity limitation (engine power) and 
technical measures (gear issues) as of 2004. This reflects the affirmative assessment of the state-
industry cooperation by both industry and by the administration, which carried out several 
evaluations of the Biesheuvel system (e.g. MNLV 1995 and 2002; Stuurgroep Nijpels 2005). The 
evaluations were generally positive, confirming the system’s implementation according to the 
                                                
65 The groups’ development of internal quota management rules, though devolved, was coordinated initially through the 
Fish Product Board. Over the years, the Board withdraw from coordinating and supervising the groups. 
66 This includes the existence of non-fishing quota-holders; difficulties for newcomers to enter the fishery; the limits of 
the system to better address ecological concerns within the given national quotas. Also, ITQ transferability has led to a 
continuing, though not drastic concentration of rights (Davidse 2001), which was buffered to some extent by the 
possibility of Dutch flag vessels to accumulate UK sole and plaice quota (‘quota hoppers’). 
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steering group recommendations and its positive outcomes. The ‘stok von Mok’ clause was 
removed as an acknowledgement of the system’s succes. The most recent evaluation (Nijpels 
2003, 2005) recommended some minor changes in the Biesheuvel groups quota management rules 
and suggested a strengthening of the private enforcement and control system. This would, according 
to the Ministry, go hand in hand with reducing the public control of auction duty. Beyond quota 
management, the new remits of co-management include above all a joint industry-ministry engine 
power working group (set up 2004). Its aim was to reduce at least 15 percent in engine capacity in 
the cutter sector. A private policy on engine power as developed on the conditions for engine-
power measurements, seals, audits, and sanctions. After initial scepticism, the Biesheuvel groups 
unanimously adopted the rules. Between 2005 and 2006, engine-power measurements and sealings 
were implemented on board all vessels (ibid: 27-29; Hoefnagel 2007). A public-private working 
group on nets aims at an industry commitment to avoid the use of illegal net appliances to catch 
undersized fish. Finally, sporadic voluntary geographic and temporal (real time) closures had been 
carried out as of 2002 to spare flatfish during the spawning season and prevent bycatch of juvenile 
plaice. These initiatives were explicitly supported by the Nijpels (2003, 2005) report. In the upshot, 
recent changes point towards reducing the state involvement in quota management and broadening 
the scope of co-management beyond quota management – a learning effect from the Dutch success 
of co-managed RBM, and possibly a ‘retreat of the state’ for budgetary and ideological reasons at 
the same time. 
The UK: Using co-management for RBM 
In the UK, the starting point of our analysis is the introduction of Producer Organisations (POs) as 
industry self-governance mechanism. While some distinct steps of institutional learning can be 
identified, there are significant shifts between these steps, due to the fact that the UK Fisheries 
Departments renew quota management rules on an annual basis. The overall direction of 
institutional change was that this structure was built upon when quota management was introduced 
and that quota allocations increasingly turned intotransferable rights.  
Table 10: Institutional learning in the UK case 
Time Management System Institutional learning  
Till 1973 Open access fishery, no co-management = Baseline 
1973 Industry self-governance in marketing: 
First POs established; no link to fisheries 
management 
• Complex learning: New European legal opportunity for 
industry to control market supply and market jointly 
• [Complex learning: In parallel, government establishes 
publicly-run quota management system, based on 
(weekly, fortnightly etc.) catch limits] 
1984-98 Sectoral quota management based on 
rolling track record quota allocation;  
In POs: common pool system 
predominant 
• Simple learning: Government devolves quota 
management functions to POs but goal of fishing within 
quota limits remains 
Since 1999 Sectoral quota management based on 
fixed quota allocation (FQA):  
More POs moving away from common 
pool form of internal FQA allocation 
• Simple learning as regards allocation basis to provide 
more stability and of a more ITQ-like system of 
allocation and trading; quota trade/market was not 
intended but intensified 
Source: authors. 
With the accession of the UK to the European Economic Community (EEC, today EU) in 1973, the 
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first fish Producer Organisation was established in the UK. In EEC law, the PO system enabled 
fishermen since 1970 to enjoy the benefits of the EU minimum-price scheme and market-support 
mechanisms and to collaborate in marketing. Insofar as industry organization to control market 
supply was a radical change in the system (though similar regimes had already been introduced in 
agriculture), this can be regarded as an instance of complex learning. At this time, there was no 
direct link between the emerging POs and fisheries management in the UK. Output limits and quota 
management arrangements had first been put in place through the NEAFC (‘complex learning’). 
Since introduction of the CFP in 1983, most commercial stocks were subject to TACs and national 
quota. Fisheries were managed by the Fisheries Departments on the basis of daily, weekly, 
fortnightly or monthly quotas (catch limits). All vessels would receive the same quota, which was 
varied occasionally depending on vessel-size (Goodlad 2000). While industry was regularly 
consulted, the ultimate quota decisions on vessel quota limits were taken by government. This lack 
of involvement in the decision-making process, combined with the negligence of regional or 
sectoral considerations in the quota allocation process, sparked criticism (ibid).  
Criticism was especially pronounced in Shetland, and it was at the request of the Shetland PO67 in 
1984 that the government for the first time vested quota management responsibilities with a PO. In 
subsequent years and at the industry’s request, thi decentralised and sectoral quota management 
system spread widely and was expanded – both in terms of POs involved, and in species, quota and 
areas covered – until it applied to most demersal and pelagic stocks.68 By the early 1990s, all of the 
(then 17) UK POs managed quota allocations on behalf of their members. The allocation was based 
on the principle that each PO received quota proportional to the catches made by its over 10 meter 
member vessels in the previous three years (‘rolling track record’). Within the POs, pool systems 
were operated, i.e. joint catch limits set. Since 1994, the groups were allowed to buy up licensed 
vessels and to “ring-fence” their track record if the benefit remained with the PO. As of 1995, track 
records were de-linked from the vessels themselves and linked to vessel licences. Hence, when 
licences are transferred to other vessels, the associ ted track records move with them. This not only 
increased the value of licences but also facilitated licence and hence quota trading. In general, POs 
could swap quota between themselves at any time. In practice, however, under the rolling track record 
system swapping or ‘gifting’69 of quota could lead to reductions in future quota allocations and was 
hence risky. Permanent sales in particular were rather complicated (see more in Hatcher et al. 2002: 
20).  
Summing up, as of 1984 a rather evolutionary (as opposed to ‘designed’) and bottom-up process of 
institutional learning took place in which a whole n w system of co-governed quota management 
was created. From the perspective of POs, this means that they adopted completely new goals in 
addition to supply management and marketing (‘complex learning’). From the perspective of the 
fisheries management regime (which is our main frame of reference in this study), the underlying 
objective – to sustain stocks by fishing within quota limits – remained the same since TACs and 
quotas had first introduced. It was ‘only’ the governance structure by which this objective should be 
achieved that changed (‘simple learning’). The goal itself was not fully achieved since overfish of 
                                                
67 ‘Shetland Fish Producers Association’, SFPA. 
68 From 1995 onwards, POs wishing to manage sectoral allocations for demersal stocks were required to do so for all 
stocks, while beforehand they could take sectoral alloc tions for selected stocks and have their members fish against the 
non-sector’s allocations for other stocks. As of 1999, this was also introduced for pelagic stocks. 
69 ‘Gifting’ is the one way transfer of quota which was allowed as of 1996. 
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national quota was still common with a number of species and illegal landings were at a high. 
A major systematic shift occurred in 1999, when the ‘rolling track record’ allocation was replaced 
by a fixed quota allocation (FQA). Following two years of consultation with industry and supported 
by some but not all parts of industry, annual allocations were linked to a single fixed reference 
period (1994-96, slightly updated in 200270). Thus, each group (POs, the non-sector and the und r 
10 meter fleet) would receive a fixed percentage share of national quota irrespective of whether 
they had fully fished their allocations the previous year. Technically, track records were converted 
into quota units (in tonnage). The new allocation basis was to provide greater stability in the yearly 
allocations. Also, pressure should be lowered on fishermen to maintain their track records by utilising 
their full quota allocations, or to maximise the records through fake records (‘paper fishing’). A 
further aim was to increase the ability to swap or gift quota between POs without suffering a reduction 
in future quota allocations (WGFQA 1997: 5). Finally, the fixed allocations should relieve Fisheries 
Departments from the heavy administrative burden of assembling the necessary track record data to 
calculate annual allocations (UK Fisheries Departments 2008: Annex A).  
The move to FQAs was not intended to lead to a free trade of FQAs (UK Fisheries Departments 
1997: 3) but the fishing opportunities associated with FQA units can and de facto do move around 
the industry. Tradability is still limited by the fact that in most cases FQA units have to stay with a 
vessel’s licence. However, in 2002, following a review of the operation of FQAs, it became 
possible to transfer FQA units separately from licences whenever licence entitlements are created as 
well as between the creation of an entitlement and its placement on a vessel (UK Fisheries 
Departments 2002). Hatcher et al. (2002: 21-22) point out that the implications of the 1999 reform for 
quota trading were ‘to simplify short term leases but to complicate deals to sell quota permanently (apart 
from sales of units for aggregation on the licence market).’ The amount of trading (especially leasing) 
has increased dramatically after 1999 (Hatcher and Read 2001: 6) and again after a round of 
decommissioning in 2001/02.  
As quota trading has intensified, more and more PO members started calling for the right to manage 
their ‘own’ FQAs (i.e. the equivalents of their vess ls’ catch records). Because of this, many PO 
boards voted to move from pool systems to pool-plus, mixed or IQ-only systems. If a PO 
management board was not ready to accommodate the wish for individual quota management, 
fishermen moved to those POs that had enabled individual quota management already. Vessel-
owners with large FQA holdings have a stronger incentiv  to do so, since the pool solution often 
meant that their allotted catch limit over the whole year was below the track record of their vessels. 
With those ‘larger scale’ fishermen retreating, the pure pool systems became increasingly unable to 
operate and typically moved to pool-plus quota management. At the level of individual operators, 
fishermen now routinely retain own FQAs when purchasing a new vessel; FQAs, licences and 
vessels are traded individually rather than as package. Brokers buy up licences and licensed vessels 
to ‘asset strip’ them of FQAs (Hatcher and Read 2001: 6). In terms of institutional learning, the 
move to FQAs was geared towards making the existing quota management system more stable and 
effective (‘simple learning’). Interestingly, the ral change – i.e. emergence of a market in quota 
units – was an unintended side-effect of institutional reform. 
A future step of institutional learning may be relat d to the Quota Management Change Process. 
                                                
70 Allowing the transfer of FQA units, in order to adjust the holdings of FQA units associated with licens s and thus to 
account of permanent transfers of quota that may have occurred over the last years. 
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Though at the time of writing the process was stopped by the Scottish government’s opposition to 
ITQs, some of the discussed changes may be implement d i  the future. The process, a highly 
participatory one, has tackled, among others, the issues of entitlement to quota, trading 
arrangements and allocation methodology; impact of quota management changes on vulnerable 
areas of the fishing industry; and the role of POs as well as that of the non-sector and under-10 
metre fleet (UK Fisheries Departments 2006). As a possible further option, Scotland may continue 
resisting ITQs while the rest of the UK may move towards them. This, however, is linked to more 
fundamental questions regarding the possibilities of regional devolution in the UK. 
Evaluating the hypotheses regarding social robustness 
Do the described management systems support or discourage the propositions on social robustness, 
as presented in Chapter 0? 
RBM and diversity of stakeholder involvement 
Our first proposition was that rights-based management systems tend not to have broad (diverse) 
stakeholder involvement. This expectation is supported by our cases. We find that apart from the 
fisheries administrations only a narrowly defined core group of industry stakeholders have been and 
are involved in the development and operation both of t e Dutch and the British RBM systems.  
In the Netherlands, no industry or non-industry stakeholders apart from the concerned fleet 
segments had been involved in the development or ope ation of the management system. In the 
system’s operation, a somewhat special role is that of the independent, non-industry chairman that 
the co-management groups need to have, since they are not necessarily a member of industry. 
Often, the chair is a local dignitary. He or she might hence be seen as a community representative, 
somebody who mediates between the interest of the local community and the fishermen. However, 
one might also see the chair as a disinterested part of the fishing industry. The latter view is 
supported by the fact that there exists no formal feedback mechanism to the local communities and 
that the chair really is mandated to act on behalf of the fishermen.  
In the UK, stakeholder involvement extends to the PO-organised segment of the fishing industry 
only. Non-PO members, both from the so-called ‘non-sector’ and from the ‘under 10m fleet,’ are 
not involved in the system’s operation and were not regarded as ‘stakeholders’ by most of our 
interviewees. They are, of course, involved in higher level policy review which can affect the PO 
sector (such as anti-ITQ sentiment). A certain role, however, is played by vessel agents, which act 
as non-fishing co-owners of vessels and of quota. They may exercise influence on quota 
management decisions through their business partners, who are PO members, or through the use of 
‘dummy licences’.71 Finally, although both in the Netherlands and the UK environmental groups are 
partly consulted in the wider management of the soland plaice fishery (e.g. through representation 
in the North Sea RAC), they were not involved in the development or operation of the quota 
management system. The cause of the narrow stakeholder representation can be seen in the narrow 
definition of responsibilities within the management system (management of pre-determined quota 
shares only), which results in a narrow definition of ‘stakeholder’. 
                                                
71 See Footnote 48. 
 93 
Acceptance of RBM and diversity of stakeholder involvement 
The third expectation was that the more diverse the stakeholder involvement in the dev lopment and 
/ or operation of a management system, the lower th acceptance of the concerned commercial 
fisheries actors.  
In both countries, only specific industry segments have participated in the development and 
operation of the co-managed RBM systems. Stakeholder involvement has thus to be classified as 
‘non-diverse’. This hypothesis could be rewritten as follows: the less diverse the stakeholder 
involvement, the higher the level of acceptance on the part of the concerned commercial fisheries 
actors. Acceptance of the concerned commercial fishermen (i.e. members of the Biesheuvel groups 
and the POs) was relatively high. In this form, the proposition is confirmed. However, the causality 
is unclear: we cannot be sure whether the system’s acceptance can be attributed to the non-
involvement of wider stakeholders or whether it is actually due to other factors. 
Acceptance of RBM and characteristics of the RBM system 
Our second hypothesis was that commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a rights-ba ed 
management system will be a function of the extent to which a) the management system is perceived 
by the fishermen to be practical; b) the initial allocation reproduced the status quo of fishing 
opportunities when introduced; c) which new entrants are facilitated; d) which retirement options 
are provided for.  
In the Dutch case, we find a high, and in the UK case  moderately high level of acceptance among 
the fishing industry. In both countries, the systems are considered to be practical (a). The initial ITQ 
allocation (b) in the Netherlands reproduced the statu  quo of fishing opportunities, though only 
after some early adjustment of the initial allocation basis. Similarly, in the UK, both the rolling 
share system and the fixing of the quota allocation came close to reproducing the fishing 
opportunities status quo, although the time gap betwe n the onset of FQAs and the qualifying 
period was substantial. As regards retirement options (d), in both countries pension schemes for 
fishermen existed independent of the quota management systems. Selling or leasing out of quota 
rights at the end of a fisherman’s professional life provides an additional, ‘windfall’ income. 
However, many active fishermen were quite negative about retired quota-holders (so called ‘slipper 
skippers’ (UK) or ‘sofa fishermen’ (NL)) and also opposed to other non-fishing quota-holders. 
Rejection of this practice was a bit keener in the UK, where there exists a group of quota holders 
(traders) who are not part of the harvesting side of the fishing industry.72 The selling of quota shares 
after retirement was viewed as more legitimate than le sing them out. This points to a broader 
moral issue about holding and speculating with quota.  
One condition of our hypothesis, facilitation of new ntrants (c), was not met. Fishermen in both 
countries expressed concerns about difficulties and costs of entry, though possibly more vehemently 
in the UK where the costs of leasing quota can be high. These concerns, however, did not however 
undermine the general acceptance of the system. That this driver appears less important to overall 
satisfaction may be because it relates to third parties ather than the fishermen themselves. In this 
                                                
72 Professional quota traders, banks, vessel-agents. This group is estimated to hold no more than ca. 5% of the available 
quota shares. Among the listed actors, vessel agents are seen as most legitimate quota holders, since they play an 
important role in facilitating (i.e. financing) new entrants. 
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vein, one might argue that new entrants are no immediat  concerns to those privileged to belong to 
the ‘club’. A caveat, of course, is sons in family businesses, but in both countries alternative 
economic opportunities exist (oil jobs in North East Scotland, the service industry in the 
Netherlands) that may buffer the concern about their future. 
RBM and capacity for institutional learning 
We held that rights-based management systems restrict capacity for institutional learning. As we 
will show, this hypothesis was not fully supported by empirical evidence and needs specification.  
In the Netherlands, several steps of learning can be identified after the original IQ system had been 
introduced in 1976. The first step of learning was the introduction of the transferability of quota in 
1985 (i.e. IQs were turned into ITQs). The change was above all a reaction to the fact that 
fishermen in the early 1980s had started to trade quota although this had not been legally intended. 
The next step of learning was the attempt to redesign the ITQs system into a (prototype) 
participatory ITQ system by introducing for the first time quota management groups between 1988 
and 1990. The idea was to counter both the problems of quota overshooting that the ITQ system had 
not been able to prevent and the crisis-ridden state-industry relations which resulted from these. The
attempt failed and only the second time round succeeded, when in 1993 an institutionally more 
sophisticated approach to quota management groups was developed and the ‘Biesheuvel’ system 
emerged. As of the year 2004, the system was even ext ded when the groups’ responsibility was 
widened from quota management to the control of engine power and technical measures (nets), 
building upon the system’s success.  
In summary, the introduction of the co-management sys em and broadening of its scope in the 
Netherlands can be regarded as significant step of learning within a rights-based management 
system. This finding does not support our hypothesis or at least necessitates some modification: 
learning can take place in RBM systems, in different ways – both through making rights more 
easily transferable and introducing participatory st uctures. In our case, institutional change did not 
overhaul the balance of allocated rights but served to make the system operate more smoothly. 
In the UK, the major steps of institutional learning were linking the existing industry self-
governance structure of POs with the RBM system and the subsequent change from a sectoral quota 
management system based on a rolling track record quota allocation (introduced 1984) to a system 
based on fixed quota allocations (FQA) in 1999. Theint ntion of this change, which was requested 
by parts of industry, was to provide more stability. Emergence of quota trading and a quota market 
had not been intended (and intensified only after successive rounds of decommissioning had ‘freed’ 
up quota). These changes can not therefore be labelled ‘institutional learning’ which we understand 
as a conscious and intentional process, but as unintended shifts in the system (evolution) leading to 
new functions or practices. Interestingly, however, this unintended shift was geared, like in the 
Netherlands, towards making rights more easily transferrable (and exclusive). 
Consequently, the institutional learning that took place was mainly directed toward making the 
systems work more smoothly which included finding ways for greater accountability and flexibility. 
In both cases this led to an intensification of the transferability and security of property rights, even 
though full-fledged ITQs are still resisted in the UK. 
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Stakeholder diversity and institutional learning 
Our final hypothesis was that the more diverse the stakeholders involved in the development and/ or 
operation of a management system is, the more institutional learning takes place. This proposition 
is not confirmed by our analysis: in both the Dutch and UK cases, stakeholder involvement was 
quite narrow. Apart from governmental actors it basic lly encompassed the relevant industry 
segments only. However, as Section 3.4 showed significa t steps of institutional learning did take 
place. These include widening the Dutch RBM system o co-management and combining the pre-
existing UK industry self-governance structure of POs with RBM. Apart from these two ways at 
arriving at participatory RBM systems, we find insttutional changes within the RBM system in 
both cases to be geared towards making rights more transferrable and exclusive. Non-diverse 
stakeholder participation has favoured an even stronger movement toward market-based fisheries 
management. 
Conclusions 
Both the Dutch and the UK co-managed systems of rights-based management can be considered as 
socially robust. By this we mean that there is a generalised acceptance among at least industry 
stakeholders – greater in the case of the Netherlands – and that the systems have managed to evolve 
in adjustment to stakeholder demands, changing frameworks of fisheries management and, to some 
extent, ecological requirements. As regards institutional learning, both cases feature significant 
steps of learning – against our expectation that RBM would per se precludes a lot of institutional 
alternatives through a narrowing of perspectives, interests, and stakeholders. However, we found 
that learning within the RBM systems was often geared towards specific forms of institutional 
alternatives, namely more transferrable and secure rights. As regards the type of institutional 
learning, more instances of complex learning could be identified in the Netherlands, though 
distinguishing complex from simple learning is not always easy and there are grey zones between 
these two ideal types. 
Let us now return to our initial questions. Firstly, to what extent and why do the levels of 
stakeholder acceptance differ in the two cases? We found that stakeholder acceptance is higher in 
the Netherlands, though still moderately high in the case of the UK system of co-managed RBM. 
The degrees and diversity of stakeholder involvement in the development and operation of the 
systems are comparable in the two countries, so that they cannot explain the identified variance in 
acceptance. Similarly, most of the RBM systems’ characteristics which we had expected to affect 
stakeholder acceptance were similar, so that these, too, cannot explain variance.  
A major aspect which we had not specifically looked at, however, is the security of property rights 
and this is a major damper on stakeholder acceptance in the UK – while some want a more secure, 
ITQ-like title, others are dissatisfied with the current trend of the system towards becoming a more 
fully-fledged ITQ system. In the Netherlands, the ITQ system is more than twenty years old now 
and the legal titles are held to be secure. This paradigmatic question hence does not concern 
fishermen any more today. A further factor explaining the different levels of stakeholder acceptance 
is the complexity of the overall setting. With the UK PO’s larger group sizes and the diversity of 
species, fleets, vessel sizes, vessel types, and fishing areas in the mixed demersal fisheries, it may
be more difficult for the system to work well for all. Finally, different cultures of cooperation may 
help explaining varying stakeholder acceptance. Cooperation is an inherent feature of the Dutch 
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neo-corporatist and consociationalist culture, pervading many aspects of social life (Lijphart 1968, 
Visser 1998). The British POs operate in a generally more competitive, pluralist context of socio-
economic governance (Hall and Taylor 2001), which may challenge the groups’ self-governance 
capacity and impact on acceptance of the co-management system. 
Our second guiding question was what caused institutional learning in the two cases to take 
different directions? In the Netherlands, a RBM system was combined with co-management, 
resulting from the need of government to increase the legitimacy of its fisheries management; over 
time, co-management was widened beyond quota management. In the UK, an industry self-
governance structure was combined with RBM into a co-managed system at the request of 
fishermen. Over the years, this co-managed RBM system trengthened in terms of the tradability of 
rights and ownership expectations, but not so much wit  regard to co-management. While the first 
process can roughly be summed up as a top-down but legitimacy-driven process of institutional 
learning, the latter was more bottom-up but efficien y-driven (i.e. market-creating). The diversity of 
species, fleets, vessels, fishing areas, etc. in the UK mixed demersal fishery may halt the evolution 
to a pure ITQ system and keep open the possibility of other alternatives or the continued ‘mixed 
system’.  
Let us finally mention favourable conditions external to the co-managed RBM systems that have 
fostered the systems’ social robustness. Unequitable quota concentrations could so far be avoided, 
in the Netherlands due to the small businesses structure of the sector and in the UK by limited 
transferability of rights and the political determination (at least in Scotland) to support the owner-
operator structure of fisheries. In addition, in both countries, capacity reduction, days-at-sea 
schemes and strengthening enforcement frameworks supported the systems’ working over the years. 
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Appendix 4 
Social robustness in the Western Shelf: 
The case of the Basque Country 
 
Andréa Leme da Silva and Martin Aranda  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The focus of analysis of Work Package 6 is to evaluate the social robustness of fisheries 
management regimes, and in particular of rights-based management (RBM) and forms of 
participatory governance. This report focuses on the case of the Western Shelf with focus on the 
Basque industrial and coastal fisheries. Basque industrial fleets are represented in this report by the 
industrial trawlers fleet (altura) participating in the fisheries of the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC). The fleet harvests various demersal species, being the most important hake. 
The management of this fleet is done through a system of individual rights (through effort quotas in 
the early stage and nowadays through ITQs). This fleet has an active participation in the 
management process at the local level and has a leading role in the European management context 
through the South Western Waters Regional Advisory Council (SWWRAC). Basque coastal 
fisheries (bajura) are represented in this report by the purse seiners harvesting anchovy and other 
pelagics in the Bay of Biscay. This fleet is managed through the fishing guilds (cofradias). 
Cofradias have strong territorial rights and are active in participation in the regional management 
context and at the European level in the SWWRACs and the Pelagic RAC.  
 
To meet our aims, 20 interviews were carried out in the Spanish Basque Country during August and 
September 2007. Interviewees included members of two industrial fisheries associations: 
NORDPESC (Pasajes) and OPPAO (Ondarroa); fishermen union associations of coastal sectors 
from the provinces of Biscaya (harbors of Bermeo and Ondarroa) and Gipuzcoa (harbors of 
Hondarribia, Getaria, and Pasajes), and Regional Advisory Councils’ (RACs) members of the 
South-Western Waters and North-Western Waters RACs, among others (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Interviews carried out in the Basque Country, Spain. 
Present job 
 
 
Background 
Civil servants 
(People in 
Ministry, or 
inspection)  
Researcher  Green Fishermen (and 
their 
representatives) 
Total 
Biologist/scientist  1 1  2 
Social science 
(anthropology, 
economy, law) 
     
Fisherman    17 17 
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Other    1 1 
Total     20 
 
 
2. Background of fisheries  
 
2.1 Study area 
 
The Spanish Basque Country (Euskadi) is located in northern Spain. It has an area of 7,089 square 
km. The population in the Basque Autonomous Community is 2.1 million inhabitants. Population 
has had the most significant population growth occurring prior to 1981, after that pick population 
has declined in 1% until 2003. From 2003 to date, population has shown a rising trend due to 
immigration from non communitarian countries. 
The Basque Autonomous Community is divided in three historical territories (Araba, Biscay, and 
Gipuzkoa). Vitoria-Gasteiz is the administrative capit l where the Basque Government and 
Parliament are located, whereas Bilbao is the judicial apital, where the headquarters of the 
Superior Court of Justice are located. There are two official languages in the Basque community: 
Spanish and Basque (Euskera).  
 
Figure 1. Map of the study region – Bay of Biscay, Spain 
 
 
2.2. Coastal fisheries  
 
The coastal fisheries (locally known as bajura) refer to the fleet targeting pelagic and demersal 
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species. These species including European anchovy (Engraulis encrachicolus), Atlantic horse 
mackerel (Trachurus trachurus), blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou), hake (Merlucius 
merlucius) and others. The technology used in the bajura sector is diverse, and consists of purse 
seine, trolling, and hand lines with live bait. The bajura fleet is characterized by a wide variety of 
vessel types, ranging from motorized small boats to middle-size vessels called hake boats. The most 
important harbors are Bermeo (27.6% of the whole coastal fleet in terms of units), Hondarribia 
(9.9%), Getaria (9.4%), San Sebastian (9.4%), Pasajes (3%), Ondarroa (20%), and Lekeitio (7.7%) 
(Arregi et al., 2004) These six ports provide more than 70% of the total coastal fleet, and account 
for about 40% of the employment in the fishing sector (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: Harbors of Gipuzcoa and Biscay (Source: Basque Government). 
 
Coastal fisheries has a long history in the Basque country, for example, one of its oldest harbors, 
Getaria was founded in 1209, and was one of the main economic villages of Gipuzcoa during the 
middle ages. Between 14th and 15th century, Getaria expanded the commercial scope to the 
commercial fishing. In particular, the fishing rights of navigation were conceded by the monarchy 
to noble Basque in return to military services. During the 16th to 18th century, Getaria was the main 
harbor for anchovy and sardine industries. At that ime, a great number of guipuzcoanos sailed to 
Terranova (Canada) and to the Arctic to fish cod an whale. Since the end of the eighteenth century, 
several factors contributed to the reactivation of the bajura sector, like the foundation of Compañia 
Sardinera Getaria in 1764; the end of the Carlist war in 1876; and the emergence of new 
technologies of fish capture and preservation. In twen ieth century, Getaria continued to be one of 
the main harbors for artisanal fishing of the Basque Country. For further details on social history of 
fisheries in the Basque coast see Vascos (1925), López Losa (1997, 2000), and Itsas Memoria 
(2000).  
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Figure 3: Main species for the coastal fleet - bajura (Source: AZTI Tecnalia). 
 
2.3 Industrial fisheries 
 
There are three industrial fishing technologies in the Basque Country: Cod ships (Bacaladeros), 
tuna clippers with freezing facilities (atuneros congeladores), and demersal trawlers (altura la 
fresco). The bacaladeros are bottom trawlers that work in pairs (four pairs, eight vessels), targeting 
Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and Greenland halibut (Reinharditus hippoglossoides) to be frozen or 
salted. The atuneros congeladores are purse seiners bigger than 250 TRB. There are curr ntly 27 
vessels in the Basque fleet that fish in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans, freezing and storing 
the fish on board. These target tuna species, primarily: albacore (Tunnus alalunga); bluefin 
(Thunnus thynnus); yellowtail (Thunnus albacares); skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis); bigeye 
(Thunnus obesus). The Altura al fresco fleet comprises vessels larger than 100 TRB. It operates 
within the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) geographic limits. They are bottom 
trawlers that work as individual vessels or in pairs. It is also a small fleet composed of six gill net
vessels that target hake (Merluccius merluccius), European conger eel (Conger conger), and ling 
cod (Molva molva / Molva dypterygia). The fishing sector in the Basque Country has seen its fleet 
shrunk to 50% from 1990 to 2002. This reduction has meant 40% contraction in the coastal sector, 
and 60% reduction in the demersal trawlers. The cod fleet has been reduced in 70%, and the tuna 
vessels have been reduced in 20% in both number of boats and crew. Despite this reduction over the 
past 17 years, the fleet is still experiences a substantial renovation, supported by the Basque 
government.  
 
2.4. Pelagic resources and management: The European anchovy 
 
Anchovy fishing in the Bay of Biscay has traditionally been a Spanish right. After the entry of 
Spain into the European Community in 1986, the French pelagic trawling fleet gained access to the 
Biscayan fishing grounds. The initial distribution of shares allocated 90% for Spain and 10% for 
Sardina 
Mackere
l 
Anchov
Tuna 
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France. The Archachon Agreement (ratified in 1992 and reissued in 2003) has considerably 
softened this distribution, resulting in much larger quota shares for the French fleet. Contentious 
issues were the fishing techniques of the French fleet (banned in Spain) and its fleet growing up to 
150 vessels. The fisheries are now well separated in space and time, and share the TAC granted by 
the EU. The Arcachon Agreement, however, it is not palatable to the Spanish coastal fishermen.  
 
Since the 1980s the EU placed restrictions on annual catches of anchovy in the Bay of Biscay. TAC 
applies to the whole ICES Division VIII and is distr buted among the French and Spanish fleets via 
a system of fishing licenses (Del Valle, Astorkiza, Astorkiza, 2000; AZTI, 2006). Traditionally, 
TAC has been decided on an annual basis by the Council of Fisheries Ministers. This decision was 
based on scientific advice provided by ICES Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management 
(ACFM) and the Commissions own advisory body, the Scientific and Technical and Economic 
Committee on Fisheries (STECF). The Commission makes proposals which are accepted or rejected 
by the Council of Ministers. This annual procedure, trying to provide for exhaustive political 
deliberation, may bring various disadvantages for the sector.  
 
In recent years, the ICES repeatedly reported that the anchovy’s stock in the Bay of Biscay suffered 
a reduced reproductive capacity and was outside safbiological limits (SBL). In 2000, ICES 
recommended the closure of the Anchovy fisheries, bcause of poor recruitment and low SSB 
estimates. Despite of this, the Council of Minister decided to keep the TAC in 33,000t as in 
previous years.  
 
The fishery of European anchovy had been closed in July 2005 after a collapse of the stock 
resulting in a sharp decrease of catches by 98% (Regulation EC No 1037/2005). The ban had 
initially been proposed for a period of three months, although it has been prolonged several times 
(Regulation EC No 1539/2005). The ban on the anchovy fishery has even been interrupted in spring 
2006, which caused considerable discontent in both France and Spain. The Arcachon Agreement 
forbids that the French fleet target anchovy in spring, while Spanish vessels fish. The resumption of 
the closure of the fishery at the beginning of the Fr nch anchovy season has reluctantly been 
accepted and some fishermen have illegally targeted anchovy during the ban, which caused severe 
conflicts between French and Spanish fleet (Berria Info 200573).  
 
After the initial three-month ban set up in July 2005 and prolonged until December 2005, the new 
TAC has been set up employing a decision-rule mechanism. A cautionary TAC of 5,000 tons has 
been set up in the beginning of the year that was due to revision in June when new scientific data 
would be available. A Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) level of 28,000 tons had been previously 
defined as within Safe Biological Level (SBL). In the case the biological data available would 
indicate a lower SSB level; the fishery would automatically be closed. This in fact led to the 
continuity of the ban in July 2006 as SSB level hasbeen under the threshold of 28,000 tons (AZTI, 
2006). It is likely that a similar procedure will be included in future management plans for the 
stock.  
                                                
73 http://www.berria.info/azala.htm 
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Since anchovy stock was still at peril with a SSB level below the SBL threshold of 21,000 tons 
(AZTI, 2006), the Council proposed that the fishery remain closed in 2007 (ICES 2007). The 
fishery was closed with severe economic consequences, especially for Basque fisheries. Since signs 
of recovery of the stock are not visible, a reopening of the fishing grounds is not in sight for the 
near future (AZTI, 2006). New approaches to management of this severely damaged stock are 
urgently needed, including revisable TAC, taking into account natural and human-induced 
fluctuations of the SSB, and thus, reproductive capa ity of anchovy in the Bay of Biscay (ICES 
2005a). Information on how anchovy in Community waters is to be managed in the future is scarce. 
Generally, management instruments like Vessels Monitori g System (VMS) will likely play a role 
in anchovy management. The European Union has announced in-year management plans for 
anchovy implying the setting of reversible and flexible TAC based on incoming scientific data (Bay 
of Biscay anchovy 2005). So far, these plans have not been accessible to the public. A second focal 
point will certainly be the limitation of fishing effort, which likely exceeds the capacities of the 
stock in the Bay of Biscay.  
 
Spanish fishermen organizations agree with the closure of anchovy fisheries for the stock recovery 
plan requested to the European Community in 2005, when stocks showed the first signs of 
depletion. There has been some conflict between Frech and Spanish fishermen over the revision of 
the TAC for anchovy in 2005. Spain supports the continuation of the ban, while France opposes it 
(Martínez, 2006 ; Schönherr, 2006). After the preliminary reopening of the fishery in spring 2005, 
the Spanish fleet was able to fish anchovy (althoug not very successfully). When the fishery was 
closed again in June the French fishing season had only just begun. There have been calls in favour 
of abandoning of the Arcachon Agreement.  
 
In 2006, the ministers negotiate with EU a TAC of 5,000 tons to the French and Spanish fleet, 
despite disagreement of the coastal Spanish sector and scientists recommendations. During 2007, 
the European Community set up a cautionary TAC of 5.000 tons for accomplishing “scientific 
experimental” anchovy fisheries. Since Basque coastal fi hermen positioned themselves completely 
against with such cautionary quota, they consensually decided not fishing, instead of that they 
proposed to evaluate the fishing stocks through biolog cal samples (catch and release).  
 
2.5. Demersal resources and management: Atlantic European hake (Northern stock) 
 
Northern hake is one of the most economically important target species in the Bay of Biscay. The 
demersal northern hake stock is considered mixed fisher es. The exact fishing techniques may vary 
from country to country. According to ICES data (2001) Spain accounts for about 61% of all 
northern hake landings in the EU, while France contributes in 23% to the total landings. The 
remaining 16% are shared between the UK, Denmark, and Ireland (AZTI, 2006).  
 
Hake stocks are managed by means of an annual TAC and complementary technical measures, 
including restrictions on mesh sizes and other gears, s well as the deployment of observers on 
fishing vessels (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1162/2001). The annually fixed TAC for each 
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species has been replaced by a revisable TAC aiming at a multiannual consistency of quotas. This 
new procedure has been tested in the context of the Recovery Plan for Hake fisheries in ICES 
Divisions IX. Quotas are allocated to both French and Spanish fisheries targeting hake. 
Furthermore, the Commission has tried to reduce fishing effort in both fleets. France uses a special 
licensing system, while Spain keeps vessel a register, limiting the total number of vessels (OSPAR, 
2000, Schönherr, 2006). As hake is caught in mixed fisheries, any management measures taken will 
have an impact on other commercial and non-commercial species, and the trophic relations between 
them. However, these factors are not yet sufficiently i cluded in recent management considerations 
(ICES, 2005b). 
 
The alarming state of hake populations resulted in the issue of an Emergency Plan since June 2001 
(AZTI, 2006). After that, a number of new management instruments have been introduced by the 
2004 proposal for a Long Term Recovery Plan in order to recover the depleted fish stock based on 
‘command and control management’ of the EU. Currently, efforts have been made to introduce new 
management schemes, i.e. through the South-Western Regional Advisory Council (SWWRAC) and 
flexible TAC. This implies a tendency towards more participatory governance and the use of 
decision-rules in the management of northern hake stock  (AZTI 2006, COM (2003) 347final 
2003). 
 
Hake recovery Plan 
 
A similar mechanism is provided in the Recovery Plan for Northern Hake of 2004. Articles 4, 5 and 
6 of Regulation EC No 811/2004 are concerned with the procedure to setting TAC for Northern 
hake in the future. 100,000 tons have been defined as the baseline SSB level against which quotas 
have to be decided. TAC is still decided on an annul basis by the Council of Ministers but these are 
initial quotas that can be revised throughout the year. The goal is to reduce fishing mortality to a 
level equal or below 0.25. Moreover, stability in TAC setting is guaranteed by a clause which states 
that changes in the quota from one year to the next may not exceed ± 15% of the last year’s TAC. A 
decision-rule mechanism takes over as soon as the SSB level falls below the 100,000 tons threshold. 
In this case a TAC needs to be adopted for the following year that has to be lower and should result 
in an increase of mature fish.  
 
Some interviewees considered the recovery plan of hake as alarming und unnecessary. Others 
considered that the plan recovered the hake stocks. Actually, the main problem, according to the 
interviewees, concerning hake is the price of the fish. The price of fish in general has not increased 
since 20 years. Because Spain imports hake from other countries such as South Africa, Namibia, 
and Argentina it is a tendency to blame imported fish for low domestic prices. Another fact 
affecting negatively the price of Spanish hake is the presence of a parasite. As a consequence, many 
fishermen feel that is not cost effective to fish, w at is especially true for the smaller fleet.  
 
The industrial sector considers itself as excluded itself from the decisions concerning the measures 
that had been taken with regard to the recovery plan of hake: “The recovery plans are good 
whenever are based purely on scientific criteria, but many of them have a certain tendency of being 
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influenced by political aspects”. Concerning to the recovery plan of hake, a representative of one 
producer organization expressed that “our organisation always had a fear that the recovery plan 
was not sufficiently supported by scientific information. We have never understood how a recovery 
plan can be set so swiftly. We considered that hake was not doing so badly. Hake stock has been 
able to recover only in three years”. This representative concluded that scientists’ projections were 
“excessively pessimistic because scientists tend to be cautionary and do not take into account the 
economic and social repercussions, since there are many people who live from fisheries”.  
 
3. Description of the management system 
 
3.1 The Rights-Based Management system 
 
3.1.1 From effort quotas to ITQs: The case of Spanish fleet in the NEAFC grounds 
 
An excellent example on the evolution of fishing rihts in Spain is given by the case of the offshore 
fleet (trawlers and long-liners aka industrial fleet) operating in the geographical limits of the 
Northeast East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)74. In 1981, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAPA) passes the order of 12th of June recognizing fishing rights -expressed as days at 
sea- to individual vessels in areas for which access mechanisms were granted (Gonzalez-Laxe 
2007). The starting point for these allocations of rights was a census of the vessels operating in the 
aforementioned area. This census constituted the basis for allocation of rights. The original list of 
vessels was 416 boats75. Rights were allocated to individual vessels and the total amount of rights 
that a fishing company could accumulate was given by the sum of the rights of its individual 
vessels. Rights could be accumulated on vessels of the same company when scrapping one fishing 
vessel. Transferability of rights to vessels of other companies was not allowed without the selling of 
the fishing vessel.  
 
In 1992 the MAPA passed the order of 12th of June that allowed accumulation of fishing rights to 
vessels of the same census. Besides the accumulation of rights the MAPA kept granting a bonus for 
scrapping. Accumulation of rights was possible among companies and harbors. These attractive 
conditions allowed the large restructure of the fishing fleet. In 1996, Galicia held 53% of the fleet, 
while the Basque fleet held 47%. In 2006, Galicia holds 74%, while the Basque Country holds 23% 
and Cantabria holds the remaining percentage. 
 
In July 1997, the MAPA passed the Law 23/1997 that allows free transference of rights among 
companies, owning vessels in the same census, without ransferring the property of the vessel. The 
concept of temporality is introduced and the law stated that right are allocated for a non-defined 
time.  
Royal Decrees 1838 (November 1997) and 1915 (December 1997) establishes limits to fishing 
                                                
74 ICES areas VI, VII, VIII a, b, d 
75 In 1987 and coinciding with the entry of Spain to the European Community the fleet had shrunk to 300 boats. The “list of the 300” 
comprises long liners and trawlers enable to fish in Communitarian waters. Nowadays, the fleet is up to 199 boats.  
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rights, being the maximum 315 days and the minimum level at 210 days. In 2004, the Royal Decree 
1596/2004 abolishes the upper limit for accumulation of rights for individual vessels but establishes 
a maximum limit of 30% of all possibilities in the fishery. In December 2006, the MAPA issues the 
order 3773/2006 establishing a system of individual transferable quotas (amount of fish) for vessels 
over 100 GRT operating in the ICES V b, V, VII and VIII a, b, d. 
 
3.1.2 The anchovy fishery in the Bay of Biscay and territorial user rights  
 
The Cofradias play a major role in regulating and managing of coastal artisanal fisheries in a co-
management regime. There is a historical participatory system culture present on the local and 
community level, particularly in artisan coastal fisheries (Franqueza, 2004). Cofradías have 
traditionally shaped fisheries management under a common pool regime (Astorkiza, del Valle and 
Astorkiza 1998) based on strict regulation of extraction of sea resources and the management of 
access to those resources and the maritime domains where these resources are founded, as well as 
the marketing of fish76. The territorial component is such important that Cofradias management of 
resources can be considered as a territorial user right (TURF). It is a high degree of legitimacy and 
acceptance of the Cofradias among the population because of their traditionally important role in 
local fisheries management. Cofradias claim the right to exploit certain resources in a given area. 
For exploiting a given resource one must be a member of the cofradia (cofrade). Since the entry of 
Spain in the EC, Cofradias have had concerns regarding the sharing of the anchovy stocks with the 
French fleet that exploits the resource using technologies not allowed by the Cofradias. They 
consider the Treaty of Arcachon deleterious to their rights and a threat to the anchovy stock. 
Cofradias has reacted as a single man to face the challenges of the collapse of anchovy and have 
made their opinion respected through the Basque govrnment and though active precipitation in the 
Regional Advisory Council first in the Pelagic one and then in the South Western Waters RAC. 
Capacity of react to threats and support by the civil society and local government may rest on their 
history and participatory organisation (see 4.2). 
 
3.2 Participatory governance system 
 
The coastal fishing of the Basque Country is regulated by different authorities. The competence of 
fishing regulation in territorial waters is shared between Spanish State and Autonomous 
Community Administration. The Autonomous Community (AA.CC) of the Basque Country is 
responsible for fishing regulations for the interior waters (until 12 nautical miles), while the 
competence of fishing regulation of the external waters (up to 12 miles) corresponds to the Spanish 
State. Furthermore, European Union legislation in fishing matters ranks higher than those described 
previously, i.e., state and autonomic legislation must adjust their decisions to those of the European 
legislation (Arregi et al., 2004). 
 
Since the entry of Spain into the EU, both the central government and the Autonomous Community 
                                                
76 Article 52 of the Spanish constitution on Corporate Administration officially recognises the special role of the cofradias in the 
Spanish constitutional state. 
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have ceded a part of their decision-making capacity to he Community, accepting certain obligations 
concerning the adoption of legislation. Generally it remains that the central authorities are 
responsible for basic legislation, while the AA.CCs hold the competencies for its implementation 
and enforcement (Schönherr, 2006).  
 
The management of fisheries is generally structured in a centralized way. Notwithstanding, there is 
a process of decentralization going on, conferring more and more competencies on coastal AA.CCs 
(Van Hoof et al. 2005, Schönherr, 2006). In the Spanish Basque Country, the extractive sector has 
been pre-eminent and best represented in decision-making processes. Lately, there have been efforts 
to coordinate the fisheries policies among the AA.CCs by means of founding the Committee for the 
Coordination of Fisheries Management in the Western Shelf. The committee held its first meeting 
in February 2006.  
 
Generally, participation of stakeholders in political decision-making in Spain has resulted in a 
relatively inefficient and slow process. Political decisions are often based on scientific 
recommendations without other agents being involved. At the state and autonomous community 
levels, no real participation of stakeholders occurs. Consequently, measures taken are often 
perceived as distant and/or alien by the sector (Van Hoof et al. 2005, Schönherr, 2006). 
Notwithstanding, efforts have been done to strengthen stakeholder representation. Some measures 
include allocation of subventions to different projects within the fishing sector in order to assure 
quality and socio-economic viability.77, the acquisition of new business partners, and the 
improvement of the representation and participation of fishermen’s associations in decision-making 
both on the national and international level78 (BOE 05/23/2006 No 8995).  
 
3.2.1 Participation in the Regional Advisory Councils 
 
The management through participatory governance is just starting in the European Union through 
the Regional Advisory Councils (RAC), in which fishery industry groups are being recently 
organized to participate as a supplier of advice. The Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) were 
established as part of the reform of the CFP (Common Fisheries Policy) in 2002. Such measure 
aims at active participation of stakeholders in the decision-making process in fisheries management 
in the EU. The Council has created seven RACs79. Furthermore, they have decided to establish an 
Inter-RAC Committee to cope with questions of common interest which demand joint delivery of 
policy recommendations (DG Fisheries 2006a80). 
 
Especially relevant to the Basque fisheries is the South-western waters RAC which has great 
                                                
77 The responsible organisation is the Fund for the Regulation and Organisation of the Fisheries and Fish- arming Products Market 
“Fondo de Regulación y Organización del Mercado y Productos de la Pesca y Cultivos Mariscos (FROM”),  http://from.mapa.es  
78 Funds are also reserved for scientific research and professional training of fishermen, as well as the strengthening of 
communication and the diffusion of information relevant to the fishing sector. 
79North Sea RAC (since 2004), Baltic Sea RAC (since 2006), North-western waters RAC (since 2005),  Pelagic sto ks RAC (since 
2005), Mediterranean Sea RAC, the South-western waters RAC, and Distant waters fisheries RAC (2006 and 2007, respectively).  
80 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/faq/resources_en.htm#1 
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importance for the management of anchovy and hake stocks in the Bay of Biscay. This council 
covers ICES Division VIII, IX and X as well as the waters around the Azores, Madeira and the 
Canaries (ICES 2006). It is relevant to say that a Basque representative leads this RAC. Another 
meaningful RAC to the Basque fisheries is the Pelagic RAC which was founded in August 2005 
and deals with pelagic resources found in the North and South Western Waters, and the North Sea81. 
In the opinion of some stakeholders, RACs are seen as a good mechanism of participation, as 
reported by a key boat owner representative: “We had always complained about a lack of 
communication with the EU, and many of our ideas have never been considered. My opinion is that 
RACs have positive and negative aspects. Logically, it has positive aspects, such as enhancing 
dialog among member states to approach consensus, and to improve knowledge. Within the 
framework created by the EU and the fisheries industry ector, we convey many opinions on how 
managing the fisheries. Certainly, some years will be necessary to approach a dialog and to change 
mind. We must look for a management system that is not only sustainable and respectful, but also 
equalitarian”. 
 
RACs are also seen as a good platform for negotiatin, a key representative of the Fishing Guild of 
Hondarribia recalled a negotiation between Spain (Federation of Fishing Guilds of Gipuzcoa) and 
France through the Pelagic RAC. The Spanish fleet aimed at fishing in the Lagaron, (in the mouth 
of Garrona river, 130 miles to the North), which is jurisdiction of France. This zone consists on a 
very rich area of small anchovy, which is used as bit to catch bonito. Spanish coastal fleet 
proposed to interchange quotas of anchovy for fishing in these areas during some weeks of the year. 
 
3.2.2 Participation in the Cofradias 
 
Fishermen guilds in Spain (so-called Cofradias) have a long history. Some of the current Cofradias 
were founded during the XII to XIV century as economic associations under religious bases 
(Erkoreka Gervasio, 1991). In the beginning, such guilds established agreements between the 
fishermen community and the King (or the Church) to exploit fisheries resources in specific areas. 
Under the influence of the French Revolution, different governments tried to abolish the guild 
system during the XVIII and82 XIX centuries, which produced disorganization, conflicts and 
overexploitation related with the free access. Notwithstanding, fishermen guilds in fact did not 
disappear. Cofradias changed its appearance from religious institutions to industrial associations, 
cooperatives and trade unions (Franquesa, 2004).  
 
Cofradias have a system of representative parity between shipowners (álcades mayores) and crew 
(álcaldes menores). The consultative body is represented by the president, vice-president, and 
directive body. The presidential elections occur every four years. A fisherman becomes cofrade 
after being contracted; however, just after two years he can take part into decisions (e.g., to be a 
                                                
81 http://www.pelagic-rac.org 
82 According to Franquesa (2004) an excessive and unreal number of Cofradias are being maintained in Spain. These require 
amalgamation and reorganization of the Cofradias. According to this author, about 75 Cofradias, instead of 229 in all the Spanish 
coastal line and islands, could be enough to regulate fishing grounds in Spain.   
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representative member of the crew). Every boat has a fishermen representative (so called second 
skipper), who takes part into presidential elections, and participate to the meetings and assemblies. 
A representative of the Cofradia de Hondarribia stated that “the Cofradia itself does not have 
changed so much, we follow the same. Each fisherman is  cofrade, and once retired he continues 
taking part into the Cofradia. We have always dedicated ourselves to the same fishing arts, which 
knowledge used to be passed from parents to children. Young people do not want to go to the sea 
anymore, so the fleet deceased, we must bring foreigners. We are now 40 boats, the shipowners are 
younger, from 27 to 40 years.  
 
The entry of Spain to the EU added a difficulty; the EU regulations promote Producers 
Organizations (PO), which differs from Cofradias in several features. The PO is voluntary, while 
the adhesion to Cofradias is compulsory to fishing in a given area. Moreover, PO associates only 
the owners while Cofradias associate also the crew, which is particularly important for participation 
and compliance in any agreement and decision-making process. A practical measure firstly adopted 
in Gipuzcoa and then extended to all Spain includes th  establishment of a legal institution as PO 
that depends fully on the Cofradias. Such kind of apparent PO can solve many of the past conflicts 
because allows complying the EU requirements and maintain the self-control over the territory. 
 
Presidents of the Federations of Gipuzcoa and Biscay agree that positive internal changes occurring 
in the Cofradias last years include improvements in the administration hrough implementation of 
informatics system (e.g., invoices, contracts of memb r of the crew, fish commerce), staff 
qualification (e.g., skippers must have skills in the computer science in order to inform which 
species is captured and where), and renewal of the fis ing fleet with EU subsidies. Most of these 
changes happened to respond to Spanish State and European Community demands. 
  
3.2.3 Participation in the national organizations 
 
The most important POs (producer organizations), fiheries associations and trade unions in Spain 
at the national level are the National Federation of Fishermen’ Guilds (FNCP), the National 
Organisation of Fisheries Associations (ONAPE) and the Spanish Federation of Fisheries 
Organisations (FEOPE). Moreover, shipowners’ associati ns and producers’ organisations play an 
important role in the marketing of fish products and the provision of harbour services for industrial 
and artisanal fisheries, respectively. FNCP represent 225 associations of fishermen primarily active 
in coastal fishing, ONAPE represents 12 regional deep sea fishing associ tions, and FEOPE are 
representative of owners of fishing vessels that operate especially in the Bay of Biscay, the 
Mediterranean, the Southern Mediterranean and the South Atlantic.  
 
3.2.4 Participation in the industrial fisheries organizations 
 
A producer organization, such as OPPAO, which is based in Ondarroa, is represented by a general 
consultative body constituted by twelve directors and  president. All of these members are chosen 
in an electoral process every four years. Only the consultative body takes part into the meetings, 
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while all the companies participate in the general assemblies once or twice a year.  
 
The industrial sector from the Basque harbor of Pasajes (NORDPESC) takes part into the 
Cooperative of Vigo (ANASOL), which represents several other industrial fleets. The industrial 
sector stakeholders have no relationship with the coastal sector (bajura). The interviewees believe 
that national organizations represent the interests of the industrial fleet, but not in the extension that 
should be, because each fisheries category defends its own interests. 
 
Two main problems have not been solved yet, the low prices of the fish in the market due to 
globalization of fish trade, and depletion of the fishing stocks. A representative of one Basque 
producer organizations let us know that “what will determine the future of the Europe fisheries and 
ours in particular is the market. The market behaves in a completely anarchical way, with a total 
freedom. While some countries export fish with little or any sanitary guarantees, a European 
fisherman is asked to fulfill the criteria of sustain ble development, taxes, social security, etc”. 
New demands and expectations include alternatives to overcome with the lower prices due to 
concurrences in a globalize market. One possible solution could be the creation of a “label”, which 
has been discussed between the organizations and the Basque Government. Such label could 
distinguish fish product quality and inform consumers concerning to the fish origin, fishing gears 
used, and so on. 
 
3.2.5 Participation of women in fisheries  
 
Women (usually wife, mother, or daughter of the shipowner) have been played a historical role in 
the bajura fisheries of the Basque Country. Traditionally, the men fish and the women market the 
captures. Besides sewing the fishing nets, these women have don several activities in the harbors, 
such as organization of the fish prior to be sold, collection of the money, and payment to the crew. 
 
Nowadays, women still play a role in sewing the nets during the seasonal fisheries of the pelagic 
fish species such as anchovy, Atlantic horse mackerel, sardine, Blue fin Tuna, and mackerel. Small 
individuals of horse mackerel and anchovy are used as bait for catching tuna fish. Some women 
also help in organizing, unloading and weighing the fish prior to the trading at the Cofradias.  
 
Despite of being involved in many fishing activities, women do not take part into the Cofradias 
neither have any social welfare. One interviewed woman in the Port of Ondarroa reported that: 
“Since the beginning nobody wanted us. Now we are organizing a women association in Gipuzcoa, 
Biscay, and Galicia. It is an artisanal work that we learned in the house of our parents and we have 
done it for years”.  
 
4. Analysis of social robustness  
 
4.1 Stakeholder acceptance 
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4.1.1 How stakeholders see government 
 
Consensually, Basque coastal fishermen do not feel properly represented by the Spanish national 
state (see, for example, the low acceptability of the Arcachon Agreement). Fishing quota of the 
bajura sector at the Cantabria level is managed by the Spanish State, which negotiates with other 
fishery sectors a right acquired for historical activity of the coastal fishermen. For example, the 
Spanish Senate has recently given licenses for the category surface-long line to fish tuna, which has 
been historically a quota of the purse seine fleet. A similar negotiation has been carried out for 
mackerel. A Basque Fishing Guild representative pointed out that “We feel disrespected concerning 
to the decisions of Madrid (MAPA), as well as concer ing to the international agreements 
especially between France and Spain. Mackerel, for example, is now being fished by the industrial 
vessels known as the list of the 300 (see note 2), which takes advantages on the species traditionally 
caught by the coastal fleet”. 
 
On the other hand, the work of local government rega ding fisheries issues is largely accepted by 
stakeholders both for the coastal and industrial sector. According to the interviews, the Autonomous 
Government of the Basque Country is involved with fsheries policies, supporting and defending 
local producer’s interests to the Spanish State. Moreover, the local government supports research on 
fisheries topics. 
 
4.1.2 How stakeholders see rights and their dynamics 
 
Ship-owners of the industrial fleet consider that status quo has been negatively altered, since most 
of the fishing property rights were purchased by Galicia. Factors attributed to the growth of fishing 
activities in Galicia include mostly subventions to the industrial fishermen organizations for the 
acquisition of licenses and boats. Furthermore, many ship-owners decided to move from ports of the 
Basque Country to Galicia, where benefits are better concerning crew salaries running costs and 
boat maintenance. One interviewed ship-owner of the Basque Port of Ondarroa considers that: 
“Privatization of property rights has not done well for us, since some companies that in the 
previous years did not buy licenses have a very little quota to fish now. After the distribution of 
quotas, many companies have not been in good situation, since licenses from the Basque country 
were bought by Galicia. The Port of Pasajes is actully in OPPAO, since the boats there started to 
disappear. The Port of Ondarroa is also decadent, si ce many people does not have quota to work 
all over the year”. He continues pointing: “I believe that fishermen have much more force at the 
Galicia level because they worried about the fishing i dustry concerning to buy rights and renew 
the fleet and also because costs are lower there than here”.  
 
4.2 Evolution of the management system and institutional learning:  
 
Table 1 (input from Astorkiza, del Valle and Astorkiza, 1998) explains the long development of 
cofradias as holders of historical rights on exploitation of pelagic resources and territorial rights. 
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Cofradias have managed to survive by adapting to changing political conditions and in the last 
years to collapses of key resources such as anchovy. Moreover, they show openness to the 
emergence of new management tools such as harvest control rules and are active in the 
development of management plans. Its capacity of lobbying and strong support from the Basque 
government ensures that they can react swiftly to threats.  
 
 
Table 2 explains the development of the RBM in the industrial Spanish fleet operating in the 
grounds of the NEAFC. Notice that the evolution hastaken place along a 25 year period. Evolution 
has been quite natural. The fact that rights were accumulative from almost the beginning 
determined that some vessels gain rights from scrapped ones. As a result of incentives to 
decommission (i.e. the possibility to transfer the rights and gaining a bonus after scrapping), a 
restructure of the fleet was produce. At that stage, th re were more rights than vessels. The 
introduction of free transferability of effort rights may have balanced rights and vessels. Free 
transferability between ports and companies may have determined the predominance of Galician 
Time Management System/ implementation of tools Type of institutional learning 
Middle ages Emergence of cofradias and its territorial rights = Baseline 
French 
Revolution 
Abolishment of cofradias. Cofradias transformed to mutual aid 
societies.  
1873-1936 Cofradias are forced to accept free enterprise. 
Emergence of industrial fleets. 
 
Dictatorship 
1936-1975 
Part of trade unions. Responsible of representation nd 
training of fishermen. 
 
Transition to 
democracy 
1976-1983 
Recognised by the Constitution as Corporate 
Administrations. 
Introduction of historical rights in the 
constitutional regime. 
1983 Emergence of autonomous communities. Consultative 
body in collaboration with administrations. 
Consolidation of cofradias as suppliers 
of advice based in experience. 
1986 Entry of Spain to the EC. France participates in the 
exploitation of anchovy. 
Modernisation of the sector. 
2002-to date Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. Federation 
of Cofradias participation in the RACs 
Active participation in the 
Communitarian management process.  
2005 Collapse of the anchovy stock. Participation in the development of 
management plans through RACs 
platform. 
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boats. After 25 year, the system has shift from a system of input quotas to output quotas through the 
implementation of an ITQ system. This ITQ system is not entirely market based as the Icelandic 
system. Transference of rights is still done among participants belonging to the original census. 
 
 
 
5. Discussing the hypotheses on social robustness  
 
Hypothesis 1: Rights-based management systems tend not to have broad stakeholder 
representation. 
 
In the Western Shelf case study, none representatio by groups other than fishermen was found in 
Time Management System/ implementation of tools Type of institutional learning 
before 1981 Open access fishery = Baseline 
1981 Census of the Spanish vessels operating in the i  
the NEAFC domains. 
Concern in identifying the size of the fishing 
fleet 
1981 Allocation of effort rights to individual vessel . 
Accumulation of right within the same company 
when scrapping a fishing vessel. Accumulation 
only possible when selling the vessel. 
Rights are understood as a limit on 
participation in the fishery. Concerns on 
overcapacity. 
 
1986 Spain in 
the EC 
List of the 300 vessels with right to fish in the 
NEAFC. 
 
1992 Rights on effort can be transferable only to 
vessels of the same census and are attached to a 
fishing vessel. Accumulation is allowed among 
different harbours and companies. 
The aim of attaching the right to the vessels 
is understood as a means to get read of 
redundant capacity. 
2005 to date Participation in the RAC of South-Western 
Waters (SWWRAC). 
Adaptation on new requirements of the 
improved CFP. 
1997 Transference of the rights on effort is allowed 
without the requirement to transfer the property of 
the vessel. Limits are established for 
concentration of rights. 
The excess of capacity is apparently 
eliminated and the transferability may enable 
that excess of rights on some vessels could be 
distributed among the rest of boats. 
2006 ITQ system is introduced. Shift from the effort quota to the output quota 
model. Transference is still only allowed for 
participants in the fishery (original census), 
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the two RBM cases studied: ITQs for hake and other demersals and TURFs for the Bay of Biscay 
anchovy. It is hard, however, to assess whether the RBM system has created the narrow stakeholder 
representation as proposed in hypotheses 1 or if it is due to other factors. A lack of participation of 
conservationist could likely be the result of the small or negligible room for non-traditional 
stakeholders in the management process at national or Community level. Basque green ONGs have 
views on the fishery issues and convey their opinions to the civil society through the local media. 
However, they do not have any officially recognised consultative role in the management of Basque 
fisheries. Although representation is narrow; RBM seems to have built strong and active 
participation for industrial and coastal fishermen. They have an active consultancy role in fisheries 
management within the autonomous Basque jurisdiction. They are active in lobbing and through 
their government they express their needs to the central Spanish government and to Brussels. 
Furthermore, Basque fishermen are active in four RACs and even have leading roles in some of 
them.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a (RB) management system will be a 
function of the extent to which a) the management system is perceived by the fishermen to be 
practical [and necessary]; b) the management system (in RBM: the initial allocation) reproduced 
the status quo of fishing opportunities when introduced; c) which new entrants are facilitated; d) 
which retirement options are provided for. 
 
The acceptance of the two kinds of RBM in use in the Basque country is relative. In one hand, the 
system gathers all the conditions to satisfy fishermen since: (a) the system has clearly established 
rules and it is accepted since it has been evolved from an open access situation that was deleterious 
to the resource; (b) the initial allocation was based on historical criteria, having as a starting point a 
census; (c) It has facilitated new entrants althoug they are required to buy licenses or rights from 
vessels from the original census and; (d) The RBM system has given facilities to the fishermen for 
retirement since they have been allowed to selling the right to fish and also receiving a bonus for 
scrapping. However, some of the Basque industrial stakeholders interviewed pointed that they do 
not feel satisfied with the evolution of the RBM system implemented. This unconformity is not 
result of the management system itself but of the un q al conditions when competing with other 
fleets such as the Galician. Indeed, the evolution of the RBM based on individual effort quotas has 
changed the face of fisheries and the specific weight of Basque fleets in the NEAFC area. Basque 
fleet has shrunk due to transferability (introduced in 1997), which has allowed the Galician fleet to 
growth in terms of number of vessels and rights. Basque stakeholders see that factors not easily 
controllable such as lower crew and maintenance costs may have determined the predominance of 
the Galician fleet. So we need to be careful in taking these expressions of unconformity as a 
measure of rejection of the RBM system itself. 
 
In the case of the coastal fleet or bajura, factors that theoretically may produce the acceptability of 
the RBM system are present in the fishery: (a) the management system is perceived to be practical 
and necessary because Cofradias have the right to par ially manage the fishery, for example, by 
proposing technical measures and advice to managers t regional (Basque Country) and national 
level (Madrid); (b) the rights allocation reproduced the status quo because Cofradias’s rights to 
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exploit and manage were established by law and are respectful of the historical presence of the 
Cofradias in these area; (c) new entries are allowed but through Cofradias. Indeed, no one can fish 
in a given area without prior acceptance by the Cofradia concerned and; d) retirement options have 
been provided for those wishing to leave the fishery through incentives to decommission. 
Acceptability of the system, however, is relative since it depends on external factors. For instance, 
the most referred source of concern is the Arcachon Agreement that allows French pelagic trawlers 
(technology banned in Spain) to exploit the anchovy stock. They blame the central government of 
Spain for giving facilities to “intruders” to exploit the aforementioned resources they consider a 
historical right of Spanish Cofradias. Facilities for entrance of participants using different fishing 
technologies are definitely unpalatable for the bajura sector As it was pointed in the case of the 
Basque industrial fleet, acceptance of the RBM system does not necessary rest on the intrinsic 
characteristics of RBM (see hypothesis 2) but on other factors that are not directly connected to it.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The more diverse stakeholder involvement in the development and/ or operation of 
a management system, the lower the acceptance of the concerned commercial fisheries actors. 
 
Involvement of stakeholders is narrow in the Basque fisheries on the Western Shelf. As pointed out 
before, conservationists and other groups are not ivolved in the management process. The 
acceptance of stakeholders regarding the Basque government and its intervention in management is 
high. Low acceptance is found in relation to the second level of management for Basque fisheries, 
which is the central management by the Spanish government. Basque stakeholders seem to be 
disconformed with the management by the central government since they think it do not fully take 
into consideration the needs of the Basque fleet. Basque stakeholders argue that the central 
government has many fisheries to manage (diverse stakeholder involvement at national level) and 
cannot assure everybody’s satisfection. But the main complain of the Basque fisheries is what they 
call “low support from the central government” when validating the access of French fleet to 
anchovy through the widely criticised Arcachon Agreement. Moreover, Basque stakeholder sees the 
complexity of management in Europe as a problem to face Basque fisheries problems. In this 
context, the interviewed stakeholders see RACs as a good platform to express their ideas, give their 
advice and defend their rights, besides being a point f encounter with counterparts of other 
nationalities in a sort of platform for negotiation. To sum, in the case of the two Basque fisheries 
studied the hypotheses 3 is confirmed at national ad European level but not confirmed at local 
level. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Rights-based management systems restrict capacity for institutional learning. 
 
In the case of the industrial fleet, it seems that e RBM system has not impeded the fishery to adapt 
to changes in the fishery system. Thus institutional le rning has taken place regardless the RBM 
mechanisms introduced. Rights have evolved naturally since decommissioning of vessels produced 
an excess of effort rights (expressed in days at se) that needed to be transferred to other vessels 
within the census. The shift to transferability of rights (rights not been attached to the vessel) have 
allowed a more efficient distribution of rights. The recent introduction of a proper ITQ in the 
fishery has not been resisted, although seems to benot very palatable for some of the stakeholders 
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that have seen their effort rights absorved for the most effcient (e.g. Galician fleet). Thus it is likely 
that right will continue being gathered by the most effcient actors in detriment of the less efficent. 
Other major change that has been welcomed is the enancement of partcipation in the managment 
process at the EU level though RACs . Such a change has been welcomed since RACs are seen as a 
platform to defend their interests and to deliver advice to managers.  
 
In the case of the coastal fleet targeting anchovy in the Bay of Biscay, the management through 
rights has not impeded the fishery to adapt to the requirements of Brussels regarding participation in 
RACs, renewal of the fishing fleet and incorporation of measures on security on board. It is worth 
pointing out that Cofradias react as a single man to face challenges. They have an active voice when 
proposing the closure of the anchovy fishery because they see the recovery of this stock 
fundamental to the sustainability of the fishing activity. In this context, they have questioned the 
opening of the fishery even for the experimental camp ign carried out by commercial vessels in 
2007. To sum up, institutional learning seems not to be restricted by the territorial user rights 
(TURFs) approach since the sense of ownership of the resource encourages stakeholders to 
participate actively in the RACs and to find alternative and innovative measures to manage the 
stock. For example, the coastal sector is now involved together with scientists and managers in the 
development of a management plan for recovering the anchovy stock. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The more diverse the stakeholders involved in the development and/ or operation 
of a management system, the more institutional learning takes place. 
 
Stakeholders Involvement is quite narrow in the Basque fisheries. Conservationist groups, for 
example, do not participate and it is not a sport fishing sharing the resources. Besides stakeholders 
in both industrial and coastal fisheries it could be mentioned a third stakeholder, the government of 
the Basque country. It could be considered a stakehold r playing a meaningful role for the sake of 
Basque fisheries, which are conisdered as strategic to the Basque region. From the above it is 
notable that partcipation is narrow in the managment process of Basque fisheries. However, 
institutional learning have taken place in the lastyears in both fisheries This fact does not confirm 
the hypothesis above. Simple learning has taken place in both fisheries, for example, the swift 
adaptation to the new requirements of Brussels on mdernisation and withdrwal of fishing capacity, 
involvment in RACs and, in the particular case of the coastal fisheries, institutional learning at 
complex level when shifting objective from rent maximisation to resource protection. Coastal 
stakeholders were active in requesting the closure of the anchovy fishery and supportaitve to 
scientific advice even when it meant the indefinite closure of the fishery. Now they are activly 
involved in the development of the anchovy managment plan. Moreover, the swift reaction and 
opposition to what they perceived as a threat (e.g. experimental campaign spring 2007) has proved 
their high problem capacity.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Participation and access rights are not new for Basque fisheries. TURFs for anchovy and other 
pelagics have a long history in the Bay of Biscay. Participation is found in the traditional 
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organisation of the cofradias. Coastal and industrial Basque fisheries are involved in a wide process 
of participation. They are active in lobbying and participate actively in advice-giving within the 
boundaries of regional management and at the European level in the RACs where they have leading 
roles in the Southern Waters and the Pelagic RAC, in addition, they participate in the Distant Water 
and North Western Waters RACs. At national level, they see that their efforts to defend their rights 
encounter a bottle neck due to the Spanish State is not able or willing to take their claims into 
account due to the diverse national needs it has to ddress.  
 
Rights on inputs and outputs are also in place for Basque industrial fleets. Since early 1980s input 
quotas to operate in NEAFC grounds have been distributed among Basque and other regional fleets 
in the Spanish side of the Western Shelf. Rights have been allocated reproducing the status quo and 
have given facilities and advantages for retirement.  
 
Basque fisheries are complex and we can see that accept bility of rights management have not been 
as expected (see hypotheses section). The narrowness of actors’ representation in the processes may 
be due not only to the strength of fishermen’s rights t at could block conservationist to participate. 
It may be due to the lack of understanding on the rol of these groups in management what 
determines that there is not room for them in the thr e stages of fisheries management for Basque 
fisheries: the regional, the national and the Communitarian level. Theoretically, the rights-based 
management should be accepted due to rights hold historical components and provide exit 
compensation. However, they are not widely accepted due to other factors (e.g. lower running costs, 
managerial capacity) that may have determined the predominance of Galician fleet in terms of 
rights and number of vessels.  
 
Rights in the Basque fisheries in the form of TURFs for the anchovy and other pelagics and 
individual quotas for the fleet fishing in the NEAFC have not restricted institutional learning since 
these fleets have been evolving during the last twenty-five year. During the last decade they have 
adapted to the demands of Communitarian management of fisheries. RACs is seen as platform of 
participation and understood as a mechanism to speed up communication with Brussels. As a 
consequence, Basque fleets have representatives in four RACs. The evolution of transferability of 
rights for the Spanish fleet, the capacity for lobbying of the coastal fisheries and the openness to 
innovations (e.g. active participation in the design of the management plan for anchovy) show that 
institutional learning have not be restricted because of rights. It is possible that the ease in adapting 
to and accepting management innovations is motivated by the risk of collapse that experienced the 
hake fishery and the collapse experienced by the anchovy fishery. These two factors may have been 
one of the main components in triggering institutional learning. Institutional learning in this case 
may have not been caused by the diversity of stakehold rs because representation of groups is 
narrow and involves only fishermen groups. However, it is interesting to see that the regional 
government can be considered a stakeholder due to the efforts carried out to keep the wellbeing of 
the fishery. This may be one of the reasons of success for institutional learning in this fishery. 
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Appendix 5: Guidelines for interviews 
 
Context/background questions 
The aim of the interviews is to test the hypotheses. But a number of explorative questions are 
needed before we can test the hypotheses; we need to have some sort of basic idea of the field 
(depending on the literature some of this information can be obtained before going to the field).  
 
• How is the management system setup?  
• What is the history/development of the system? 
• What have been the ups and downs in history? 
• Which fisheries are important in the area? 
• Which species and which gear types are more important? 
• Which are the relevant institutions? 
• How are decisions made?  
• What are the processes/institutions behind the decisions?  
• Who can influence the process?  
• Who are the relevant stakeholders in the case?  
• How are the stakeholders organised? 
• How/where are they represented? 
• You will also need to ask some basic questions on the community (or communities), which 
is defining empirically the boundaries of your case study 
• Economic development / prospect of the fishery 
• And so on (please add more in your comments) 
 
Questions about the informant 
• Who is the informant?  
• Where does he/she work? In what kind of institution? Which role in the institution? 
• Personal background/education/ previous jobs 
 
Testing hypotheses 
We are going to talk to many different people in the field. And the questions asked have to be asked 
so they fit the situation (who you are talking to and what you want to know). I haven’t made a 
specific list of possible question but a framework ta ing a starting point in the hypothesis.  
 
The system below is fairly easy and systematic: Each hypothesis has been broken up to the key-
components. Under each component I have made suggestions for a number of questions/ways of 
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knowing/researching. The suggestions are based on our w rk in Pasaia. Some of the questions are 
duplicates; but the hypotheses are overlapping.  
 
HYPOTESIS 1  
Rights-based management systems tend not to have broad stakeholder representation 
 
RBM systems… 
• The basic questions should make a majority of input we need here.  
• what kind of rights are distributed 
• how does the system allocate the right 
• are the rights transferable / heritable  
• what are the consequences of this at the individual / community level? 
• how does the RBM system in question operate on a daily b sis 
• etc 
 
… tend not to have broad stakeholder representation 
• Who are the relevant stakeholders in the case? - (or wh  is involved and who is perceived as 
relevant?  
o Commercial fisheries interests: primary interests (harvesters – industrial, small-scale, 
subsistence etc.; gear types; nationality) and secondary interest (processors, 
marketing, other businesses directly depending on the fisheries business – boat 
builders, gear suppliers, chandlers…) 
o Fisheries management: managers and scientists/ advisors 
o Non-commercial interests: Conservation NGOs; community and family; 
recreational/ angling interests; consumers  
o Other commercial interests related to the marine enviro ment: aquaculture; oil, 
energy, tourism etc. 
• How/where are they represented? 
• How are the stakeholders organised? 
• How do the stakeholders collaborate internally? 
• Do the stakeholders respect each other/each others stake? 
• What are the processes/institutions behind the decision-making?  
• Who is involved in decision-making? 
• Who else can influence the process? How? 
 
HYPOTESIS 2 
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Commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a (RB) management system will be a function of the 
extent to which 
a) the management system is perceived by the fishermen to be practical83 [and necessary] 
b) the management system (in RBM: the initial alloction) reproduced the status quo of fishing 
opportunities when introduced 
c) new entrants are facilitated  
d) retirement options are provided for 
 
Commercial fisheries actors’ acceptance of a (RB) management system  
• Do the commercial fishermen accept the RBM system? 
• Does the system have general support from the fishermen? 
• Do they comply with the RBM system’s rules? 
• Do they engage in it? 
• In that case; which parts of the system are they engaged in? 
 
... will be a function of the extent to which a) the management system is perceived by the fishermen 
to be practical [and necessary]; 
• Discuss the every day practises with the commercial a tors 
o Where do they face obstacles? 
o Where does the system work smoothly? 
 
… b) the management system (in RBM: the initial allocation) reproduced the status quo of fishing 
opportunities when introduced... 
• This is something we should know from our background studies. 
• Otherwise we can ask relevant people of the developments. 
• Has the initial allocation been made on the basis of historical catch? Was construction of the 
baseline (years to be included) contentious? Why? (e.g. because it excluded some interested 
parties) 
• Is the equitable? If not why not? Can all fishery participants take part in the RBM system, or 
are some excluded (e.g. on grounds of vessel size delineation, see Case Study Alaska)? How 
did those excluded react? 
• What are the consequences (possible consequences) of exclusion?  
 
…c) new entrants are facilitated 
                                                
83 e.g. is transparent; not too complicated; no necessity to break the rules; easy to monitor so that others are prevented 
from cheating etc. 
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• Find out how new entrants are facilitated 
• Ask the fishermen how they think issues of new entrants should be facilitated in the system.  
• Ask the fishermen if they are happy with the systems for newcomers. 
 
…d) retirement options are provided for 
• Find out if the system can provide retirement 
• If so, find out how the retirements are provided 
• Ask the fishermen how they think issues of retirement should be facilitated in the system.  
• Ask the fishermen if they are happy with the systems for retirement 
• What happens to the right when somebody dies? (heritable/reallocated?)  
 
HYPOTESIS 3 
The more diverse the stakeholder involvement84 i  the development and /or operation of a 
management system, the lower the acceptance of the conc rned commercial fisheries actors. 
 
The more diverse the stakeholder involvement in the development and /or operation of a 
management system … 
• Who are the relevant stakeholders in the case?  
o Commercial fisheries interests: primary interests (harvesters – industrial, small-scale, 
subsistence etc.; gear types; nationality) and secondary interest (processors, 
marketing, other businesses directly depending on the fisheries business – boat 
builders, gear suppliers, chandlers…) 
o Fisheries management: managers and scientists/ advisors 
o Non-commercial interests: Conservation NGOs; community and family; 
recreational/ angling interests; consumers  
o Other commercial interests related to the marine enviro ment: aquaculture; oil, 
energy, tourism etc. 
• How/where are they represented? 
• How are the stakeholders organised? 
• How do the stakeholders collaborate internally? 
• Do the stakeholders respect each other/each others stake? 
• What are the processes/institutions behind the decision-making?  
• Who can influence the process?  
 
                                                
84 E.g. greens, processors, communities - but also other parts of the fishing industry. 
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… the lower the acceptance of the concerned commercial fisheries actors. 
• Participation of the stakeholders in the management regime  
o Are the stakeholders engaged  
o Do the stakeholders attend relevant meetings? 
• Views expressed by various stakeholders:  
o positive, neutral, negative 
o Do the stakeholders recommend other fishery actors to adopt their system?  
o Future prospects: What changes/ adaptations would they like to see in the system? 
• Actions taken by the stakeholders (against a management regime, e.g. protest, lawsuits) as 
well as (non-) compliance with / infringements of the management regime 
 
HYPOTESIS 4 
Rights-based management systems restrict capacity for institutional learning  
 
Rights-based management systems  
• Please see under hypothesis 1. 
 
… restrict capacity for institutional  
• At the process level:  
o General: 
 What do you consider the most important learning effects in the evolution of 
the RBM system? 
o Simple learning (i.e. the attempt to more effectively achieve existing objectives):  
 What were the prime objectives that the stakeholders wanted to attain 
through introducing the RBM system? 
 Was the system changed over time to better achieve thes  goals? How? 
 What were the causes of these adaptations? Why was the original system not 
effective in addressing its goals?  
 Were these changes contentious? 
 Did the changes succeed, i.e. indeed lead to a greater attainment of the 
original objectives (in the perception of the stakeholders)?  
o Complex learning (i.e. changes in goals): 
 Did the stakeholders over time associate the RBM system with new 
objectives, and how were these institutionalised?/ Has the RBM system 
changed its objectives? 
 What were the causes of these changes in objectives? (changes in ecosystem, 
economic/ social/ political/ cultural conditions…) 
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 Were these changes contentious? 
 Did the changes succeed, i.e. indeed lead to a greater attainment of the 
original objectives (in the perception of the stakeholders)? 
• At the outcome-level:  
o High vs. low problem-solving capacity: 
 Did the institutional changes ‘solve’ (in the perception of the stakeholders) 
the problem successfully or not? [overlap with above] 
 
HYPOTESIS 5 
The more diverse the stakeholders involved in the development and/or operation of a management 
system, the more institutional learning takes place 
 
The more diverse the stakeholders involved in the development and/or operation of a management 
system  
• See above 
 
…the more institutional learning takes place 
• At the process level 
o What do you consider the most important learning effects in the evolution of the 
RBM system? 
o Simple learning (i.e. the attempt to more effectively achieve existing objectives):  
 What were the prime objectives that the stakeholders wanted to attain 
through introducing the RBM system? 
 Was the system changed over time to better achieve thes  goals? How? 
 What were the causes of these adaptations? Why was the original system not 
effective in addressing its goals?  
 Were these changes contentious? 
 Did the changes succeed, i.e. indeed lead to a greater attainment of the 
original objectives (in the perception of the stakeholders)?  
o Complex learning (i.e. changes in goals): 
 Did the stakeholders over time associate the RBM system with new 
objectives, and how were these institutionalised?/ Has the RBM system 
changed its objectives? 
 What were the causes of these changes in objectives? (changes in ecosystem, 
economic/ social/ political/ cultural conditions…) 
 Were these changes contentious? 
 Did the changes succeed, i.e. indeed lead to a greater attainment of the 
original objectives (in the perception of the stakeholders)? 
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• At the outcome-level 
o High vs. low problem-solving capacity: 
 Did the institutional changes ‘solve’ (in the perception of the stakeholders) 
the problem successfully or not? [overlap with above] 
  
 
